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If in the context of Plato's Theory of Justice, the,
important Greek term eU~O€lcnf!had been inadequat~ly
its meaning would as a result have been insufficiently
comprehensively rendered, in English and other translations of
the Republic in particular, and the Platonic dialogues in
general - with serious consequences.
thesis that this has been the case.
It is contended in this
b. The second and principal contention of the thesis
is that owing to this inadequate evaluation and the resultant
unsatisfactory renderings, Plato's Theory of Justice itself has
been inadequately evaluated. The outcome of this has been
serious because, through it, the whole basis of nan's motivation
for activity at all (and it Qust be stressed that without activ-
ity there can of course be neither justice nor injustice) has
inevitably been glossed over as though it were .of ,no account.
c • The term eU~OE1Cnf, it is correspondingly argued, is
used by Plato to cenote, as the second of,three sectors constit-
uting the soul (the other two being the logistic and the appet-
itive), a morally neutral energy-potential. The meaning
virtually uniforRly assigned to it by English translators (others
closely correspond, and are accordingly not quoted) is "spirite~"
(in substantive ferm "spirit", "spiritedness", etc.). Yet this
term has, in the moral sphere, exclusively "favourable" connot-
ations. If, as the thesis further and crucially proposes to
demonstrate, the eU~OE1Cnf elenent is overall the major source
of "drive" for all man's activity, it cannot be a purely favour-
able force.
iii
If it were) there could be no injustice. It must)
overall) be a broader entity. And if - as) it is hoped) may
further be shown - it has at different points different nuances)
varying between the morally highly_ favourable through neutral
to highly unfavourable) these must be given their full individual
force at each such point.
cl • When this is done) and we observe that) on all the
Platonic "levels") Justice is a Harmony) it is found that this
Harffiony is produced by due logistic control not of some anomalous
"force") amouliting to some mysterious "whim" of Ulan to act in
one way or another) but of a clear-cut) irrepressible energy-
source conferrec. upon hin by the Deity. As one important result
of this)
,
the nature of the suprenely ~Iilportant entity EpwJ is
explained. It is that combination of ~oYla~lK6v and eU~OE16ff
(the ~oYla~lK6v being fused with) and "fired" by) the eU~OE16ff)
by whos~ agency nan strives towards the ultimate Good. Ultiaate
Justice then becomes the har~onious
,
functioning of fpwJ) working
,
toeether with the subordinate aid of the appetitive (tTIleU~n~lK6v)
sector) through which ultinate Good is attained. If basically
neutral dynamism of the eU~OE16ff firing the ~OYla~lK6v is
. , '.. fposltea to account for the varying success of EpW ) Plato's
T~eory of Justice becoses far more rationally consisteGt than it
has yet been shown to be.
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INTRODUCTION
a) The central postulate of the thesis is that Plato's Theory
of Justice is fuller than the traditional accounts allow it to
be. The crucial omission of the latter is a comprehensive
description of the 8UUOE18ff('thumoeidic') sector of the soul.
Traditionally, as the 'middle' of the soul's three sectors, it
is the 'Will to Contend'. But on Plato's express indication
it is also the source of absolute drive to action. Traditionally,
lOG is tic, t ):-, u m0 e i Co i c, and a ppet i t i ve s:~ c tor s t h r u s t the i n [~i v i -
(~ual into, respectively, l03is:~ic, t~lu!}oeicic, or al:>petitive
behaviour. Each also does so at apparently unspecified
intervals, and for unspecified reasons. But Plato implicitly
suggests first that the 8UUOE18€f does so constantly and
irresistibly, and second that it affects both other sectors.
Traditionally, the thrust seems an incidental affair. In fact,
it appears as though, if the individual chose to do nothing at
all permanently, he could. But on Plato's clear suggestion,
this is impossible. Man, on his thesis, is inevitably involved
in dynamic existence.
b) This being so, the effect on Plato's Theory of Justice is
drastic. For Plato has shown that only justice is profitable.
And he states that only ordinary intellect is required to
understand this. Every man will therefore wish to act justly.
However, he will only achieve that justice if he knows how to
channel his drive. And, for this to happen, superior intellect
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becomes vital. For in certain situations it can take a great
deal more than normal intelligence to determine what exactly is
just. And few people possess this degree of intelligence. On
the other hand; given the additional knowledge outlined in
'(a)', the circumstances are seriously qualifi~d. For by
virtue of the awareness that he must inevitably act, man can
plan ahead. If he has prior knowledge that an irresistible
force constantly accumulating within him has to be catered for,
he can prearrange its expenditure. He can avoid mistakes.
Instead of being forced impromptu into indiscriminate conduct,
he can devise ethically acceptable behaviour patterns. These
patterns may well be trivial.
from unjust.
But this will be very different
c) That the thumoeidic element should have this character
becomes readily acceptable on consideration of Plato's concept
~ Jof €Pw • For it was said above that traditionally the logistic,
thumoeidic and appetitive ('epithumetic') sectors thrust the
individual into action 'for no specific reason'. It could well
have been asked whether any specific reason existed for the
absolute thrust of eU~O€lO€J. The reason, in Plato's terms,
would arguably be this. The Deniourgos (deity) could have
created nothing but perfect Ideas. Instead, he chose to create
imperfect objects as well. Yet perfection, Plato conceived
with Pythagoras, must be the desired ultimate aim. He (Plato)
therefore concluded that the deity had an aim in harmony with
this. The deity (we may fairly term the Demiourgos Plato's
'God'), in his view, regarded the true and proper function of
- 3 -
all beings as €pwf, the struggle towards perfection.
with so much in common with €pwf, embodies one of its features.
It is a divinely created source of ethically neutral energy. As
such, it" fuels the ethically positive process of ~pwf.
d) The findings summarised in paragraph 'a)' are in strong
contrast with scholars' interpretations so far. To begin with,
the term 'eu~o€l6€f' is almost universally, in English
translations, rendered 'spirited'. This word has no trace of
morally "unfavourable' purport. Nor are English translations by
any means the sole ones involved. Leading German, French and
Italian versions are found to give the word exactly the same
tone. But if the term 'eu~o€l6€f' denotes something that can
lead to unjust as well as to either neutral or just activity,
this rendering is not adequate. The word cannot consistently be
translated into terms which have none but 'favourable'
connotations. The terms by which it is rendered must, on due
occasion, have certain baser aspects incorporated into them.
Yet these (with some notable exceptions referred to later) are
never introduced. The eU~O€lo£J' explicit capacity for
fuelling evil is minimised. Quite apart from what it means in
the Republic, however, it appears that the general contemporary
Greek sense of the word eu~o€l6€f was by no means purely
favourable. Indeed, it had a strong vein of 'anger', or
'passion'. Evidence will be provided that that vein was far
stronger than 'spirited' can even begin to convey.
- 4 -
e) The conclusion from these considerations is readily arrived
at. Plato has said a great deal more about Justice (the
ultimate 'balance') than has so far been suspected. In
postulating a perpetual thrust intrinsic in the "Will to
Contend", he has provided for a Theory of Aggression. A new
Theory of Justice, on revolutionarily modern lines, follows.
He has shown that eU~o€lo€f inexorably accumulates, and that
random action occurs unless the individual knows enough to
channel his thumoeidic force justly. If these things are so,
and the extreme form of injustice is lethal aggression,
thumoeidic misdirection includes war. The inevitable corollary
of the finding is as follows. If channelling of the eU~OElO€f
is knowledgeably and systematically carried out, neither
injustice nor war will occur at all.
f) The chief fields for exploration in an attempt to obtain
proof that Plato made this postulate are threefold. First, the
internal evidence for the significance of eU~o€lo€f in his
texts. Second, the dialectical relationship of the respective
parts of the soul with each other. Finally, the
relationships between the various typologies of
soul-sector, man, social unit, and transcendental form. The
relationships with the soul, and with one another in turn, in
regard to Justice and the Cosmos follow in order. The separate
parts of the soul can of course only properly be seen in the
overall context of the Platonic dialectical whole. And this
will entail that any concepts cccurrin8 outside the iBmediate
material of the dialogues can only be given secondary
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importance. Lexicographical and other relatively "external"
evidence may be highly illuminating, but however much this may
be so, it must be subsidiary to the textual.
g) The overall plan of the thesis is, accordingly, as
follows. A historical background chapter is inserted at the
outset. The purpose this fulfils is to place the study as a
whole in its concrete perspective. still, in its capacity as a
mere introduction to the central topic, this chapter lays no
claim to represent original research. And second, even the
philological and quasi-philological material of the second
chapter is illustrative rather than demonstrative. It is the
ensuing comparisons in that chapter of the various senses of
the word that are most important. Following them, and
comparable in importance, is the analysis in chapters three and
four of their bearing on the dialectical structure created out
of them. These have a special role in linking up the various
typologies of soul sectors, human genera, etc. For the
remarks made about the thumoeidic faculty and its importance in
the particular context of the thesis have one special
qualification. They cannot be seen in any light other than
that of Plato's actual dialectic as a whole.
h) Reviewing the topic from a more present-day standpoint,
several considerations present" themselves.
i) The chief problem presented by war, namely its
apparent habit of periodic recurrence, has led to much
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modern literature on Aggression. One table given by a
modern historian (Toynbee, A.J., A Study of History, vol.
IX) shows cycles of war and peace over randomly chosen
periods among randomly chosen peoples. This table has
possibly been one of the earliest pointers in the later
20th Century to the thesis that the generating of war is
more an affair of physiology than 'moral' decision.
Ardrey, Lorenz, Morris are other exponents of man's
behavioural syndromes in this direction.
ii) In the light of this modern material, one is abruptly
brought face to face in Plato with the term eU~O£lQ€J
f
-.the
angry",' "passionate" .As if this concept 'were now not electri-
fying enough, it appears in an' obviously .special context as the
'drive' sector .. of the-mind. The suspicion that one has met with
a Platonic Theory of Aggression becomes virtually a certainty.
iii) Granted this, however, it might be asked in what the
alleged philosophical, as opposed to merely scientific,'
interest of the thumoeidic* lies? What, it could well be
inquired, has war to do with Philosophy? The answer to
this seems unequivocal. In as far as Philosophy has to do
,
with man's ethical behaviour, it must concern itself with
any serious deviations apparent in that. In regard
specifically to war, Plato reveals that it is a product of
the thumoeidic. The position the thumoeidic must assume in
the scheme of his ethics therefore becomes unique.
* (Used synonymously with eU~o£lQnf)
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iV) The philosophical interest of the thumoeidic then lies
chiefly in the moral implications which a duly modified
rendering of the word must carry. If men cannot help being
thrust into action by it, there will now be a doubt as to
how "guilty" they are if unaware that they are being so
thrust. The logical connexion between the eU~OElO€f and
the other two parts of the tripartite soul will in any
event be altered drastically. So will the ethical
consequences implied by that changed version. That it has
hitherto been inadequately translated now becomes an
obvious and leading consideration.
v) Moreover, its interest is not limited to this aspect
of inquiry. The whole structure of Plato's philosophy,
amongst others his Principle of Identity and Concept of
Forms, is involved. For we have seen that the thumoeidic,
as the fundamental driving force to which men, society and
the universe owe their dynamism, is at the basis of ~pwf.
And ~pwf in turn is not only at the basis of the very
existence of these entities, but also the process by which
man strives towards the supremely important goal - the
Good. The thumoeidic is the 'springboard' of that
process. It thereby becomes the concept showing the
closest affinity with ~pwf - the latter being perhaps the
most formidable of all terms encountered in Plato's
philosophy.
vi) As was seen above, the mind consists, on Plato's
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tripartite principle, of three sectors: intellectual,
hot-tempered*, and appetitive. These are termed variously
AOYlaTlK6v, eU~oE16fJ, lTIleU~nTlK6v; or again ~lAo~aefJ,
~lA6vIKOV, ~lAoKEP6~J, etc. '£pwJ is not explicitly
included among them. We can accordingly take it to be
either made up of a combination of fractions of them, or
alternately a divine infusion into them. But if the
Divinity meant man to struggle towards the Good, it is not
likely that he would have implanted in him inadequate means
of doing so. It is, after all, solely by means of the
faculties given him by the Demiourgos that man glimpses the
Good at all, let alone struggles towards it. We might
rather guess that 'fpwJ (though earlier as a philosophical
concept than any of them) is in practice a simple or
fractionated compound of two or more of the soul's
sectors. If so, we must include in those sectors the
aspiration towards ultimate Good. This is acceptable
enough, since Plato makes the search for Good a matter of
knowledge, which is covered by the logistic sector. 'fpwJ,
then, could be taken simply as a compound of at any rate
predominantly thumoeidic and logistic. On the other hand,
if that seems too facile, we may think of it as some such
combination touched with the divine inspiration. It seems
less likely that it should be identical with anyone
sector. Still, if finally we took it to be such, the
thumoeidic touched by that inspiration would cover most
conceivable requirements.
* This rendering is used anticipatorily.
- 9 -
vii) Nevertheless, whichever way it is seen, ~pwI is
positive for good. And here lies the essential difference
between it and the thumoeidic. For the thumoeidic, although
perhaps overall, by the Platonic synthesis, more inclined
towards good than evil, can promote evil as well as good,
and ~pwI is never associated with evil. The thumoeidic
appears in its more obvious Platonic context specifically
as the primarily good-orientated energy-source. The
logistic may still sway it in whatever direction it sees
fit. But more commonly it chooses a good rather than a bad
direction. (It is in a less obvious context that we see it
as the neutral energy-source, which will operate whether so
swayed or not.)
If, we found, the logistic is defective, it will not
have the wisdom to recognise the Good. It will not know
how to get it, or even that it is worth getting. A
critical issue arises at this point. Since this thumoeidic
power incessantly accumulates, and by its accumulation
forces its own expenditure, effective and just means of
channelling it must be found. Yet these can only be found
by the sufficiently intelligent being. But, more than
that, this channelling must, of course, also be for
application not only to the intelligent, but to the
insufficiently intelligent, man. The latter must, indeed,
be coerced into correct activity, if other persuasion
fails. There must, in short, be state organisation by the
intelligent of activities leading to sufficient, just
expenditure of thumoeidic resources.
viii)
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The connexion of these findings with ~pwJ and
the overall Platonic view is of course critically import-
ant. Taking tpwJ provisionally as a blend of thumoeidic
with logistic, we can say that the logistic provides both
the intelligence necessary to realise that the Good is
pre-eminently worth seeking, and the know-how to find ways
of attaining it. The thumoeidic provides the drive to
prize it vigorously and carry on the search for it. A new
light is hereby shed on €pwJ The thumoeidic is not
merely a 'spirited' element, to be employed wholly
voluntarily by its possessor. It cannot be 'switched
,
on ,
so to speak, or 'switched off' at will. In just the same
way, 'f~wJ is irrepressibly dynamic. It must be "catered
for". This last characteristic is noted by both early
philosopher-scientists, and by Plato, as one of the
greatest, if not the greatest, mysteries of nature.
Undoubtedly it will have been inferred by them from the
persistent, constantly upsurging energy of the natural
animal. But observation of cosmic forces such as tides,
volcanoes, etc. will have caused them to read it further
into the cosmos. Later they introduced it into the social
unit, ultimately the transcendent world of abstracts. Some
probably read it back from the natural phenomena into man.
But, whatever the case, the erotic element takes over from
that earliest energy concept a feature of perpetuity, of
never-ending recurrence of thrusting force and dynamism
towards the high ultimate goal.
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ix) Referring back from the force of Epwl to its simpler
version in the thumoeidic element, we rehearse once more
the main conclusions of the present thesis. These are that,
since TO eU~O€lc€l accumulates incessantly, action is in-
evitable and permanent inaction inconceivable, and that,
if the unbridled, ultimately explosive force of TO
eU~O€lc€l is not to materialise in brutish and lethal war,
higher intellects must be applied to channelling
that action. The eternally self-regenerating thumoeidic
'hot-temper' must be harnessed, in '€pwl , to attain ap€Tn -
the supreme power to attain, in turn, the ultimate Good.
Justice is of course incorporated in that Good. The




A BRIEF PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF THE INFLUENCE OF MYTHOLOGICAL AND
FOLKLORISTIC SOURCES ON PLATO'S CONCEPT OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL,
AND THE CONCEPT eU~o€lo€f IN PARTICULAR
a.l SOURCES
Plato's concept of the soul was necessarily moulded in the
circumstances in which life was lived in 5th - 4th Century
Greece. This meant that it was moulded under the potential
influence of the mythology and folklore current at the time. By
this stage of Greek culture, one might have suspected that
ancient prehistoric and traditional beliefs were on their way
out.
This was by no means the case. On the contrary, they were
rife. A short list of their objects would include powers such
as Dionysos controlling the crops (and so, indirectly, Life),
Hades controlling Death, theories of Reincarnation (or
Metempsychosi~, (Palinrenesis)such as the Pythagorean, Orphicl,
etc., and finally worship of the gods in general. Cults and
superstitions of this pattern were universally popular.
Amongst other things, they rationalised Life and Death as a
detailed cycle, and primordial forces such as these still meant
a great deal to the Greeks. For even the sophisticated
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townspeople were scientifically uninformed. Storms, disease,
crop failure were no less unaccountable to them than to the
peasants of the countryside. They made no sense except as
divine inflictions. We cannot be surprised, then, if, as Plato
himself bears witness 2 , the rule of mythology and folklore was
exceedingly powerful. Admittedly the younger generation were
beginning to regard much myth as old wives' tales 3 . Among the
common people 4 , however, belief in and reverence for it had an
undiminished strength. This was mirrored in several solidly
real phenomena. A few samples of these would be the current
popularity of drama, tragic and comic; a religious conformism
harsh enough to lead to the execution of Socrates on religious
grounds alone; and finally the universal terror and indignation
resulting from the notorious Mutilation of the Hermai (Athenian
household gods). The violence of reaction to this last 5 am6ng
the Athenians, proletariat and nobles alike, was so phenomenal
as to strain belief. One may perhaps best just quote
Thucydides' report. Once blame for the mutilation had been
fixed on Alcibiades, the whole monumental failure of the
Sicilian expedition of 415 B.C. was, Thucydides tells us, put
down to this sacrilege.
a.2 THEIR INFLUENCE ON PLATO.
To what extent Plato consciously allowed himself to be
influenced by myth is a harder question. Still, it can to Some
extent be learned from his own writings. His knowledge of myth
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was certainly very wide. Socrates condemns much tradition and
folklore out of hand as fantastic and degenerate 6 • But not
only do the many traces of myth found in the dialogues form
evidence that Plato (and probably Socrates) treated certain of
the more familiar legends very seriously. Plato himself
actually refers to them as accounts handed down by our
forefathers "who are now wrongly disbelieved* by many"7. Other
possible sources from which he might have drawn for his
material concerning the soul included the Presocratic
philosophers. Prior to all these were, however, a considerable
fund of established religious and chthonic institutions. To
those listed above, we could here add the Eleusinian Mysteries
(strongly if diffusely connected with Dionysiac ritual), and
the rites of Demeter and Persephone. These stand at the head of
many cults of other deities intimately affecting human physical
survival. Last but not least, and providing the bulk of
available enlightment on all the aforementioned, come the
Homeric and Hesiodic Epics.
a.3 A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE
DIONYSOS CULT, REINCARNATION, THE ELEUSINIAN
MYSTERIES, AND ORPHISM.
First and foremost, the above-mentioned elements provided
material for a theory of the Underworld. It was not a very
precise theory. As far as concepts of 'spirit' and 'mind' went,
*(my underlining)
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it seemed to be summed up in the general belief that the dead had
their being nerely as a kind of 'strengthless,8 semi-solid 9 •
(Importantly, they were not totally insubstantial spirits.)
These smoke-like versions of men's previous selves then
apparently roamed throughout eternity the asphodel-strewn
marches of Hades. It was a perhaps fanciful belief.
Nevertheless it was a plausible one, and from it we can trace
later, and in particular Platonic, theory through a natural
progression. The shades of the dead were substantial enough to
be visible to a person such as Odysseus who happened to gain
access to the Underworld. Yet they were not substantial in a
normal sense lO • That was convincing. The body of a person was
irrefutably, visibly, earth-bound after death. Only abstract
"life" had left it. Yet even life (taken as virtually
synonymous with breath) was not totally abstract. Air blown
from the lungs carried a palpable force, and on cold mornings
was p~ysically visible as smoke. The concept of smoky,
wraith-like shapes (forms?) of the dead, which these 'shades'
were, also carried a logically sound ring. More than that, it
functioned as a stepping stone to the concept of the
all-but-insubstantial, because maximally attenuated, soul. And
from here it extended to mind and reason, which by the
Pythagorean doctrine would only be separated from the soul as
universal ingredients, the soul 'itself' being individual to
its possessor ll . Ultimately, as has been apprehended, it would
reach the stage of maximal attenuation. This would be the
guise proper to the Ideas themselves.
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It would accord with this that the soul was taken by Plato
as of more or less equal insubstantiality with mind and reason,
since its affinity with the Ideas makes it virtually indistin-
guishable in kind from them. The point should be made here,
however, that this near-abstraction of the Ideas
('unseen', &6PULOvl 2 , and 'unperceived', avuloenLov13 ) is still
only a "near-abstraction". The ruling Greek concept of the
cosmos was one involving continuous matter (~An). The
postulate of a so-to-speak cosmic essence, together with
Parmenidean-type arguments that 'nothing cannot exist', will
have ruled out a concept of total abstraction.
a.4 THE DOCTRINE OF REINCARNATION.
Plato's conception of the soul is in great part traceable
to Pythagoreanism. The fact that speech was the vehicle of
thought will early on have led to the conclusion touched on
above that the breath in which speech was contained was also
insubstantial - in as far at any rate as it was capable of
being invisible. By virtue of this property it was then
accepted as being also indestructible and eternal 14 . A
situation will then have presented itself in which two things
had to be assumed. First, the human body when alive must
possess a minimally material soul. Second, if the body died,
the soul, unable to die with it, must remain an unfixed
wanderer through the universe.
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The idea that the soul roamed at large was one
possibility. That it could fuse with a 'universal' soul was
another. But, whichever of these doctrines was believed, there
was a further difficulty. For if each new creature born
obtained a new soul, this would entail an infinite increase in
the number of souls. Without a simultaneous increase in the
size of the so-to-speak 'psychic' cosmos, which does not seem to
have been envisaged, it was straining common reason to suppose
that new souls could continue to be manufactured indefinitely.
And, besides this difficulty, there was another. It lay in the
implication, mentioned above, that the souls of deceased
persons continued to exist in an 'unattached' state. That is,
that they could be supposed to drift eternally through the
cosmos without any apparent function.
The answer to both these problems was simple. It was to
conclude that every soul, on the death of the physical being
that housed it, eventually entered a new-born physical being.
It might wander for an unspecified time before doing so, but in
the end it found a suitable recipient. No new being ever
possessed, so to speak, a 'new' soul. The primordial one which
entered it, however, remaining with it until its physical
death, then continued on its way through multiple existences
until it reached moral perfection. Presumably it then, at some
later unspecified stage, began its journey over again, but this
was a pedantic rounding-off of the theory which received corres-
pondingly little attention.
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a.5 ORPHISM.
The perfect soul was nevertheless scheduled to find its
eventual haven. Orphic doctrine, handling this problem, and
fundamental to Plato's theory of the after-life, was mainly
exemplified in the Eleusinian Mysteries. These perhaps went no
further than to maintain the soul's mere survival, together
with its arrival at this divine destination. Still, more
important than details of this last was the possible, indeed
probable, adjunct of happiness for those who had lived
virtuously.
Orphism made use of the Dionysos cult, but was also
regarded as the forerunner of Pythagoreanism. It was,
moreover, to a large extent recorded. The early Orphic poems
are unfortunately lost, so that late sources alone can be
consulted, but among these Plato himself lists six l5
generations of Orphic cosmogony. He speaks further of the
'Titanic' (i.e. sinful) nature of man. (The Titans, themselves16
incinerated by Zeus' bolt for their sin in killing and
devouring Dionysos, were taken to have supplied, by means of
their ashes, the substance originating man.) However, the
doctrine of re-entry of souls set free by death into new bodies
beginning a new life was not dependent on this. It was a
natural rationalisation, even without the clear evidence of
material reality. New bodies were of course in any case not
strictly 'new', but built up from the dust of the earth formed
by previously live matter. The theory covering this was no
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doubt earlier than Pythagoras, but he emended and expanded it.
The ancient and modern debt to Pythagoras is indeed
overwhelming. In as far as his influence relates to Plato and
the present inquiry, he is, according to Burkert 17 , 'the
hierophant of Great Mother mysteries with an Anatolian stamp,
and has a new doctrine, probably influenced by Indo-Iranian
sources, of immortality and of the triumph over death through
successive rebirths'. The Iranians themselves had not produced
a very elaborate theory of reincarnation. Pythagoras, in fact,
remains the only likely immediate source of the doctrine, his
own probable source being the Indians. Refinements on it, such
as questions of the transmigration, or even presence, of souls
in animals 18 or plants, and of inter-transmigration between
these and humans, are harder to trace. Plato's use of animals
at all as representatives of parts of the soul is a question of
considerable interest l 9. An immediately important' feature,
however, of the Pythagorean legacy used by Plato is the
mysticism surrounding number. Especially relevant is the
number three 20 • And in particular relation to it, we have the
division of the soul, the so-called "tripartite" division, into
three sectors. This question receives a brief treatment under
the next heading.
a.6 SOME FURTHER ASPECTS OF PYTHAGOREANISM, AND PLATO'S
CONTACT WITH IT.
According to Alexander of Aphrodisias 2l , commenting on
I - 20 -
Aristotle's book on the Pythagoreans, the Pythagoreans took the
number one to be vou! (mind), two to be c6~a (opinion), and
three "the whole". These echoed the trio beginning, middle and
end. Every whole would, therefore, initially tend to be
conceived of as composed of three rather than any other number
of parts. It cannot be questioned that Plato attributed an
inherent significance to numbers. A single passage in the
Republic alone 22 puts this beyond doubt. But in his division
of the soul there seems more than the simple desire to make the
number three 'fit'. There is more, that is, than a simple
insistence on a "half-way mark" (here eU~OEICf!) between two
obviously distinct parts of the soul, reason and appetite. The
fact that in the subdivision of citizen types into three:
intellectuals, soldiers, and workers, he finds it necessary to
add a 'superintellectual'23 group, proves the integrity of his
approach. He was not inclined to pursue mysticism at the
expense of science. The opposite was, indeed, more consistent
with his policy. He took number as a higher entity, but with which
facts mi~ht conform, not on which they should be modelled.'
a.7 In the case of the tripartite division of the soul,
there was already extant a Pythagorean thesis which distin-
guished three types of person: buyers-and-sellers,
competitors, and thinkers 2 4. These of course exactly
correspond with the Platonic classification. The divine origin
of the soul was even more widely affirmed. Pindar had asserted
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it 2 5. Anaximenes had designated the soul as air, and air as
God. Of the Pythagoreans specifically, Timaeus maintains that
the only eternal, genuinely existing things are vonal!,
thought, and Aoye!, reason, which the Demiourgos then infused
into the ~uxn, thus making that eterna1 26 , and combining it
with the body, which was not. The Pythagoreans had in
addition, by the 6th Cent. B.C., developed an ethical theory of
rebirth27 • This probably emanated from the Eleusinian
Mysteries 28. And these, concordantly with Orphism, definitely
promised the possibility of a happier lot in the after-life.
It is the Pythagorean variant of Orphism that is
encountered in Plato, as it is in Pindar, Empedocles, and
Herodotus 29 . The basic principle of this variant was that a
soul, consisting of attenuated substance, entered the
physically more 'solid' substance of an animal or human, and
there formed the thinking agency which guided that body through
physical life. This provides one reason why Pythagoras demands
abstinence from living things 30 (and even avoidance of
association with butchers and hunters). During this life, the
spirit's constant aim was to transcend the merely physical
traits of matter with which it had become associated.
Appetite, greed, anger, and lust had to be subjugated. This
was done with a view to attaining an ultimate state of
perfection in which AOYo! rules. But this process of striving
towards perfection was very difficult. Ordinarily it was not
to be achieved in less than a great many lifetimes. This was why
the soul, haVing left one body, would be compelled to enter
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another3 1 , and again yet another. And it continued to do so
until it had totally risen above the domination of gross matter.
a.8 Plato's life-long friencship with the Pythagorean
Archytas of Tarentum is well worth observing for another
reason. Archytas was both mathematician and theoretician of
music. In this context, the view of music taken by the
scientists may be seen in a far clearer light. It is so much
more evidently the experience in which the Dionysiac (vigorous
without rationality, and so virtually thumoeidic), and the
Apollinian (rational, or logistic), become fused. It was
discovered moreover by the Pythagoreans that music constituted
an excellent means of purging the soul. In this we detect a
forerunner not only of Aristotelean Ka8apolf, but of Plato's
stress upon consistent types of music as an absolute necessity
for maintaining a consistent Republic. Archytas' friendship
with Plato and his influence with Dionysios of Syracuse was
extremely strong; strong enough indeed to prompt and enable him
to procure Plato's release from prison in Syracuse32. And
there is no doubt that Pythagorean doctrine in general enjoyed
wide currency and respect at the time.
Plato's own actual references to Pythagoras himself number,
in fact, one only33. But he speaks respectfully of the
Pythagoreans at all ti mes 34, talks seriously with them when he
happens to meet them 35, and occasionally seems to reflect their
doctrines quite explicitly in his own dialectic. We have, for
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instance, Aristotle, followed by several others, e.g. Cicero,
Apuleius; maintaining that at this or that point 'ITAaTwv
~ ,
TIUeayopl~El (Plato is 'pythagorizing')36. At the same time,
of the three sectors.
Aristotle himself has left substantial material distinguishing
Pythagorean and Platonic doctrines. Overall it seems clear
that Plato's reliance on them, although immense, was by no
means unqualified.
His closest contact with them began during his visit to
Magna Graecia and Sicily in 387B.C., when he was already
fort y 37. Even at this time the reigning interest in the
Academy was still Mathematics and Astronomy ('Philosophy' as we
understand the term coming later). This will have caused him
to be preoccupied with current Pythagorean speculations
concerning Number and Geometry. Yet these themselves could
have led him to take greater notice of Pythagorean metaphysical
doctrines when he himself began to move in a philosophical
direction.
a·9 To return to the specific Pythagorean doctrine in
question, that of Reincarnation. The concept of an
'insubstantial' vau! and Aoya! being made to unite, in the
soul, with the substantial body led naturally to the concept of
certain less attenuated parts of the soul uniting with that
body. Throughout Plato's treatment of the soul, we are made
aware that the epithumetic (appetitive) is the least attenuated
In natural consequence it is the part
which has become most inextricably entwined with the body, and
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finds it hardest to break away from it. Here at any rate, in
both Orphism and Pythagoreanism, was a constructive departure.
Here at last a contrast to the dull, colourless fate ascribed
by Homer to good and bad alike. How indeed could such an
unconvincing account be accepted? The suggested existence in
Hades of criminals such as Tantalus and Sisyphus suffering
interminable pains made it thoroughly implausible that
positively good people should be left totally without
pleasures. Orphism, as developed in Pythagoreanism, had
destroyed this anomaly. Positive happiness in the after-life
awaited those who had achieved perfection in the present one.
a.IQ BACKGROUND INFLUENCES OF OTHER PRESOCRATIC
PHILOSOPHERS.
In regard to the "semi-abstract, semi-solid" "shades" of
Hades mentioned earlier, the fact that the Greek philosopher-
scientists held to a predominantly 'hylozoic' principle brought
them up against certain problems. To maintain, that is, the
assumption that what was at times invisible, or at times
apparently totally imperceptible (nothing had yet been found to
be invariably "either of these), was still "substantial" was not
too hard. As has been said, no entity invariably such had been
identified except theoretically. But here came the
difficulty. To insist that theoretical entities were also
substantial necessitated certain awkward generalisations.
First, substance must be everywhere. Second, some individual
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substances must be made out to be "thinner"38 , some "denser",
than others. But if tAn was continuous 39 and omnipresent, it
was a bit hard to describe the apparently totally insubstantial
(i~ it existed) in such terms. This hurdle was ignored.
Doubtless, also, as the ultimate, divinely originated essence,
tAn had a unique claim. It was a thing which we would be
presumptuous to expect to be able to understand. Undeniably,
as long as mental products were associated with breath, then
air, Anaximenes' choice as the universal and divine essence,
had the fairest prospects as a candidate for the 'universal
substance'. Its visible and invisible versions would, to an
early way of thinking, have seemed proof that the same 'thing'
could be both 'something' and 'nothing' (the question of its
'solid' attributes, if any, was another problem). And if
Anaxagoras could postulate, as he did, that all was mind, we
may also be sure that he was by no means suggesting that mind
was 'insubstantial'. It was merely one of the 'thinnest'
"substances". The concept of a thing existing without possess-
ing substance could therefore have posed a problem, had that
concept existed. It did not. 'Nothing', as Parmenides had
pointed out, could not 'exist'. .""uAn therefore, varying in
density from solid, 'material' substance to the maximally
attenuated, accounted no less for evanescent 'idea' than for
gross matter. The concept of a soul, one of the "thinnest"
substances, being able to wander the earth unhindered was, as a
result, not a difficult one. It rested simply and primarily on
the observation of the behaviour of the air. And since air
seemed, in the shape of the breath, to constitute the life
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principle, we see here the completion of a logical sequence.
Air was invisible; the invisible formed breath; breath was the
"real" constituent of life; life was invisible; the invisible
was therefore the most essentially real. Yet, in spite of all
this, we might reconfirm our previous observation that, even if
Plato did conceive of the most abstract entities as
, ,
unseen
(&6pcna), and 'unperceived' (<Yva'lo8rrra)4 0 , he would not have
divorced them from tAn. Attenuated though they might be, they
were still, to him, continuous with the cosmic essence.
The alliance of the insubstantial with the substantial was
therefore a hlendin~ of substances. These differed not in
essence, but in degree of attenuation4l . The thumoeidic
element is one good example of the less attenuated. It is, as
it were, partly 'spiritual', partly material. (We may take,
here, as now meaningful the terminology '"spiritual" and
"material" "substance"'.) The latent possibility existed that
it could slough off its material fraction and become purely
Aoyaf. For Plato envisages, in the attainment of ultimate
perfection, the discarding of everything but the logistic (i.e.
most 'insubstantial' and so most 'real'). But there remains,
in the eu~6f, the highly central concept of 'drive' or
'energy'. And since we can readily conceive of a drive to
perfection being discarded once perfection'is reached, the non-
perfection of that drive is also easy to envisage. There is
the interesting consideration, moreover, of eu~6f as possible
origin of Schopenhauer's absolutising of the will. This adds
further to what is already considerable matter for discussion
regarding its relationship to ~pwf.
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a.ll A problem now arises as to whether Plato's concept of
the independent soul includes all three of its sectors:
logistic, thumoeidic, and epithumetic. This, in turn,
presupposes the problem of what function the thumoeidic and
epithumetic sectors of a soul could conceivably perform if the
soul were independent of the body. Put in another way, the
question might be: What function could the logistic sector
possibly have if there were no thumoeidic and epithumetic
sectors present? For the most obvious of the logistic's
functions is to oversee those of the latter two. Indeed their
absence might seem to leave it, as it were, in a vacuum.
But Plato clearly saw no objection to having, as an
ultimate state of perfection, a situation in which absolute
mind "intellectualised" 'in abstraction'. The purpose to which
this intellectualising was directed was contemplation of the
Good. It did not, then, seem specially in need of any sort of
'drive', particularly of the sort the difficulties of earthly
life made necessary. He clearly regards perfection as a
progressive process. It is an activity in which something
eternally still-to-be-ascertained (namely the Form of the Good)
is the object of perpetual thought. But the thought process at
this stage seems able to get along with the help of its own
energy (unless perhaps with the contributoiy help of ~pwJ). As
regards the ultimate termini of thought, he gives no more
enlightenment than moderns do on the query as to how a
Demiourgos should originally have come into being. As long,
however, as we can accept that his system includes a
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constant aspiration to discover more about this, then that
system presents consistency.
In his denial, in the Seventh Letter 42 , of an ability to
describe the ultimate Good, he was therefore no doubt stressing
the purely theoretical nature of the conclusions he had so far
drawn. The realisation of man's limits as well as of his own
philosophy is one of the marks of Plato's greatness. The
aporieutic character of his Parmenides confirms this in full.
He presented aspects of the Good, namely Truth (rational
insight), Harmony (beauty), Justice, etc. If he did not claim
to know what the Good itself was, he certainly could have
claimed to have carried his argument as close to its logical
termination as anyone could. Its lack of finality was no fault
of his. It was the inherent consequence of the human
condition. The mysteriousness of the Absolute Good was no
doubt due to the fact that it must imply 'good for every single
individual' •
It scarcely seems possible that Plato did not feel, when he
shrank from describing this, that this knowledge was a divine
province, overwhelmingly difficult for a human to attain to.
On both scores, of divine origin and practical inaccessibility,
it deserved respect. He clearly had the logical right to
suspend his investigation of the Good itself in favour of its
more accessible aspects. His choice therefore of the human
soul and of human Justice as principal objects of study
resulted, in the Republic as elsewhere, simply in as close as
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possible an analysis of the spiritual process as he could manage.
The importance he attaches to an examination of the soul
accords naturally with Socrates' well-known reminder to various
colleagues in the Dialogues that their overriding aim must be
to find out 'how one ought to live'43. And "knowing how one
ought to live" presupposes knowledge of the Truth (as seen by
Plato). The guiding instrument of life must be the mind, which
is contained in the soul. Accordingly, the make-up and various
qualities and characteristics of the soul are the least that
have to be analysed for the science of life to be grasped.
a.l2 To get to closer grips with the eU~O€lO€J concept
now, we may observe that, in his approach to the study of the
soul of the Guardian in the Republic, Plato postulated two
leading qualities of the good watch-dog. First it must be
, ~
aVOp€loJ (brave), second ~lA6ao~oJ (eager to learn)44. These
qualities were mental. But just before this he had required
that it be keen, swift, and strong, and he had called these its
bodil y45 qualities. In his summing up46, he requires it to be
philosophic, thumoeidic (which here is apparently an umbrella
term including aVOp€loJ), swift, and strong.
These seem at first to be an arbitrary mixture of terms.
Two psychic sectors are combined with two bodily attributes.
Further mention of a sector of the ~uxn comes only in
aw~poauvn47, that part regulating the bodily appetites. The
dialogue here is either deliberately flexible, to give dramatic
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been collected.
conviction, or further illustrates Plato's resistance to
Susp iciously over-neat duo's, trio's,numerical pigeon-holing.
. PI t 's metier. They
or other mystical collections are not ~n a 0
such a fter all available evidence hascan only be assembled as
If they then still happen to show a certain
t '"'· . s welcone to him. But thepattern anc. neatness, ",~s ~
t h as no ultinate sacro-nUflerical criterion, we nay res ress,
sarrct status in his view.
a.13
, .
The linkage of the thumoeidic quality with aVOp€la, since
without eu~6J one cannot be dVOP€lOJ48, is a critical step. It
carries one, finally, into that particular morally positive
field which perhaps provides most justification for the deeper
study of eu~6J. The aim to live in accordance with the moral
virtues necessitates that the soul be able to generate these
virtues in itself. Therefore, since particular virtues seem to
be confined to particular parts of the soul, those parts of the
soul which originate the particular virtues must be
scrutinised. Regarding this, the Republic contains a
scientific groundwork to its own moral discourse. (It will
also, incidentally, be found to do so for the other dialogues
in which enti ties such as Justice, apcrn (excellence),
Pleasure, the Good, etc., come up for analysis.) The reason
for wishing to live in accordance with the virtues is, to
Plato, obvious. His arguments have shown that they represent
I - 31 -
the only path by which the Good may be reached49. If the sum
total of the virtues is contained in ap£ln, any examination
eventually made of the various uses ·~f eU~o€loEf in the
,
Republic must explore in particular its links with ap€ln·
a.14 THE DIONYSIAC ENERGY SOURCE.
To return temporarily to the springs of eu~6f, we have
found that it is certain, from considerable material available
in several dialogues 50 , that Plato recognised the existence in
man of a primitive Dionysiac energy. This energy was
'irrational', in the sense that it welled up irrespective of
reason. It was even unconcerned, that is, with whether reason
regulated its operation or not. Moreover, it forced its own
outlet by its sheer biologically accumulating presence. The
course of pursuit of the Good, which involved a process of
perpetual striving (all summed up in €pwf) was the occupation
by which Plato judged existence's requirements most effectively
fulfilled. This course involved struggle, first, towards
knowledge of the Good, second, towards its achievement. A
struggle required energy. The Dionysiac energy was accordingly
postulated as the motive force to be harnessed by the AOyO! to
pursue this end. Even if one cannot expect to find out the
ultimate Truth, or Good, one cannot do better than channel
one's energy towards that end. Failure to find it was better
than failure to strive, and strive in a direction as
closely approxinating to it as possible.
I
means towards that end.
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A life free from the conflicts of the
imperfect world is, after all, by definition unattainable in
the world. But if Plato has discovered that reason does not
exhaust truth, this does not mean that he abandons the search
for truth. On the contrary, the search for truth and goodness
is the perpetual preoccupation of his philosophy. And it




The treatment of £PwJ in the Phaedrus, while it would
be in agreement with the eU~O€lcnJ doctrine as so far
discussed, may well not have the exact connexion with it that
it at first seems to. At first, it seems possible that in this
dialogue Plato is dealing with love as a form of emotion
('~avla') rather than a drive. Certainly he objects to his
earlier definition of it as an €TIleU~la52. But he seems to be
,
attempting to say that, though it is a desire, an €TIleU~la, it
is simply not the crude one most people take it to be 53 . The
'best' soul 54 is a lover of the fine ('beautiful, or fine,
things', TWV xaAwv)55. When it sees beauty, it looks upwards 56
to the truth of which that beauty reminds it, and wishes to fly
up to it. The possessor of this kind of soul clearly wishes to
reach the Truth. To that extent he might be presumed to desire
it. Yet the struggle he engages in is not, strictly, one of
desire - an aim at possessing. Rather it is an aspiration to
be in proximity to the thing loved. We are compelled on this
ground to put ~pwJ into a category distinct from desire. The
question is whether it is distinct from it in the same way as
the thumoeidic element is. We had assumed that with ~pwf an
emotion alone was in question. But clearly, if it incorporates
an urge (to fly upwards), it must at least incorporate a form
of drive as well.
a.l6 EARLY SENSES OF eu~6J HOMER AND HESIOD.
In its earliest literary uses, the term eu~6f seems to be
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allotted the overall, approximate meaning "~~eath of energetic
life", i.e. the breath not in the guise of ~he cool, rational
~uxn @erived from ~6xw = to breathe, make cool), but as loaded
with the warm vapour of the. blood. (The rationalisation of
this was that the blood is most heavily concentrated in the
heart, and thus between the lungs, which hold the breath.) In
Homer it consistently means this. Since, however, the Bu~a!
'energy-loaded breath', so to speak, technically implies the
~uxn, it can also mean the stuff of cool consciousness, the
'mind'57. It is worth emphasising, indeed, that it is
sometimes used quite interchangeably with ~uxn in Homer. e • g.
Sarpedon's ~uxn (seeming here more to equal 'consciousness')
leaves him when he is stricken58 . Then, even after having been
said, in connexion with the same incident, to have 'breathed
forth his BUlla!', he still revives. Still, as a term in early
myth and folklore, BUlla! is seldom found. It is only in such a
writer as Plato that we find it assuming an important place,
and one indeed comparable with that of'€pw!. Here, however,
~ .
the place is at times so importantly unlike that of €pw! that a close
preliminary study of ~pw! itself becomes essential.
a.17 Here we are on firmer ground. The background to tpw!
is, by contrast with that of BUlla!, deep and extensive. The
greatest mystery to the early philosopher-scientists was the
one surrounding the primordial source of energy. The dynamic
processes of the cosmos had been set in motion. By what?
Independently of the scientists, Hesiod59 names tpw! as having
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come into being, fourth in order after Chaos, Gaia, and
Tartaros, to initiate the cosmos. still, it does not, to him,
assume the status of a critically important force so much as a
catalyst by means of which forces, initiatory and otherwise,
act. The concept of ~pwf as a vital driving power behind the
cosmos falls to Empedocles, as to a small number of other
philosophers 60 •
As rain, the 'semen' fertilising the soil, ~pwf does not
appear either in Homer or Hesiod, but we do find it in
Aeschylus 61 • It is certainly, to the philosopher-scientists
concerned, an agency generating and promoting the continuance
of the cosmos. However, it is nowhere treated by them as a
fundamental force in the mental or spiritual life of man.
The result of this finding seems to be significant for the
status of eu~6f. In relation to ~pwf, eu~6f has a varying
intellectual ingredient conjoined with the energetic ingredient
which at any rate the primitive ~pwf does not seem to possess.
The Platonic ('true') £pwf is indeed a far fuller entity. It
is highly selective, and in this implies a strong mental
factor. Meantime, however, ~the primeval force of Epwf was, we
may safely say, altogether without that factor. Its root
folkloristic significance, as we may take it from Hesiod's and
Empedocles' record, was a flowing, the flow, presumably, of the
semen generating new life. To this the flowing of rain onto
the earth was a clear parallel. From the generative power
evinced by this flow the assumption will have arisen (since we
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can regard the witness of Hesiod and Empedocles as fairly
symptomatic of folkloristic belief) that the cosmos was itself
generated through a form of tpwJ. The force of this entity
either acted on its own, or existed in some divinity, the
further origin of whom was not i~q~ired into. Again, the
distinction between ~lA6TnJ and ~pwJ62 in Hesiod seems to be
that between the inner force of loving and the act of love.
Yet even this distinction should probably not be strained.
Hesiod for instance 63 speaks of'~pwJ as 'fairest among the
gods, looser of limbs'. But then he tells of the conception by
Night of Aither and Day after mingling in '~lA6TnJ' with Erebus.
It seems ~ Jcertain that €Pw must to him have conveyed the sense
of the act of love in being the actual 'flow' of the seed, the
process at all events during which the limbs were loosed.
this core of meaning, a transference to a 'feeling' of £pwf
From
would be natural, ~lA6TnJ having the same approximate sense.
~ JIt could be this that formed the source of the process of €Pw
which we see in Plato.
~But though £pwf may generate life, the most superficial
glance shows that it is not the critical symptom of life. Life
in man stops, to the primitive eye, with the breathing. The
breath represented the real 'stuff' of life. Later, more
sophisticatedly, it became the stuff of consciousness.
other hand, life stopped in plants when they dried up.
On the
But this
was no hindrance, since breath was not only vapour, but warm
and moist, as plants were moist, and it made good sense that
moisture should be included. So another ingredient of eu~6f
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seems to be accounted for. With moisture the common factor in
both cases, no doubt this had its part in the distinction
of eu~6f from ~uxn. The ~uxn was the colder and drier form of
air which was the substance of cool reason.
a .18 But to stress solely its moist character is to take
away from eu~6f the primal significance it has of 'breath'
simplex£4. This is an important error to avoid, for from
aspects of the b rea t hs pr in g 'mind', 'anger', 'fatigue' - all
the major symptoms of changing mood and vigour in the highest
faculties of man. In this regard, our early testimony
concerning eu~6f is strangely limited. It comes, significantly
enough, solely from epic and lyric poetry. There is no earlier
record. It is found in Pindar, Bacchylides, etc., as well as
Homer, but folklore outside Homer and the Lyric poets does not
show any concern with it.
object of interest.
It is clearly a relatively late
This could logically be expected. The power of the
original creating force, or of the enormous but virtually
'blind' natural forces of the created cosmos, was not 6 5 of such
a kind as to be associated by the common man with intellect.
Much less was it thought that it could be steered or countered
by humans exercising their own intellect. The original
creating power did not create the world by means of intellect.
It created it by means of its sheer power. Similarly, it could
not have been conceived of that the acts of the gods could be
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evaded by humans exercising mere intellect. Indeed, .even to
have attempted to evade them thus would have constituted an
insult, risking serious punishment. Odysseus is the wisest of
Homer's Greeks, yet there is no question of his escaping
Poseidon's wrath by his own cleverness. The intervention of
Athena might help him, but that is all he hopes for.
Similarly, it would not have occurred to him, or to early man
in general, to trouble to isolate intellect as a particular
attribute of the gods. They had an all-embracing power which
totally overshadowed - it simply implied - intellect. Odysseus
can therefore only use his utmost resources against the
elements when in trouble, trying to survive as well as he can,
and constantly praying for divine help or forhearance. On the
other hand, his intellect is still in general, and correctly,
represented as being of great importance to him. It can
properly help him evade some of the worse aspects of his
divinely inflicted hardships. And crucially enough, of course,
it keeps him supreme amongst humans.
a.l9 It can easily be appreciated why only the more gross
natural forces should have received attention from the
philosopher-scientists. Forces such as hunger and thirst,
physical fear,sexual love, etc., were predominant in man's
primitive state. The gross powers controlling these were
therefore to him the only ones that could possibly be worth
considering. One could almost never, by ingenuity, avoid their
effects. Drought, flood, 'attacks' by the elements in general,
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or by animals, the demands of sexual libido, which could drive
one to frenzy - these had to be accepted. It was certainly
~
possible to take some precautions against them. But no
precautions at all could be effective if their onset was at all
strong. If the deity concerned intended your destruction, you
had no escape. On the other hand, on a more sophisticated
level, when these primal necessities had been dealt with, man
still had his surplus energies. He could devote them to more
complex activities.
However, an unfortunate phenomenon now presented itself. Of
these activities, gratuitous competition, that is war with his
fellows, for some reason became a leading medium. At this
point, at all events, the more sophisticated forces in him,
such as will-power and intellect, began to claim his attention.
For this reason, we expect to find multiple references to man
and his possession of eu~6J, ~uxn, ~€voJ, etc. in the Homeric
Epic. And we do. It is, after all, later than the primitive
era, although several stages earlier than the Presocratic in
sophistication. Correspondingly, there are fewer references to
the cosmos outside man, and its forces of tPwJ, drought, flood,
famine. These he can now handle more efficiently. In
accordance with this, it is also the mainly more 'human-
orientated' divinities such as Athena, Hephaestus, Aphrodite
and Ares that get the more interesting parts in epic and
lyric. Less so do the vast, cosmic wielders of power such as
Dionysos, Demeter, Zeus. The interest has shifted. It is the
newer dangers which confront man, now that his growing technical
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ability has removed the old ones, that claim attention - war in
particular. As yet, the activity of the philosopher-scientist,
of detailed reflection on the cosmic forces, has no place.
Still, it will not be long taking that place.
Not entirely unexpectedly, then, we find much stress on war
and comparably sophisticated human action, and little stress on
'... fEPW or any other cosmic force in Homer. It does occur in
Hesiod, and in Presocratics ~lAla or ~lA6Tnf may be taken to
correspond with it 66 • But otherwise its primitiveness takes it
beyond the age of records. Empedocles indeed, the inquirer par
excellence back into first causes, writes well into the 5th
Century of Love and Strife as the originating principles of the
cosmos. That Plato's ~pwf, combining these two, owes its
origin at least in part to Empedocles can scarcely be doubted.
On the other hand, such specifically mythical and folkloristic
influence as Plato was subject to will not have come from
Empedocles, or anyone like him. Plato's basic impressions
concerning the ljJuxn and eu~6f will, we find, be principally
from epic and lyric.
a.20 DIONYSOS WORSHIP, ORPHISM AND THE SOUL.
Concerning, once again, Plato's interpretation of the
nature of the soul, as it springs from these, and other,
earlier, force-concepts, we have seen that we must reckon here
specially with various vitally important forerunners to
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Pythagoreanism. Dionysos worship, the Eleusinian Mysteries,
and Orphism have been mentioned. These phenomena are primitive
enough to rank with folklore.
If, on the one hand, human intellect as such was, for self-
preservatory purposes, of secondary interest to early man 67 ,
the problem of death was decidedly of primary. Accordingly,
folklore concerning death was voluminous. Doctrines of its
nature were even more so. Hades the god of the Underworld was
the most acutely feared divinity, and efforts to pacify him
most consistently made. They were also automatically made,
since of course whenever any sacrifice was offered to any deity
whatever, it automatically, by incorporating a death, implied
one to him.
was death.
The maximum penalty exacted by any cosmic power
Accordingly, the form of placation of Hades was
most commonly in the shape of a 'scapegoat'. This creature,
human or otherwise, was made to die in place of oneself, in the
hope that the god might accept such a substitute 68 •
The commonest causes of death in primitive times would have
been starvation and disease. The first would have resulted
from crop or herd failures. These could in turn be caused by
weather or other inexplicable divine causes. The second,
disease in general (which could, of course,as plant disease,
also cause crop failure), was also a divine imposition. As the
deities concerned with crops were Dionysos, Demeter, and Zeus,
these three assume colossal importance primitively. The story
is found in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter that Hades (Pluto)
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carried off Kore (Persephone), who is here made out to be the
daughter of Demeter. He then took her clown to his
.
subterranean kingdom, and this removal symbolised the
disappearance of the green shoots in winter. Demeter, after
searching in vain for many years, eventually wandered to
Eleusis. Here she revealed herself to the Eleusinians, who
built her a temple. It is evident that the Eleusinian
Mysteries were concerned with the death and rebirth of the
corn, and were also pre-Hellenic, and thus considerably older
than Demeter; but now, naturally, they took on an association
with her. The death and rebirth of the corn had without a
doubt given original rise to the thoughts of human rebirth
after death. In turn, the probability is that these simply
merged spontaneously into Orphism. Thus the main features of
the phenomena of death and rebirth of the corn were transferred
to human beings.
a.21 DI ONY SOS THE GOD.
Demeter was almost exclusively a corn-goddess. Still, she
sufficed for all crops, and for fertility in general.
abruptly the Thracian-Phrygian import 69 Dionysos takes
Then
over
wine and much of general fertility. H~ had come in possibly as
early as c. 900 B.C. (his other name, Bakchos or Iakchos, a
Lydian word, further confirms his eastern origin), and his cult
was more that of an emotionalism than a religion. The emotion
was no doubt further stimulated by wine. Basically it was
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characterised by the devotees roaming at large in a state of
intoxicated frenzy70. Women were especially concerned in these
activities, which were known as the OPYla. They scoured the
countryside until they found some live animal (sometimes, as in
the case of Pentheus, human) which they then rent apart and ate
(omophagy). In eating it they believed themselves to be
absorbing the vitality of the animal victim (usually, also, a
young one, to accentuate this vitality). In this way their vigour
and life were, as they saw it, increased. Ancient writers say
further that, according to the specifically Phrygian tradition,
Dionysos was bound7l during winter and awake during summer.
This links his character. quite closely with that of Kore. He
was also known as a child-god72 , and is essentially a divinity
not only of vegetation but of any young, growing thing.
Another influential factor promoting his cult may have
stemmed from Asia Minor, where he was a general god of
fertility. (The phallus carried in the Dionysiac processions
is proper to him, though he himself is not represented as
phallic.)73 He was also, there, a god of the fruit of the
trees, in particular the vine. Oddly, though, this influence
did not apply to any other crops. His connexion with the
Underworld no doubt came from the Phrygian myth, or from it via
Orphism, in which he had a great place. He was thus introduced
into Mysteries other than the extremely ancient ~PYla with
which he had once been exclusively concerned. That the
traditions associated with him in this connexion treated of a
happy after-life, moreover, is shown by the decoration of later
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Greek sarcophagi with Dionysiac myths. From these and the
various Orphic doctrines we find that an already well-marked
belief in an after-life was taking detailed shape. There
remained only its full logical development by some gifted
philosophic mind. This mind was that of Pythagoras.
a.22 PYTHAGORAS.
A final reversion here to Pythagoras may seem otiose. It
can be justified on two counts: both as a probably worthwhile
recapitulation, and as a re-emphasis of the critical nature of
his influence on Plato. Pythagoras' reputation has, to give it
no more than its due, been so universally great as to
have engrossed the Reincarnation doctrine - amongst a lot else -
almost exclusively to him. That his forerunners had already
evolved its basic structure is, however, clear from what has
already been said. The main difference between the doctrine as
developed by them and by Pythagoras74 is in its completeness
and definition. Pythagoras turned what was a web of myth into
a formal, logical theory.
A study of the most ancient testimony, uninfluenced by
Plato, shows Pythagoras as we saw him earlier. He is "the
hierophant of Great Mother mysteries with an Anatolian stamp"
who "has a new doctrine, probably influenced by Indo-Iranian
sources, of immortality*and of the triumph over death through
successive rebirths"75. The doctrine of reincarnation is found
* (asain my underlining)
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in early Iranian records (the Avesta). Herodotus 76 ascribes it
to the Egyptians77 • Orphic doctrine, written down immediately,
as we have observed (unlike Pythagorean), no doubt supplied a
particularly fertile source. This fact that it was put down in
written form straight away was incredibly valuable. The
emphasis the Orphics put on permanent records appears from the
evidence of vase paintings of Orpheus, each invariably showing
a scribe standing writing near Orpheus' head. Actual Orphic
writings are in consequence available to, and alluded to by,
Euripides78 and Aristotle79 , (as also in fact Plato80 himself).
~ --
One more source for Plato's thinking on soul and idea thus
stands revealed.
Testimony concerning Pythagorean theory in its earliest
form is rare. Regarding the so-called 'Pythagoreans' as a
possible source, it is interesting to note some remarks of
Porphyry's8l. He states that the fruitful part of Pythagorean
doctrine was taken over by Plato, Aristotle, and their pupils.
The 'dross', he claims, was left to the 'Pythagoreans'. Their
name had now clearly, in his estimate, become considerably
cheapened. Indeed, his comment is just one of many symptoms of
the vanishing reputation of 'Pythagorean' productions of later
years. At all events, there is no record left by
'Pythagoreans', early or late, which throws any light on the
sources used by their alleged founder.
In contrast with this, the vast reputation of their master
has even caused it to be suggested, as a variant82 , that
Orphism was the borrower from him. However, this is not the
common view83 • It also has relatively little importance for
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the present argument. Orphism, as does Pythagoras, at all
events comes chronologically between the Eastern tradition and
Plato. So whether Pythagoras drew from it, or vice versa, the
form in which Plato inherited the doctrine is clear. We can
regard either source indifferently as valid.
a.23 DRAMA.
The vital,counterpart to the Dionysiac-Orphic factor - the
Apollinian - now comes naturally to the fore. There is much
more than coincidence in the fact that it should have
materialised most prolifically in the drama, itself an offshoot
of Dionysiac worship. The two naturally complement each
other. That they can perfectly convincingly - as above - be
argued to involve a parallel with the eU~o€lo€f - AOY10T1XOV
combination, and probably together represent £pwf, rapidly
shows us the order of importance of their role.
In the Platonic connexion, the dramatist that most
immediately comes to mind i~ Euripides. Socrates' great
admiration for Euripides presents several points of
considerable interest. Euripides' apparent departure from an
attitude of unconditional reverence for the gods may be hard to
square with the seriousness with which Socrates, whom we may also
take here as Plato's representative, viewed then. But if Euripides
'paid lip-service to religion'84, we certainly find Socrates in
part deserting the gods for a single God. ~ e€of (he refers to
this Being countless times) is clearly, to him, the single
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Supreme Being. The distinction he demands is between
reverence for traditional 'divinities' and reverence for
the Divine overall. Euripides shows a high veneration
for the natural forces which he made an embodiment of ~he
gods. If this is seen as a diminution of their majesty, we
need to ask a serious question. Why does he nevertheless make
the consequences of not observing their claims so
comprehensively catastrophic? It has been said that Nenesis to
Euripides is merely random. It is supposed, to him, to be
purely a source of human sadness 85 • But there is nothing
random about the judg~ent meted out to Hippolytos, Phaedra,
Pentheus, Medea. His gods ~ay nedehumanised, against Greek
tradition, but the powers they represent, physical and
intellectual, are by no means diminished. Nor is their
impersonalisation allowed to make them less convincing as
entities. Socrates disapproved wholly of the ascription of
human weakness to the gods 86 . He was likely to have found
Euripides' dissociation of them from all human characteristics,
good or bad, more to his taste than anything the other
dramatists produced. The preference he showed for his plays
naturally accords.
The leading concept (for Socrates' purposes) given rise to
by Euripides was, then, that the 'gods' were no other than the
great natural forces of the universe. If, as he did, Euripides
conceded to these forces an overall guiding mind, a significant
if obvious point follows. The existence of such a mind,in the
abstract, was included in his system. It was separate from
force itself. This mind, not necessarily resident in any type
of human 'superbeing', might therefore exist on its own.
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Such a doctrine was in keeping with, and no doubt sprang
from, the Pythagorean doctrine of a non-solid, independent
World-Soul. This doctrine was blended no doubt with others
concerning matter promulgated by the Presocratic physicists.
It will, too, have been close to Anaxagoras' theory (the All =
\!OU!) • Similarly, to Heracleitus' 'the All' = "'Aoyo! plus fire,
entity.
to Anaximenes' air, to Anaximander's ~TI€lPO\! (unlimited).
These philosophers, while giving yet more stress to the
ultimately attenuated, and so most close to 'insubstantial',
nature that substance could assume, still only postulated the
existence of the highly attenuated. The totally insubstantial
was not reckoned a reality. That any of them actually believed
in the possibility of "something" altogether without substance
\
at all is conceivable87 . They may have had private theoretical
convictions along these lines. But apart from any other
dissuading influences, the belief that Nature abhors a vacuum
will already have been supported by acquaintance with the
syringe. This had indeed been developed considerably before
their time. And its evidence was incontrovertible. With the
apparatus currently available a vacuum just could not be
achieved. It would have been easy to conclude that it was
inherently impossible.
We cannot, again, imagine how they would have conceived of,
for instance, air in a material context. After all,
it had all the nature of an invisible, 'insubstantial'
But since - apart from its 'smoky' potential - it
could be contained in bladders,. . b1t was 0 viously like solid
matter. It was not free to wander unchecked 88 • And if Plato's
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Ideas were the most abstract entities imaginable, their
recognised vehicle was still the air of speech, even if they
could remain unspoken. There was no other account that could
have been given of their nature. In short, they gave every
sign of being strictly tAn. The true belief in the back of
Plato's mind concerning this cannot be known. Whatever it was,
Apollo, presented in the works of such men as Euripides,
Empedocles, Anaxagoras and their fellows, could scarcely have
been given greater weight for him than by such other minds.
a.24 POSSIBLE INFLUENCE OF THE EPICS.
The probably powerful influence on Plato of epic poetry can
now be considered, and indeed it stands almost in its own
category. It is only in principle parallel to those that have
just been discussed. From Socrates' remarks alone89 we can
infer that 'Homer' was not just standard reading. He was
almost the exclusive object of literary study. In fact, he was
regarded as absolutely authoritative on almost every topic he
even alluded to. Plato's intimate knowledge of the Houeric poems is
shown by his ability to ~uote extensively f~om them. But to
this fact can further be added the assumption that this ability
was ac~uired early on. It was almost a 'reflex'. He was
grounded in Homer and Hesiod in the way a modern child is
grounded in reading and writing as such. All the events and
language of epic were absolutely embedded in his memory from
earliest youth.
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This is no additional argument in favour of his having
been influenced by them. It is no more so than the fact that
.
he makes actual use of the words Homer uses, for many of these
were clearly in common use during his own time. But it
certainly is curious that he uses no major psychosomatic term
not commonly used in Homer. His personal development of that
use, however (even if it greatly corresponds with the current
usage of his day), is of principal interest. In an attempt to
detect that development, the sense in which Homer himself uses
the words is first worth establishing.
a.25 In the Homeric epic, we find the forces of mind
and soul intimately bound up with those of life itself. The
reason for this could be fairly guessed at. It would almost
certainly be that their disappearance from the body coincides
with the disappearance of life 90 •
, ,
ap€Tn has a correspondingly
elemental nature. It is regarded both in Plato and Homer as
the highest qualification any man can have. In Homer, however,
it is more or less exclusively the ability-plus-will to
fight 91 • This is what we might expect it to be in the story of
peoples permanently fighting for existence, or at any rate in a
tale where deeds of war and emergency are treated as the
subject of greatest interest. By contrast, in Plato, it has
the broadened sense which we should expect it to have for a
community which needs talents more variegated than are involved
in plain fighting. It still retains in considerable part that
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former sense. But it has acquired additional overtones of
'excellence' in other spheres. Put in another way, the field
of application of the term "excellent" has been enlarged. It
now includes people who by coincidence have simply never had to
use their excellence specifically for fighting. The
preservation of the social unit still remains the paramount
criterion for ap€Tn. The actions necessary to ensure it will
always be primarily important. But other aspects of excellence
have multiplied. In this context, honesty, moral fibre, an
all-embracing competence in peace-time activities - these
become in themselves criteria of the possession of Gp€Tn.
, ,
In Homer it seems possible that apcrll may sometimes also be
given a wider application. Admittedly it is only on rare
occasions that this becomes necessary92. But we might
therefore have less cause to regard as strange Plato's
apparently tremendous extension of its sphere to mean the human
~uxn's closeness to Absolute Good. Still, whether we do regard
this as strange or not, we do not even have real title to say
that the extension is so very great. Much less can we say that
the men of the Homeric age had not the ability to appreciate
more than just military prowess. We can only emphasise that,
during the age of the heroes, talents for defence and offence
were at a premium.
The heroes provided the governmental basis upon which the
aristocratic nOAlf was founded, and their war-effectiveness was
the sole key to its survival. Had this not been so, and
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leisure been greater, the concept of human excellence would
have been broader. As it is, Plato's ap€Tn quite categorically
includes the 'excellence' required of the essentially military
Guar dian. This man, even if he mus t be mor e, than a mer e
soldier, still has to be a soldier before all else93 • In
Plato's city-state, the ultimate standards of Justice, Culture,
Education (~oualKn), and self-control, etc., are further
refinements required of him. But when war and emergency are
virtually never-ending, as is the case in intermediate cultures
such as those dealt with in Homer's epic, these items have no
real place. The point to be made here is that, were such
leisure as the inhabitants of Plato's Republic enjoy to have
become available to the Homeric hero, a man like Agamemnon would
have aimed at them. Even for Homer's purposes they would be
the logical objective of any noble soul. Indeed, we may assume
them as tacitly included in ap€Tn. In their developed shape
they require a physical leisure which kings like Agamemnon
ordinarily just do not have, yet, notwithstanding, olKn
(justice) is praised in Homer as a thing "beloved of the
gods"94. The Good (&ya8ov), in the guise, Homerically, of a
good man, is not only good as regards war (aya86f =
courageous); he is good in respect of other skills95. Once war
has been successfully waged, he will be, germinally, good in
the supreme activities of the ~pEv€f. Then finally, in a
society in which leisure is available for the highest
development of 'phrenic' activity - a stage of social
sophistication such as Plato experienced in his own lifetime _
the impact of everyday needs diminishes almost to vanishing
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point. The only source of exertion now remaining for the mind
is abstract objects. These objects can then ultimately be con-
vincingly divorced altogether from material existence.
can be reserved solely for totally (or potentially totally)
"non-material" ideas.
a.26 Similarly to olKn, €pwf, in Hesiod the primordial,
physical passion drawing entities together, advances, as we
have seen, considerably beyond that guise in Plato. Hesiod, in
the passage we have qupted, writes of»Epwf as "fairest among
immortal gods, looser of limbs". But more importantly, for
present purposes, he also states that he "subdues in their
breasts the mind and thoughtful counsel of all gods and all
96 ~ fmen" . This EpW , for him, is, then, an agent so physical
that it actually brings mental activity into utter subjection.
In strong contrast, Plato's €pwf retains its nature as a
powerful driving force, but so far from causing the activity of
the mind to diminish, it stimulates it. It also incorporates
an attraction of minds to one another for the very purpose of
mental interchange and research. Occasionally we have found
that Socrates even calls it a 'madness' (l..ta\Jla). But this
is a mad urge to attain higher things 97 , to apprehend the
Absolute 98 • It is a pulsing, thinking urge, the uplifted love
springing from Zeus. The relatively debased physical type of
love which springs from Ares is in the strongest possible
contrast to it. Plato indeed regularly stresses that it is
only too frequently confused with the latter. So much so does
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this in fact happen that the Arean is wrongly regarded by most
people as the only type of love. Once again, we see that Plato
has retained fpwf in the primordial sense of a powerful drive,
but at the same time done something more. He has fed into it a
quite new concept. This is the drive towards a sophisticated
and mentally abstract 'looking upward'99. The "looking upward"
implies a type of procreation, namely that of a new self out of
one's old material self. It brings into existence a new being
less weighed down by matter lOO . And this procreation is
achieved by close approximation to, and dialogue with, beings
who are endowed with gifts of soul superior to one's own. EPwf
is primarily, that is, the love which attracts us to such
people, and second, which spurs us to make ourselves finer by
such association. Any other aim in it than these is
despicable. No doubt Plato does not envisage our dragging such
persons down spiritually by our presence. The relation of
these 'finer' people to us is simply on the analogy of the
relation of the gods to humans. They are presences who, as it
were, give out an aura of light. There may be others ther~ for
the light to fall on, or there may not. It makes no
difference. The genuine 'lover' can only make his utmost
efforts to find them, and strive permanently to fly higher.
His aim is not, by mere instinct, for bodily pleasure. It is,




OTHER EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHERS.
Besides and simultaneous with these influences, that of
certain other Presocratic philosopher-scientists has deserved
me~tion. In particular we have notec Xenophanes, Parwenides,
Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heracleitus, Empedocles, and
Anaxagoras. But together with the 'cosmic' scientists and
sciences, we cannot underestimate the specialised "medical"
sciences of anatomy and physiology. Speculative and
'unscientific' as these then were by modern standards, their
findings were of much significance for the development of
Plato's theory of the soul. And apart from them, perhaps even
more significant for that theory, were the flourishing fields
of astronomy and music, let alone mathematics.
The latter, with its dependence on number, had a special
appeal for him. Its clear suggestion, especially in geometry,
of the abstraction which number necessitates was very much in
accord with it. It seems very probable that he fixed
originally on the figures or "forms" of geometry for his Theory
of Ideas. These figures, because they required mental
"picturing", would have lent themselves particularly readily to
his argument. For his claim was that they "existed" (in the
mind or elsewhere) whether or not individual rectangles,
triangles, or other figures10l were actually drawn. From this
step to the thesis that they "existed" whether or not they were
even thought of was philosophically a short distance. Numbers
themselves were equally classed as abstract. The
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universalisation of ideas to all entities would have followed.
(The belief that certain numbers had magical properties, a
belief shared by several other philo~ophers before himl02 , may
mean relatively little to modern thought. still, it is some
indication of the reverence in which they and he held the
mathematical discipline generally.)
Mathematics itself is normally assumed to have come to the
Greeks from the East. Many Greeks are credited with visits to
Egypt l03. Here geometry and medicine had already been firmly
established for over a thousand years. Because of the scant
nature of early records, it is not known whether anything
approaching the philosophical analysis of these disciplines
achieved by the Greeks had been achieved in the East. The
credit for that at least has therefore to be given to the
Greeks. And of them, it must be given to one in particular.
This man is Plato.
Pythagoras before Plato had gone so far as to state that
all was number l04 . This was a step forward on a par with t~e dicta
of Xenophanes, Anaximander, and their peers. It was an insight
of peculiar depth, and one founded on acute observation. The
possibility that the apparent variety displayed by different
substances might be merely superficial was, at such a stage of
development, a vision accessible only to men capable of strict
experimentation and deeply analytical reflection. The
'sameness' of ice, water, and steam, for instance, would not
have suggested anything of other than practical interest to a
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primitive mind. But tothe intensely inquiring minds of the
Ionian philosophers it could only suggest a need for the
closest philosophical analysis. This analysis resulted in some
cases in rather extreme verdicts. E.g., postulates were made
that all substance C'UATj) was water (Thales), that all flowed
(Heracleitus), that all consisted of air (Anaximenes), or the
infinite (Anaximander), or mind (Anaxagoras), etc.
Alternately, it resulted in less extreme findings, as in the
case of Thales, or Empedocles, such as that rUATj was reducible
to several elements (e.g. earth, air, fire, water).
These basic substances were, then, the only 'reality'.
It took Plato, however, to conjoin Parmenidean 'Being' with
these fundamental findings. His conclusion was that the
only "real" entities were indeed varying substances. These
substances were, however, characterised by one indispensable
qualification. They were so rarefied as to be only in the most
attenuated sense substances at all. For practical purposes, as
has been hinted, if Greek thought had not generically been'
along 'hylozoic' lines, we might have believed that his Forms
were wholly independent of substance. We have little prospect
of really knowing Plato's innermost thoughts on this. As it
is, we have at all events to follow the Greek concept of
substance rather than our own, and take them as what that would
have made them out to be. This was, in short, a more or less
infinitely refined version of the basic, divine element - the
fundamental stuff of which the cosmos is made up. Correspond-
ingly, the more 'solid' a thing was, the grosser a manifest-
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ation of substance it would be, the less 'real', and, in
proportion, the more worthy to be avoided.
The Pythagorean recommendations for life seem to be allied
with this sentiment. They consist variously of purges and
purifications of the body and soul, abstinence from living
things (most of all from the heart of any living thing), from
beans, from helping to unload rather than load, etc. 105 •
Purifications and taboos of this kind would (if at times not
very obviously) cause the body to tend more fully towards the
'spiritual' state. They would encourage independence from
gross matter. And this, after all, was the ultimate aim of
reincarnation. Such a doctrine immediately linked up with the
Platonic moral doctrine of bodily restraint and abstinence.
Together these must culminate in total independence of the soul
from the body. The result would be fitness of the soul, now
virtually unaccompanied by matter, to enter the divine world of
the Forms.
a.28 THE ELEATICS.
The influence of the Eleatic School can be seen in the
uniformity attributed by Plato to the highly attenuated ~An of
the Forms. Though the Forms are distinguished among themselves,
they are nevertheless of the same nature. They are composed of
the same essence, namely the spiritual This is maximally
attenuated essence, unencumbered by any of its more compressed
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versions (i.e. specimens of grosser matter).
Xenophanes' logical position as founder of the Eleatic
School has, even though Parmenides was his pupil, been
doubted. The grounds for this are that his doctrine of
'Oneness' is more like a monotheism based on a critical
re-examination of traditional theology than a closely reasoned
analysis such as Parmenides provided. Both philosophers, never-
theless, stressed the unity of the All. The actual physical
nature of that unity did not so particularly concern them. (It
did the Milesians Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes.) But in
that one critical respect - that it was one entity - they were
adamant. Parmenides especially, in laying stress on Being as
the sole ultimate component of the cosmos, has a compelling
claim to be originator of the concept of genuinely total
'abstraction' if anyone has. (Indeed, it is he who gives us
reason to wonder what Plato's innermost views about ~An
were.) As forerunner of Plato in his concern with that which
truly is (i.e. .. ~TO OV = 'the "being", or "existing", thing')106,
he is not a long step from Plato's doctrine that only certain
entities truly 'exist' or 'are' (namely the Ideas)107.
The Parmenidean formula is relatively somewhat rigid and
limited. "What is", the Master puts it, "is therefore a
finite, spherical, motionless, continuous plenum, and there is
I
nothing beyond it"108. Plato, less concerned with degrees of
extension or shape than with eternity and changelessness,
relatively ignores these more physical aspects. Instead, he
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retains the central thesis of eternity and immutability. His
version simply corresponds with Parmenides' in respect of the
.
concept of 'plenum' or 'fulness'. And he presents it to us as
~,
the maximally attenuated UAn of the Forms.
a.29 Heracleitus, though he very probably wrote earlier
than Parmenides, seems to represent a point half-way between
the Eleatics and Anaxagoras. He rejects all his predecessors'
doctrines en masse, and emphatically those of pythagoras l09 ,
(together with the Orphic system). It was useless, he claimed,
to possess vast learning if one could not understand the
Aoyaf llO . His concentration on the concept of Aoyaf, beyond
his theory of Fire as primary substance and the doctrine of the
Flux, links him most irrevocably with Plato. He further holds,
this time in common with his contemporaries in the religious
field, that the most real thing of all is soul. Most
importantly, he takes it as characterised by yvw~n (wisdom, lO
ao~ov). The wisdom which guides the soul is Fire, and the
Fiery (to Plato, no doubt, the "top-rate" thumoeidic-plus-'
logistic) soul, the wisest, is the one to be sought. Fire
implies dryness to Heracleitus. Moisture, e.g. as wine, in his
opinion destroys the soul's unique logical capacity. This
squares quite well with the logical precedence given by Plato
to the cold, dry ~uxn - the steamy breath of eu~of being
largely without logic. Where Plato and the Eleatics
essentially differ from Heracleitus is in their total rejection
of his doctrine of the eternal Flux, or changeability of the
cosmos. Their own teaching in this regard is, of course,




Empedocles and Anaxagoras lll , coming after both
Heracleitus and Parmenides, both seem to feel a 'necessity to
.
seek a way out of the Parmenidean net. This spider's web of
reasoning which made the world static as well as devoid of
variety, set up, to their way of thinking, an impossible
situation. All change, according to Parmenides, is an illusion
of the senses. To Empedocles and Anaxagoras, by contrast, "the
real" is still eternal and unchanging, but the strong claims
made by the external world for acceptable explanation have to
be met. The evidence of the senses, they believe, cannot just
be jettisoned.
To re-introduce motion's claim to reality, Empedocles
postulated a twofold cause of movement: Love and Strife.
Anaxagoras postulated a single cause: Mind. Second, to allow
for the variety of the world's contents, both postulated that
there were, in fact, different kinds of ~An. The
qualification they made was that, although those differing
~ ~,types of UAn had never become UAn, nor would ever cease to be
it, the various things in the world became what they were (or
were altered into something else) by processes of mixture and
separation (Love and Strife). According to Empedocles, as, in
part, to one or two others before him, ~An was of four types:
earth, air, fire, and water. These, mixed in varying
proportions, formed all things.
Anaxagoras, on the other hand, stated that, while the
Cosmos consisted of 'things', these 'things' were infinite both
I
in number and minuteness.
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It was by combining themselves into
'seeds' which contained all the things, but in different
proportions, that distinct substances were obtained. vouJ
(mind), the original motivating force, was by Anaxagoras'
.
doctrine "the thinnest of all things". To Empedocles, too, I
Love and Strife were 'things'. But he does not attribute to
them anything like the specialised sense Anaxagoras does.
Being principally interested in Medicine, he appears to have
been totally uninterested in what seems to be this brilliantly
original, close to 'atomic', theory. That his concern with
Love and Strife will have ·been further stimulated by Hesiod's
allusions to tpwJ is most likely. It may indeed actually have
originated from them.
SOCRATES' MAIEUTIC METHOD.
The crystallisation of more than one of the earlier
philosophical and religious tenets outlined above was now ~o
take place. It may be seen in what to Socrates was the
equivalent of writing: his 'maieutic'112 or 'midwife'
technique of conversation. The theory of the eternity of r..UATl,
whether as gross substance or attenuated soul, coupled with
that of the transmigration of souls, had supplied Socrates with
the basic rationale for his purpose. This embodied the scheme
of seeking all knowledge in living persons, however ill-educated.
For if the person's soul, in addition to its perfection in the
original world of the Forms, had traversed numerous previous lives,
vast, indeed *total, knowledge was
*That obtained in the lower materia.l world (but see Heno 81 c 5) being taken
as non-genuine.
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already present in it. One had only therefore to extract it.
And the most effective method of doing this, he found, was the
maieutic technique through the mediu~ of the disciplined
conversational process called Dialectic. His preferred method
in this medium was- not simple discussion, but question and
answer.
To enlarge on this. We have already seen something of the
probable sources of the "Platonic" (taken here as for practical
purposes = "Socratic") Theory of Ideas. The Anaxagorean
doctrine that mind was the 'thinnest' of things, as also that
it was the prime mover, would have suggested strongly the prime
importance of the logistic faculty. That the only objects
conceivably worth investigating must be mental concepts
followed automatically. The combination of all these points
with the Pythagorean doctrine of the eternity of the soul
ensued. The latter will, finally, have suggested that only the
objects of the mind's activity, i.e. ideas, were ultimately
real. This decisively set the course for Socrates.
That he should have chosen to be primarily concerned with
the Form of the Good as the chief 'Idea' can be no coincid-
ence. It will no doubt have arisen from the Orphic-Pythagorean
demand for ultimate moral perfection. It may well also have
been partly historical. The current Athenian wars with Sparta
had produced the democratic experience. Amongst other things,
this had shown, especially in the Sicilian disaster, that
expert but morally bad orators could lead popular assemblies
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into voting for catastrophic ventures. More than this, the
presence of numerous "Sophists" was disquieting. That they
could be openly claiming to teach a deceitful oratory (under
the guise of 'universal education') seemed to Socrates'
blameless integrity a serious situation.
To his naturally contentious spirit, that situation will
also have seemed unquestionably well worth confronting.
Certainly the religious motive will have been strong in him.
His highest goal was to attain goodness, therefore evil had to
be opposed. But much more than that, the nature of goodness,
and the means of obtaining it, had to be found. People who
made falsehood a profession must be shown up.
A divine agent, or oal~6~10~, aided him, he believed, to
avoid wrong courses. On the positive side, it was left to him
to exert his own energies. The concept of the Just was in his
view essentially tied to that of the good, so it was natural
enough, in the Republic, for him to investigate Justice
specifically. He enlarged the scale of the investigation to
make it easier to follow. In consequence we have what was to
have been a study of the just man converted into a study of the
just state. That established, the soul, which is the producer
of justice, remained to be analysed in its light. It is here




PLATO'S CONCEPT OF THE SOUL AS AN ASPECT OF COSMIC
STRIVING FOR TRUTH AND GOODNESS.
The purpose for which the cosmos had come into being held
no less interest for Plato than for any other philosopher.
Plato, however, takes man instead of the cosmos as his basis of
inquiry. Owing to this choice, he is faced with the problem in
turn of finding a plausible purpose for man's existence.
Granted the existence of the Demiourgos, this Maker of the
Cosmos might, as we noted, have chosen to make only perfect
Form. Why should He instead have seen fit to make perfect
souls, yet at the same time allow them to become imperfect, and
occupy even more imperfect bodies? The only answer that
suggested itself to Socrates was that the struggle for
perfection must have seemed to the Demiourgos intrinsically
worthwhile. The point of introducing imperfection would then
have been in order to initiate that process of dynamic effort.
Certainly this appears to have been Plato's viewpoint. He'
classifies that dynamic aspect of perpetual striving towards
perfection as the sole worthy occupation of man. Further,
Empedocles' theory of the perpetuity of Love and Strife,
Heracleitus' theory of perpetual Flux, etc., would have
provided a background to his inclination to see the cosmos as
irrepressibly dynamic. But it still remained for him to
select, as the purpose of this dynamism, the search for the
Form of the Good. For it was knowledge of this alone that
allowed of, but not only that - implied - perfect conduct.
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That the Perfect Good was what the Demiourgos meant man to aim
for, and that one's duty was to try to bring about what the
Demiourgos had intended, were things neither Plato nor Socrates
questioned.
Socrates' effort portrays the opening stage of the dynamic
process. This, the attempt to discover the Good, is to be
followed by th~ struggle to achieve it. But from what source
did one draw the vigour to pursue this search? In certain
dialogues we may justifiably take Socrates to be regarding this
energy as tpwJ. In others, in particular the Republic, we may
take it to be eu~6J. Here, in the context of the soul as the
tripartite whole which Plato makes it, eu~6J, or the thumoeidic
element, comes to the fore. Indeed, €pwJ scarcely receives a
mention. One could argue from this that Plato did not intend
an exact distinction between the two. That they even
occasionally seem interchangeable. Exact distinctions, we
find, were not something it was Plato's habit to insist on
unless they had special practical use. He might have felt' here
that some fusion did not particularly matter. A possible
answer to the problem may be to see ~pwJ as the trigger of the
thumoeidic element. The latter would then represent the actual
energy, and this would be drawn in turn from the fuel supplied
b ' ~y the £nleU~nT1KOV. Such an account may, however, seem too
facile. The probability, in fact, is that only one point need
here be made crucial. epwJ invariably implies eu~6J, but
eu~6J never implies ~pwJ. In fine, the thumoeidic element
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exerts the energy which, in partnership with the logistic
sector, produces the rational striving of ~pwJ. And to Plato,
we may repeat, that process is the very ratio existendi of man.
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INVESTIGATION OF PLATO'S USE OF THE TERM eU~o€lQ€f IN THE
REPUBLIC.
b.l SYNOPSIS OF ETYMOLOGICALLY PROBABLE DERIVATIONS, AND
SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MEANING, OF THE WORD.
The next stage in an attempt to trace the part of eu~6f and
10 eU~O€lQ€f in Plato's philosophical schema would probably
best be an inquiry into his actual use of the words. Also,
there will be a need to probe their uses in contemporary
literature. Where we can be certain that that literature was
not only available but almost certainly familiar to Plato, this
will be of even greater help.
In this preliminary section of the thesis, brevity is again
a prime consideration. The present chapter therefore contains
a short (it is hoped not culpably so) investigation into the
philological background of both eu~6f and eU~o€lQ€f. Then,
again, the Republic is chosen as the particular dialogue l for
more detailed examination. In the case of each of the two
words, every instance occurring in this work is, for
completeness' sake, cited and discussed here. A special
attempt above all is made to highlight Plato's own variants on
the meaning he otherwise normally assigns the terms. To begin




First, to recapitulate briefly. One central point aimed at
in this thesis, as was said in the Introduction, is to show
that the translations 'spirit' for eu~6J and 'spirited' for
. eU~O£lO€J are, in terms of what is required of the words by
Plato vis-a-vis Justice, inadequate. The term 'inadequate' is
preferred here to 'incorrect' because, to mention just one
consideration, the version 'spirited' for eU~O£lO€J is at times
an absolutely correct rendering. The word eU~O£lO€J may convey
that sense in great part, and indeed in toto. In at least
equally numerous instances it does not, however, have it ~
all. And in as far as the rendering 'spirited' is invariably
given for it, this must therefore be amplified. Certainly one
regularly occurring central and essential ingredient, namely
passion', 'rage', 'anger', etc. has to receive due inclusion.
A worthwhile preliminary step may be to try to establish
lexicographically the position that 'spirited' occupies in the
semantic framework. Philosophy is of course unconcerned with
dictionary definitions, but if 'common usage' is disputed,
these may need to be checked.
Ending up with a relatively unspecialised dictionary,
illustration of the point in question is perhaps best achieved
by starting with detailed articles in a comprehensive lexicon.
The Oxford English Dictionary* gives a large number of
meanings. These can be variously summed up as indicating
courage, self-assertion, vivacity, energy, dash', etc. In one
case, and in one case only, is there mention of an 'anger'




emotional part of man as the seat of hostile or angry
feeling'. Whether or not this is a rare sense need not at
present be argued. Certainly it is not familiar. Under
'spirited', however, we find no trace whatever either of anger
or hostility. The Shorter O.E.D.+ corresponds, with
abbreviated comment.
When we reach the Concise O.E.D.+, we find, whether under
the relevant subsections or in any other, not the faintest
indication of any ingredient of anger or hostility in either word.
We find only, for 's?irited', 'full of spirit, aninaterl, lively,
brisk, courageous', and correspondine terms for 'spirit'.
This is a remarkable fact. If a standard, moderately
detailed dictionary can totally exclude the ingredients 'anger'
or 'hostility' in either 'spirit' or 'spirited', then these
ingredients are, in normal use, simply not there. And if
Philosophy is concerned with any manner or kind of use of words
at all, it is normal use.
It is to this point that the present thesis draws
particular attention. For, certain though it is that this
exclusion has occurred in normal modern use, it is no less
certain, from the single mention of it in the fullest dictiona-
ry, that that sense was originally (if exceptionally) there.








Liddell & Scott's Greek-English LeX1con
"
gives under euv6f as Sense 11, subsect. 4: 'the seat of
anger'*.
tempered'.
eUVQ€lQ€f-, under Sense 11, is 'passionate', 'hot-
Second, the Greek-German Lexicon of Dr. H. Menge+
includes under euv6f' equivalents 'Zorn', under eUVO€lQEf',
'zornig' • Apelt+, in his note 46 on Book 11 of the Republic,
speaks of 'der .•... Begriff des euvof und eUVO€lQEf hervor, der
'Zorn', der 'Eifer', 'die heftige Gemiitsaufwallung, die zu
rascher Tat hinreisst'j Astius+ has fo~ eUVQ€lQEf 'animosus,
iracundus', Frisk+ 'leidenschaftlich', 'heftig', Leopold+
'thymo similis' where for euv6f he has 'animus, vis vitalis,
spiritus animalis, animi praesentia, impetus animi, cupiditas,
ira, iracundia'j Chantraine+, referring to eU~Q€lQEf as 'siege
des passions nobles', adds 'On note que toute la derivation se
rapporte a la notion de colere', humeur, etc.' Finally we have
Hofmann+ giving for eu~of 'Gemiitswallung, Leidenschaft, Mut'.
Of translators other than those (for convenience's sake
here, English) chosen for detailed examination, Bastien+
translates eUVO€lQEf 'porte a la colere', Bosanquet+ 'of the
nature of anger', and Apelt+ 'beherzt', where he has for eu~6f
'Beherztheit (der Zornesmut)'.
These scholars all read 'passion', and regularly 'an~er',
+ see Bibliography




into eu~6f. Their separate renderings of eu~6f are therefore
not reproduced here. The anger-hostility element, in short,
could not be more clearly present. In contrast, however, let
us say one thing before we go any further. If this element has
now disappeared, as it clearly has, from the normal usage of
the English terms 'spirit' and 'spirited', an explanation would
appear to be called for. And there is
hypothesis forthcoming to account for it.
a persuasive
The date of the first appearance of 'spirit' in the sense
'seat of anger and hostility' is just prior to A.D. 1500. This
is the period of Late Middle English, and the appearance of the
word in this sense is clearly the result of Renaissance
scholarship reviving classical knowledge. The natural
translation of eu~6f by these early scholars was into the Latih
'spiritus'. This conveyed the sense 'breath' more exclusively
than eu~6f did. But the all-important consequence is that it
will have caused Greek sub-meanings of eu~6f to be transferred
into the English renderings of 'spiritus'. 'Spirit' would now
therefore contain, in one of its root senses, an 'anger-
hostility' ingredient. However, in the era immediately
following 1500, we have the tremendous scientific advances, in
this case especially biological, made by Vesalius (born 1514),
Gesner (1516), Fabricius (1537), Harvey (1578), and others.
Their discoveries quite nullified, amongst other things, a
great number of early anatomical assumptions. The doctrines
which had made the breath the seat of so many mental,
emotional, and generally vital elements, which had made the
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brain the centre of reproduction, etc. - these were whittled
away. The term 'spirit', in its turn, began steadily to lose
most of its earlier emotional characteristics. Accordingly we
find, after Shakespeare's time, certainly increasingly rare and
j
ill-defined examples of the word 'spirit' in the sense of 'seat
of anger or hostility'.
This is, however, as may be. We are still faced with Sense
12 of the O.E.D. article under 'Spirit', 'the emotional part of
man as the seat of hostile or angry feeling'. The Concise
O.E.D.+, Webster+, Tedeschi and Fantonetti++, and numerous
German and French dictionaries consulted have no such elements
in their renderings of the word. Nor does any other dictionary
of any other language to which the present writer has had
access. This, then, is clearly, at the least, a rare sense of
the word.
But we must now put strictures on our inquiry. The last
point, though of great interest and importance, is not even
essential to the present thesis. For the rendering in question
is not of eu~6J, whether as 'spirit' or anything else, but of
eU~OE:"lO(J as 'spirited'. And the salient fact is that, under
'spirited', neither the O.E.D. nor any other English or other
dictionary consulted makes any reference whatsoever to anger or
hostility. The sole counterparts given are words such as
'vivacious', 'energetic', 'self-assertive', etc.
+see Bibliography




We therefore have, in the O.E.D., a single (and this is
clearly a rare, though the point, again, will not be argued)
"adverse" sense given of 'spirit'. In this, the factors of
anger and hostility are incorporated. But second, of sole ulti-
I
~ importance, we have in the sane dictionary, unGer the terQ
'spirited', not the faintest trace of any sense including anger
or hostility at all.
It is not just the occasional, but the virtually invariable,
use of the word 'spirite~' to render eU~oE16fJ that is being
contested in this thesis. It may first, then, be observed that
if no lexicon whatever associates 'spirited' with 'angry' or
'passionate', but in vital contrast every lexicon associates
eU~OE16€J with these two elements, then the lexicographical
grounds for invariable use of the word 'spirited' as a counter-
part to the Greek eU~oE16fJ are non-existent.
It must be stressed again that lexicographical findings can
only be secondary in value to the internal Platonic evidence
concerning the use of the word. The citations given above
supply a preliminary background against which the varying
semantic values normally attached to the words eu~6J and
eU~OE16€J appear more clearly. It may be stated further at
this point that the various Greek texts of the Republic (ed.
Hermann+ for Teubner, Chambry+ for Bude, Burnet+ for Oxford,
and Shorey+ for Loeb) show ~ significant differences from the
English ones in the passages in which eu~6J and eU~oE16fJ
appear. Where translators nevertheless retain a virtually





Greekless reader's interpretation of it can be imagined as
utterly disastrous. Its ultimate function vis-a-vis
philosophical issues can, for him, only be totally chaotic •
.
The purpose of quoting, later in this chapter, the English
translations as English translations is primarily illustrative
rather than demonstrative. The passages would have had to be
quoted whatever language was used. The main purpose, however,
is to show the differing shades of meaning contained in the
t erm eU~OE:uHf. In as far as any translation purports to be
philosophically useful to students of Philosophy who are
unfamiliar with Greek, it must achieve maximum accuracy in each
instance of the word's appearance.
Signs of an awareness of inadequacy in the rendering of the
word appear in comments made by several editors. One example
is Cornford's note (no. 1.5, p.62 of his tr. of the Republic)
attempting to circumscribe the sense of eU~oE:lo(f. He tries to
produce an all-embracing word description. But not only does
his translation not allow for the various important facets he
correctly attributes to it. He also allows himself in the note
to recoil disprDportionately from the essentially crude 'rage',
anger', ,- . ,paSSlon , 'fury' element so obviously ~er~inal to
eU~OE:lo(f. No doubt this is because of the prevalent
idealisation of the vigorous, morally clean Platonic Guardian.
Cornford must feel that he cannot permit himself any stronger
word than 'indignation' to convey its extreme emotional pole.
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But even if 'spirited' manages to cover this feeble extreme, it
only just manages to. Superficially it sounds felicitous,
especially from the idealists' point of view. It occurs in all
the early translations. Accordingly, since the concept seems
•
philosophically otiriseanyway,'latettranslato!sare:promptedto
follow suit.i~Certainly it-has ~er~edphilosophical~interests
perfectly well so far, but only because there have been no
philosophical interests to serve. To cater for a new specific
interest in the word, it must be heavily supplemented. To
satisfy a newly concentrated examination of the part
the eU~o€10€f element plays in Plato's philosophy, a much
fuller analysis is needed of its role in the dialogue.
The contention that Cornford, Jowett, and the other English
translators have given 'inadequate' renderings of the word does
nQt, of course, involve the slightest reflection on their
stature as scholars. The thumoeidic element has simply never
formed a focal point of philosophical interest. The reason the
translation 'spirited' has been so long retained by them is
therefore a straightforward one. The nuances, if any, in its
meaning did not appear to matter. No reason was seen why they
should. It is only modern research that has even suggested the
existence of an inherent 'aggression-urge' in man. And, in
consequence, it is only now that the suspicion has arisen that
Plato was well ahead, indeed almost incredibly far ahead, of his
time - and deserves to be recognised as such.
The palpable certainty that the corresponding Greek term
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eU~O€lonf has to do with the concept of human aggression prompts
close inquiry. Owing, however, to the recent nature of the
'aggression-urge' theory, leading scholars have on no occasion
devoted themselves to a close study of the term in that context
_ or indeed in any, except as a minor constituent of the
tripartite soul. Moreover, as we have seen, 'spirit' had held,
in earlier times, a possible anger element. But even if the 'spirite
sense of the word was rare, it was convenient. English possessed
no ot~er term which adequately talaGce~ 'anzer' wit~ e~otionally
neutral 'vivacity', 'vigour', 'ener8Y', etc. Researchers could
therefore scarcely have been expected to devote special
attention to what they considered of secondary, or even
negligible, importance. Even now its interest has difficulty
in coming to the fore. It suffers eclipse by the problems of
the more widely familiar sectors and subsectors of the mind:
Intellect, Desire, Imagination, etc. Second, it has less
philosophical familiarity than concepts such as those of the
Ideas, Justice, the Good, or, in short, any of the other more
prominent facets of Platonic philosophy. This has until the
present day reached a point at which the production of an
English version meeting all requirements of its interpretation
has seemed quite unnecessary. Accordingly the traditional
rendering has stuck. An approximate translation has sufficed.
German and French scholars were more fortunate, and perhaps
more perspicacious. Certainly through a favourable coincidence
of language (e.g. 'Zorn', if not 'colere', is a wider term than
'anger'), they were able to give it a rendering closer to the
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sense it held in the Greek. The examples given above
illustrate this. It seems disappointing that they still did
not attribute any explicit importance to this feature of the
word. However, th~ reason for their not having done so is
perfectly solid, and of course, from another aspect, exactly
the same as the reason for the English translators' making do
with 'spirited'. The latter no doubt knew that their
translation ought regularly to contain an 'anger' ingredient,
but there was no English word available for that. So, seeing
that the concept was to them not crucially important anyway,
they left it as it stood. Yet the importance to Plato of TO
eu~o€l6€J can without doubt be assumed great. It can indeed
just faintly be gauged by the fact that wherever it is
mentioned in the earlier books of the Republic it is expanded
on. Only later do unamplified references occur.
As things now stand,
,
there is still no suitable single word
to cover it. But even a periphrasis would, of course, in terms
of philosophical requirements, be preferable to a single but
inaccurate term. A good preliminary step at this point may
therefore be to make a slightly deeper inquiry into
etymological and other aspects of the word. This would
supplement, and indeed give a better basis all round to, the
lexicographical data so far cited.
b.2 FURTHER ETYMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON eu~o€l6€J.
To begin with, a possible primitive-meaning of eu~6J is
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*suggested by the probability of the word euw A2 ('to sacrifice
by fire') being cognate with euw B( 'to rage' or 'seethe'). In
this case, assuming eu~6J must be descended from one or other,
it is related to 'fumus' (cf. Liddell & Scott under euw A), and
,
so has association with terms denoting fire and smoke as well
as 'seething' and 'rushing'3. The obvious turbulence generated
inner fire.
by heat, especially in boiling liquids, can be set alongside
the 'boiling' of rough if cold sea-water, rivers, etc. It
certainly strongly suggests that the 'sacrifice' euwand the
'seethe' euw are connected. In any case, these particular
features of theirs are evinced in anger and strong emotion, and
even if this point were not available to give further weight to
a linkage of themselves with each other, eu~6J is certainly
linked with one, if not both, of them. (The naming of the
thymus gland is on the other hand clearly secondary - almost
certainly because its position over the heart makes it a strong
candidate for the source of eu~6J) Hippocrates in Galen4
merely defines eu~6J as the desire to cough, which does not
give much help - unless to show how unimportant the term has
become by his time. The primordial, more concrete meaning of
eu~6f, namely 'breath', could, then, as we have speculated
earlier, have been the thickened, quicker breath. This, seen
as smoke on cold days, or as steamy blasts from the nostrils of
ploughing oxen, etc., would strongly resemble an efflux of
On the principle by which the seat of the mental
powers was the ~pEV€f5 (lungs), it would naturally have been
deemed a denser, warmer, accelerated form of the ~uxn6.
* (i.e. Note no. 2)
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b.3 Whatever the case, the predominant meaning of eu~6f in
Homeric, i.e. earlier, Greek is, as we have seen, 'breath'
(hence 'life'). It also has important overtones of 'life-
warmth' or vigour, since the sense often alters to plain
'anger'7, or at a less intense level 'spirit'8, in that word's,
more contentious sense.
Indeed, Homer never on any occasion uses opyn for 'anger',
employing eu~6f exclusively for this. In Plato, the meaning
'breath' is totally displaced in favour of the emotionally-
orientated senses. 'Emotional' energy in some or other form is
indicated, in particular direct 'anger', more neutrally
'temper', 'drive', or at the other pole 'spiritedness' etc.
The invariable ingredient is dynamic warmth 9 , as in 'hot'lO
rather than more restrained temper, heated or indignant
emotion, vibrant spiritedness, etc.
The element of neutral 'drive' is, indeed, almost dispro-
portionately often coloured by the 'anger' constituent. still,
cover
this has not detracted from the use of the word eu~6f, both in
earlier and Platonic Greek, to denote not only the vehicle of
intellectually significant speech, but even much that we might
have expected words like ~uxn and ~TIleu~fa (desire) to
exclusively. Presocratic (but post-Homeric) use shows
something of an assortment of meanings: 'mind, desire, will,
spirit (=soul), life'. Most notably, however, the ingredient
of 'will' or urge is present ll in part or the whole. Most of
the 'desire', 'will' meaning is taken over in Plato by ~TIleu~fa.
Some confusion can crop up here. As we see later, the
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prime Platonic sense of eu~6f remains 'passion'12 or 'emotion',
whether generally or specifically (as, e.g. in 'spiritedness',
or again 'anger'13). The sense 'emotional drive' or 'spirit'14
*(='spiritedness') coupled with an aggressive tinge seems to
come uppermost in the term eU~o€lonf, as far as the suffix
-€lo£f means 'having the form or look of', and the eU~O€lonf;
man is said to be 'contentious' and 'honour-seeking'15. But
even if the urge to win contests or gain honour cannot be
linked simplex 16 with direct 'anger', which is only a
particularly intense manifestation of emotional drive, it can
be seen as a by-product of the incipient stages of anger. The
translation 'irascible', prone to anger' has at so many points
the strongest possible claim to consideration that, even if the
above were not fully admitted, we should have to make
allowances for it. And it can certainly only be discounted at
the expense of a full presentation of what Plato is trying to
convey. But there is no reason why such a liaison should not
be admitted.
b.4 Variably, then, the term eu~6f in the Republic is made
by Plato at varying times to correspond with our concepts of
'passion', 'spirit', 'anger', 'drive', etc. l ? Its derivative
eU~O€lonf is paired accordingly with 'passionate', 'spirited',
'irascible', 'energetic'. The eu~6f can be 'moved', leading a
person towards emotion 18 , etc., and is also (indifferentiably
from eU~o€lonf) that thing by whose agency a person eU~oULal19,
**'becomes or is irascible'. The fact that Plato chooses to use
the -€lonf ending with eu~6f might suggest that he is not happy
* (not 'soul')
** As the exclusive sense of this verb is that given, we have here
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to think of eU~O€lonJ as being always precisely of, or to do
with, eu~6J in its apparently most common sense of 'ire'20. It
might be thought that he would have chosen a more direct-
sounding adjective, if one had been available. However, there
is no other more direct-sounding adjective in common use.
'eu~l~6J', the nearest, has virtually fallen into disuse. So
that in this connexion it can only be said of his choice of the
word eU~O€lonJ that its latitude does seem to be made to extend
beyond the merely 'angry'. Plato indubitably wishes on ~any occa-
sions to convey by it the quality c1.escribable as '~-lavi~g the "look"
of ire', 'akin to irascible emotion'.
quality which fosters sheer belligerence, as we later see 21 . It
also fosters other dynaQic emotio~al propensities, in~eed almost
i ,,1 par t i all y . But this is not sufficient grounrl for unifor~ly ~ivinL
the totally favourable sense 'spirited'. The possibility of
this creating a false impression must therefore constantly be
borne in mind. The 'contentious' element is usually directly
present, seldom if ever far away. Its more or less total elimination
by the unvarying use of renderings such as 'spirited' is, it
can immediately be seen, absolutely misleading.
b.5 MORE GENERAL SPECULATIONS ON THE WORDS.
In regard to eu~6f' possible connotation of visibility
(smokiness), in contrast with ~uxn's ethereality and clarity,
it is also justifiably tempting to see an intended connexion
with Plato's Ideal Theory. Invisibility being the
characteristic of the eternal and rea1 22 , eu~6f must thereby
stand inferior to ~uxn.
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b.6 Such considerations may perhaps be too remote to
contribute to Plato's 'higher'23 classification of eu~6J. i. e.
eu~6J is ordinarily placed closer to the logistic than to the
I
epithumetic ('desiring') part of the tripartite soul, and no
doubt he is concerned with other criteria for its moral
classification. For instance, he constantly lists the mental,
emotional, and appetitive segments of a man's soul in that
order of precedence, that is, mental, emotional, appetitive as
if in "descending" order - but perhaps this is a moral and
pragmatic, not an academic, conviction. Socrates finds, for
instance, that he is not satisfied 24 with Glaucon's alliance of
eU~O€lO€J, the energetic, with ~TIleU~nTlx6v, the desirous 25 • His
reason, however, is the moral one that eU~O€lO€J never becomes
an ally of €TIleU~nTlxov if AOyo! chooses otherwise 26 , not that
the two have differing measures of realit y 27. In Book IV he
weakens the link on the moral basis between eU~O€lO€J and
'e ..€TIl U~nTlXOV. But in whatever way his treatment of it in this
book is to be reconciled with that in earlier books, the early
treatments deserve close attention.
b.7 To begin with, a principal context in which the term
eU~O€lO€J seems to demand discussion in Plato's use is that he
chooses to employ it as an independent quantity at all. He
could, one might imagine, very naturally have lumped it together
with tTIleU~nTlxov as a common passion, felt as a desire-to-
evince-emotion, a desire which must be indulged and sated by
venting itself in some sort of variant of emotion ranging,
e.g., from urgent drive to open fury. _ Nevertheless, he chooses
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to represent it as, in most cases, a greatly neutral, absolute
force. And this seems very important. It is like the force of
a passion towards some object, but, instead of being morally or
otherwise limited to that object, it remains unlimited. The
object towards which it urges a person can be good, bad, or
indifferent. In Book IX, for instance, the lion of
'spiritedness'28 can ally itself with either the many-headed
beast of the £TIleU~lal, or with the man of the AOY10T1KOv 29.
The lion and the beast are no less able to pull in the same (but
negative) direction than the lion and the logistic man. Plato
admittedly puts the stress on the possibility of the former two
tearing each other apart, and a general reign of chaos being
set up in the person's ~uxn if the 'man (i.e. logistic) does
not apply intellectual restraint. The latter two, that is, appear
here as the more normal collaborators. But the essentially
independent nature of the thumoeidic urge is kept well to the
fore. Indeed Plato's treatment of it in Book IV is extremely
revealing, because he assigns it the status no longer of a mere
inciter to either of good or evil, but of a quantity good or
evil in itself. On the balance, if it can be said to fall
absolutely into either category of good or bad,
say that overall it falls into that of good30.
we might fairly
As a purely
statistical observation, this is of qualified value, but it
ceserves the closest attention.
In Book IX, as has been mentioned, we see eU~OE10Ef, in
the shape of the lion of vigour, capable of supporting
indiscriminately the vicious elements of the beast, or
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alternately the good elements of the man. Earlier (440 e, 442
b, -c), it had been elevated to an ally preferentially of the
man, the AOY10llKOV. It is capable of being corrupted by bad
upbringing, but is not otherwise naturally a supporter of the
I
baser 'desire' compartment. Socrates even suggests}l that it
might be taken together with AOY10llKOV as an integral part of
the same form or E160f, but then corrects himself. His final -
as most frequent - view of it is as the separate, if closely
associated, helper of that element32.
b.B DETAILED EXAMINATION OF ITS USES IN THE TEXT OF THE
REPUBLIC, WITH COMPARISON OF THE TRANSLATIONS OF IT
GIVEN BY CERTAIN PROMINENT TRANSLATORS, AND AN
ATTEMPT AT EVALUATION OF THE LIGHT THROWN ON ITS
MEANINGS BY THESE TRANSLATIONS, COUPLED WITH ANALYSIS
OF THE TEXT.
To sum up the argument posed. Various renderings by
different translators show a tendency to move too markedly
away from the clearly limited term 'irascibility' in their
versions of eu~6f and its associates. The question that must
be put is a) whether in doing so they are always expressing
Plato's intended meaning, and b) whether it is possible to
decide exactly what that meaning overall is. It seems fair to
suppose that one of the safest approaches to discovering what
Plato meant by eU~oE16nJ would be first of all to analyse his
earliest uses of it in the dialogue. Here he will not yet have
subordinated it to the system of morals delineated in its more
developed form in the later passages. We can profit on this
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score from the fact that, to be comprehensible to his hearers,
he still has to restrict himself to using it in an everyday
sense. Then the later uses can be taken in their due order.
At this stage, too, it should, above all, be stressed that
speculation on the widest reasonable scale is undertaken as to
what Plato might precisely mean at each point. Fairness to
translators would not allow of anything less. If the result
appears at first somewhat diffuse, the material crystallised
out in the final chapters should, it is hoped, provide
compensation. Much may be sacrificed in the cause of
completeness, but it is believed that the end result should
prove justificatory.
(375 a 11)*: Socrates: 'But will a horse or dog or any
other animal that is not eU~o€lonf wish to be
brave (avop€lof)? Or have you not realised
how irresistible and indomitable a thing eu~6f
is, in the presence of which every soul is
fearless and invincible in the face of
anything?'
Where Plato uses the adjective eU~o€lonf, the translators whose
versions are being examined33 use the following phrases: 'has
spirit' (Lee, Jowett), 'of a spirited disposition' (Cornford),
'is spirited' (Lindsay, Davies & Vaughan, Spens). Where Plato
* (The translation of the excerpts is in each case my own; the
text used that of Burnet in O.C.T., 1900.)
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uses eu~6J, the translators have: 'high spirits' (Lee), a
high spirit' (Cornford), 'spirit' (Jowett, Lindsay, D. & V.,
Spens). As one sees, 'spirit' comes in throughout. Not even
Spens, the most independent (no doubt partly because earliest)
of all, fails to choose this version.
b.9 This first incidence of the use of the word eu~o€18nJ
is of further value in that it has eu~o€18nJ and eu~6J closely
juxtaposed to each other. So we can probably justifiably
assume that Plato was consciously giving the same significance
to eu~6J on its own as it had in the compound eu~o€18nJ. A
second related feature of interest is that ~uxn, close in
primitive meaning to eu~6f, is also in the same paragraph, and
is treated as having a pointed contrast with eu~6J.
This narrows down possible candidates for the meaning of
eu~6J at this point. The common Homeric sense 'breath',
'life', cannot apply. Or it cannot unless it is a once-and-
never-again usage 34 , which would be hard to credit. A more
restricted, specialised sense is obviously in question.
particular context it is rather difficult to extract an
In the
Still, two leading points madeimmediate meaning of eu~o€18nJ.
by Socrates give a little help:
i) No horse or dog which was not eu~o€18nJ would tend to
be brave.
ii) eu~6J is invincible, indomitable.
In other words, to be brave you have to be eu~o€18nJ. The
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possession of eu~6I is implied in bravery.
A further clue may be sought among previous adjectives
attributed to the satisfactory guard dog35 . He must be three
, ~ 'I ,~.ethings: o~uv ••••• npo cno n01V, , , 'I ~ ~eE:ACXCPPOV npo ••• \)lWJiCX E:1V,
\OXUPOV •••• 01CX~aXE:Oeal, i.e. sharp at noticing intruders,
nimble at pursuing them, and strong in order to fight them.
Now come two extra things he must be:
These are added characteristics, set apart from the others.
The previous three were traits of body, or at most of the
physical senses, not of character. 'Spirited' and 'brave' are
clearly features of character, not at all concerned with body.
To take avoPE:loI first: it is thought of here in rather a
materialistic sense - that of "possessing a sheer tendency to
resist". Apart from this, it implies a great deal of what
might be thought to be covered by the term 'spiritedness'. In
all, it suggests a resolution of demeanour, an active readiness
to take defensive or aggressive action. And this is so close
to anything which the English word 'spirited' conveys as to
cover it almost entirely. The important question arises:
would Plato have bothered here to set eu~oe:l0nf alongside
'brave' when, translated as 'spirited', it already so fully
carries the meaning of 'brave'? The sentence would simply lose
all its impact. He mentions them apart. He must imply that
they belong apart. He would hardly have used a word synonymous
with, or implying, the other. In any case, even if he had, the
order of terms in the sentence, given the translation 'spirited'
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for eU~oE:lcnf, would be "in 'reverse·if,the terms were ;so placed.,
Finalising: the question asked, if translated 'Would any
horse that is not spirited tend to be brave?', implies that all
that is brave must be spirited. But this is not the case.
Bra~epeople or animals are not necessarily spirited. They do
not necessarily display the more overtly active and ebullient
type of courage which the term 'spirit' denotes. On the other
hand, creatures which show spirit are invariably brave.
Spiritedness is, as it were, a kind of overflow of the inner
resource of courage. eU~OE:lcnf is here far more likely, then,
, -
to present a meaning distinct from that of avcpE:lof. It is far
less likely to present one at all closely similar to it, least
of all one which actually includes it. If it did, then, to
make sense, the sentence would have to read the other way round:
'Would any horse that was not brave tend to be spirited?'
b.lO Both from the context and other evidence as to the
nature of eu~6f, it seems clear, then, that Plato cannot have
intended so close a match. We must seek a meaning - here at
least - of eU~o€lonf elsewhere than in 'spirited', somewhere
further along the emotional scale towards the pole with which
it unmistakeably shows itself to have most affinity. This
shift is supported only a few sentences later by the definitive
remark that the opposite of eU~oE:lcnf is Tfpaof, 'mild' or
'gentle'. 'Spirited' could never be a strong enough term to
stand as the diametric opposite of 'mild' or 'gentle'. The
conventional antithesis of 'spirited' is properly
'spiritless'3 6 , literally '6eu~of'. The antithesis of 'mild'
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is something expressly of the nature of 'irascible'. If
eU~O€lonJ is the antithesis of 'mild', then 'irascible' is
certainly the closest approximation to it so far.
Later passages explicitly give XQAOJ (bile), opyn (rage)',
ouoxoAla (bad-temper) as part and parcel of intensifying
eU~o€lonJ37. On the one hand, then, we have proximity of the
term dvop€loJ (brave), but in a somewhat unexalted connexion -
the bravery of encroachment and acquisitiveness. This is the
first point to force upon us consideration of a meaning less
sublime, here, than 'spirited', and nearer to 'anger', for
eU~O€lO€J. On the other, we have the defining term npaoJ,
pressing that meaning even closer to 'irascible'. On a third
front, however, we face a dilemma. This is the problem of the
limited nature of terms connoting anger at al1 38 as adequate
universal renderings of a term so nearly - and so often -
conveying a sense of 'nobility' as eU~O€lonJ.
b.ll A possible answer to this problem - apart, of course,
from the eviGence of Plato's own varying usage of the word _
might be the following. In English we cannot see much
connexion between 'spiritedness' and 'anger'. We regard
spiritedness as what, after all, it has come, in English, to
mean - a higher than merely emotional phenomenon. The Greek
tradition, however, quite clearly retained a very close kinship
of type between 'anger' and what so many translators choose to
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render as 'spiritedness'. One large part of our problem stems
from the shift (discussed above) since Plato's time of the seat
of the intellect from the life-breath of speech, and its
situation in the lungs, to the head. Confusion now occurs,
because the word 'spirit', meaning strictly 'breath' in early
parlance, has nevertheless still been retained for eu~6J, but
with exclusively mental overtones. Now, however, that the
scientific reality has become common ground, we have 'spirit'
treated in everyday language as solely mental, solely stemming
from the 'higher' centre in the head. Its other sense has
wholly disappeared. No doubt in the future further separable
mental ingredients of this loose term 'spirit' will emerge,
simply because the word has not yet been sorted out clearly or
long enough to fall altogether (as it may in any case
not necessarily ever do) out of the English language. But as a
crucial result of all this we retain part of the original
complex denoted by eu~6J in our word 'spirit' meaning
'spiritedness' .
In the same way, eU~O€lonJ might itself have kept part of
the fabric of meaning covered by eu~6J. It could equally have
assimilated some other features. There seems no ground for not
accepting that as a reasonable explanation of why the Greeks
should have developed eU~O€lonJ into a word at times conveyin[ a
strong streak of nobility, at tiues crude anger.
b.l2 It is, of course, this process of, so to speak,
"splitting off" of terms which have become better understood
indiVidually, that has produced two meanings of the English
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word 'spirit' ('spiritedness' and 'soul'). In contrast with
this, the Greek term eu~6f comprehends a whole spectrum of
'life-force' manifestations. This list covers breath, anger,
and all the more heated, or 'seething', forms of emotion, yet also
very often with a ~trong mental tinge. eu~6f is the substance
of a thing we might almost call 'temper', ranging from mildness
(
to anger, and implying a capacity for thought. Cornford39 , as
mentioned, makes a bulky package of this word's analysis. He
'The fierceness is characteristic of the
"spirited element" in the soul. This term covers a group of
impulses manifested in anger and pugnacity, in generous
indignation allied to a sense of honour (439 e), and in
competitive ambition (581 a).' Our problem, however, has been
to decide what the common factor is. What single quality (if
any) enables eU~o€lonf to convey all these meanings? For where
a particular word in one language has, on translation into
another, to have its meaning changed at different loci, this is
highly inconvenient. It is a consequence of the 'splitting'
spoken aQout above, and of course it is justifiable if no
adequate single word can be found; but one of the principal
objects of any translator is to avoid it.
In the case of eu~6f, clearly a very basic quantity is
involved. This yields (depending on the amount of it present)
various degrees of vitality, 'life-force', 'sp1."r"t' t1. ,e c.,
ranging from relative life1essnessto frenzied activity, blind
rage, and other emotional mutants. Any translation of it must
reflect that particular section on the 'forceful-vitality'
scale which it happens to denote at that particular locus. But
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at the same time, we can repeat, if one term can be found
conveying the common
meanings, and is close enough to the specialised meanings to
make adequate sense, some sacrifice of accuracy (if unavoidable)
is worth making in the interests of uniformity.
b.13 Second, Socrates has said that eu~6f is invincible,
indomitable. As a rendering of eu~6f, 'temper' would have
greater claim here even than 'spiritedness' - which is at this
point apposite - to general validity. Unfortunately, 'temper'
alone does not mean a neutral degree of 'high-' or 'short-
temper', but something rather different. But if we ask
ourselves what fraction of man's mental-emotional force
spectrum is most notoriously careless of danger, what part most
easily keeps the individual dynamic regardless of threats and
opposition, it is surely the emotional force of anger (by
which of course is meant sincere anger rather than, for
, ...
instance, the anger of the QXPQXOAof, • snappish' , t-and OpylAOf,
'testy'40.) And this applies steadily more so to its more
extreme gradations.
The more intellectual quantity 'spirit' does not, then,
apply in this context. Rage is notoriously blind to menace. A
man of 'spirit', on the other hand, is cool enough to measure
danger, as well as being readier by nature to face it than a
spiritless. And this might raise the question of whether Plato
intends here a slower, more solid determination to resist
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attack. This point could be contested. Perhaps the arguments
for and against should not be pressed too hard. However, the
dog's sharpness, swiftness, and strength all suggest rapid,
forcible aggressiveness. And it would seem conclusive, both
I
from this and from the other loci, that Plato leans early on,
as well as later, towards an 'irascible', as incorporated in
the adjective eU~O€lonJ, at least as much as to any other
component, in his use of the term eu~6J.
b.14 Unfortunately, as we have premised, 'temper' absolute
in English is importantly unlike eu~6J in one respect. It does
not quite mean, as does eu~6J, that substance which, depending
upon its intensity, produces good or bad temper. And there
seems to be no single English word which does. This could be
because the concept of 'humours' and other physical substances
producing different emotions has fallen away, or by simple
accident of language-development. Where parts of a whole are
defined and become separately important, the whole may of course
lose its identity.
artificial whole.
And this is especially so if it is an
This is what seems to have happened to the
'humours' producing 'Vital force', 'rage', etc. However,
't ' ,emper comes very near to rendering eu~oJ. It is to be
questioned whether 'spirit' is as accurate, or even as
harmonious, a translation of it - especially as, at all events,
'short-' or 'hot-temper'.
If it is accepted that eu~6J,
while embracing at least the Whole "anger"-scale (and much
more), commonly refers to its more intense pole, it is apt that
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a translation should indicate this. But more than that, as we
have already seen, the word 'spirit' is not only ambiguous in
English. Even if understood without ambiguity as
'spiritedness' rather than ~soul', it still carries strong
overtones of intellect41 •
•This element is too much 'higher'
than the emotional to be left unqualifiedly present. It there-
fore becomes important that any single word that is proposed to
replace it should both be freer of that higher element, and at
any rate on statistical grounds a good deal further up the
enotion-intensity scale.
b.15 Several further instances of eu~o(16nf follow in
fairly close succession:
375 b 4: Soc.: It is clear now what sort of individuals




And spiritually, that they must be
That, too.
Soc. : Then how, Glaucon, will it be possible for
them not to be rough (aYPlol) towards one
another?
Translators' phrases (covering ~uxn as well as eU~OE16nf, with
their renderings of ~YP10l bracketed) are: 'he must be of a
spirited temper' ('behaving pugnaciously') (Cornford), 'and
also what qualities of the mind, namely that he must be
spirited' ('behaving fiercely') (D. & V.), 'his soul is to be
full of spirit' ('savage') (Jowett), 'in character they must be
high-spirited' ('aggressive') (Lee), ftS to their mental
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qualities, we know they must be spirited' ('behaving savagely')
(Lindsay), 'and with reference to his soul, that he should be
spirited' ('savage') (Spens).
If people are eU~O€lC€lf it evidently follows to the Greek
'...ear that they could tend to be ayplol: 'boorish', 'rough',
'... f'violent'. These are established senses of aYPlo • And they
carry heavy significance. Foremost, they pinpoint attention on
that constituent of eU~o€lcnf which will allow of them at all.
At the very least, it cannot be less than contentiousness. Its
stronger suggestion is of something even less pleasant. To the
question 'What characteristic most ordinarily makes people
boorish, rough, and violent?' the answer that springs
immediately to the mind is certainly not 'spirit'. Much less
is it 'spiritedness'. At best it is 'hot-', or rather 'bad-',
'temper' . In abnormal contexts (e.g. a person's feeling a
serious temporary grievance, suffering from a chronic illness,
etc.), this obviousness of the presence of bad-temper in his
make-up would disappear. But the present sense indicates that
the word is being used in the normal context. Plato is here
talking about a person's continuous natural disposition.
eU~O€lonf at this point carries a strong 'bad-temper'
cons~ituent therefore becomes a mandatory conclusion.
That
b.16 These considerations can now be weighed against the
translators' interpretations. (Of the six sets of renderings,
Lee's seems internally the most consistent. It is followed
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closely by Cornford's.) A spirited person can more or less
aptly be thought of as mildly aggressive. He can also, if
slightly less so, be thought of as being capable of behaving
pugnaciously. But the terms 'savage' and 'fierce' are out of
the running. They are quite unconvincing. Savagery and
fierceness do not go with spiritedness at all. They are far
too crude. On the other hand, the fact that the other four
translators (D. & V., Jowett, Lindsay, and Spens) can go so far
, ~ Jfor aYP10Tn as 'fierce' and 'savage' puts into really
conspicuous relief the unsuitability of the versions all of
them give for eU~O(lonJ. For a spirited person is primarily
thought of as defensively, not offensively courageous. He just
does not have ignoble (e.g. greedy) characteristics. He
endeavours to maintain what is right. Certainly, he might
initiate contest, but only for very good reasons. He would
never be gratuitously aggressive. But even less than that
would he be likely to be guilty of acts of unprovoked
fierceness and savagery. The word 'spirited' for
eU~O(lonJ against this testimony goes into the realm of the
fanciful.
By contrast, 'aggressiveness', 'pugnacity', 'fierceness'
and 'savagery' can all very properly be predicated of
'hot-temper'. If eU~O(lonJ were here translated as that
instead of as the various mutations given of the word 'spirit',
the passages would all become harmonious.
b .17 375 c 6 is less uncompromisingly, but still
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distinctly, favourable to this way of ,turning the word:
'"Then what will we do?" I asked. "Where will we find a
disposition that is at once mild (npaoJ) and fiery
(~EyaA6eu~oJ)? Since I would say a mild nature is the
opposite of a eU~oE18fiJ."'
Translators have (again my underlining for the respective
renderings of eU~oE18fiJ): 'gentleness and a high temper are
contraries' (Cornford), 'a gentle nature is the opposite of a
spirited one' (D. & V.), 'how shall we find a gentle nature
which has a great spirit, for the one is the contradiction of
the other?' (Jowett), 'gentleness and high spirits are natural
opposites' (Lee), '~ gentle nature is surely the antithesis of
a spirited' (Lindsay), 'the meek disposition is somehow
opposite to the spirited' (Spens).
eU~oE16fiJ and ~EyaA6eu~of are apparently treated here by
Socrates as synonyms. The merit of the passage as a source of
information about the meaning of eU~OE18fif is mostly affected
by the doubt attaching to the meaning we should give
~EyaA6eu~of. ('Having a large eu~6f' suggests, in the Greek,
possession of large stores of eu~6f in the sense more of
general 'drive', 'heart', than specifically of 'ire', or
similar qualities.) But the word occurs so often in the latter
sense that we might submit that, in view of the second half of
the passage, this is probably the likely sense.
b.18 In this second half, we have npaof set over against
eU~OE18fif as its direct antithesis. As is shown in the case of
n~EP6f43, which is for practical purposes synonymous with
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npaoJ, 'mild' is less properly an antithesis of 'spirited' than
of 'hot-tempered'. 'Mild' and 'hot-tempered' are both
descriptive of passionate (and thus 'suffering',
, .,
passl.ve ,
emotional) dispositions. In contrast, 'spirited' and, e.g.,
'apathetic' would correspond better as antitheses. Both are
descriptive, at opposite poles, of the more intellectually
positive disposition to take constructive steps in a particular
direction. A spirited person could never be constitutionally
apathetic. On the other hand, a hot-tempered person
conceivably could. Having effectively less intellect, on
average, he has also less of the mentally generated enterprise
that goes with it. Again, a spirited person is not the sort
who could be naturally 'crude' or 'rough' ('6YP10J). On the
contrary, it is specifically stated44 that the eU~O€lonJ person
could. Accordingly, Cornford's 'high temper' version is the
only one that comes near the meaning expressed. The other
versions, uniformly retaining 'spirit' variants, miss it.
b.19 Plato has supplied a second possible opposite of
eU~O€lonf in ~eu~of45. This has more the look of 'apathetic'
than npaoJ or n~€p6f but still strictly means no more than
'lacking in eu~6f'. As such, it is an acceptable candidate for
tempered'.
interpretation as 'mild', that i~, an opposite of 'hot-
But there is little peripheral material present in
the passage in which it occurs (not quoted here), and none to
indicate whether or not eu~6J46 leans to one or other pole of
the 'temper' spectrum. It cannot, in every event, alter our
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general conclusion that so far 6U1.10E:lCnf shows quite renarkably
unequivocal loading with an ingredient of contentiousness, if
not direct anger. Of the other pieces of evidence mentioned,
those that do not positively support this finding do not at
least run counter to it.
b.20 Further evidence for a sense of 6U1.10ElOnf incorporating
more heat of temper in it than the term 'spirited' connotes
occurs just before the first mention of the word in Book 11.
Here Socrates is discussing the way a luxury-seeking state
proceeds from superfluous complexity to war. A state of
discontentment with simple but adequate means for life had led
to acquisitiveness. In turn, this led to a desire to take over
other people's territory. The third and final step was
physical clash. The 6U1.10ElOEf quality comes up for discussion
in connexion with the conclusion that, granted war, there will
be a need for soldiers. The preliminary passage is given first:
373 e 2: '"So after this we will be making war, won't we,
Glaucon?"
"Yes."
"And let us not yet say anything," I said, "about
whether war does good or evil, bu.t just this much:
that we have found the cause of war, from which
bodies politic derive their chief private and
public ills."
"Agreed."
"So, my friend, we need a still larger city, and
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larger not just by a small margin but by an
entire army, which will march out in the
interests of the general whole and fight for the
sake of what we've just been mentioning against
those who oppose it."
This introduction has some special features. Plato speaks of
the need for soldiers for his planned Republic without further
preamble, and we can of course by no means assume that he means
their function to be purely defensive 47 • In terms of his
overall dialectical purpose, his pursuit of the ideal state, we
no doubt do not have to be explicitly shown that he does. But
at any rate we have already been told that the city is a
luxury-seeking one, which starts the fight for gain. This city
is by implication one disapproved of by Socrates, and the fact
that the Republic he is now discussing is not ideal is one that
must not be forgotten. It takes the offensive: makes
aggressive war. It is a city out for gain, as he admitted from
just after the start of the discussion (when forced unwillingly
into this position by his young colleagues). We therefore
logically enough read, through large sections of the
dialogue 48 , of fighters - the Guardians - who are the "best
possible" men engaging in the "highest possible" pursuits. But
this needs a drastic qualification. We must read into it the
In passing, even if we do have to accept this qualification,
we do not have to answer any further questions of just how
'contentious' or 'aggressive' we are to take ~v6pE~oI to be.
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It would be difficult to split 'bravery' (or, literally,
'manliness') into two types: one shown by the 'innocent'
defender, the other by the 'aggressive' attacker. In the
sentence in which we meet the word eU~O€lonJ for the first time
in the dialogue, 'The horse or dog which is not eU~O€lcnJ will
not wish to be brave', the intention is clearly to point out
one leading consideration: t~e positive wish to engage in
manly behaviour, standardly accepted as military contest - or
more simply fighting. And this will only be found in the
'irascible', 'aggressive' individual. Others will be content
to be manly when provoked. The word 'manly', a fair equivalent
, ~
to aVOp€loJ, has solely good connotations, and never loses them.
Plato's words here, as we observed, therefore include under
fighting the sort of fighting done by a self-indulgent city.
In other words, it unequivocally allows for aggressive war, as
well as that done by the city which is attacked by the
aggressor. The individual capable of bravery is as much the
avaricious one who attacks unprovoked for purposes of theft as
the one who innocently tries to ward off such an attack 49. But
, ~ ~aVup€la is a morally favourable term,not to be lightly
associated with unprovoked attack. In fact, Plato seems
actually to avoid the word 'wants' altogether in this
passage 50 , as though aware that an issue of ~TIleU~la (desire)
and blatant injustice arises. The favourable term "guard"
comes belatedl y 5 l • There can, however, be no doubt of his
referring to active commandeering of other people's goods. He
here, in short, precisely means by eU~oEloEJ a preliminary to
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acquisitive, contentious aggression. And in that connexion it
is quite implausible to speak of a 'spirited' individual; for
rather we ~ontemplate one who, without cause except his own
aggression-urge, develops truculent anger against others.
There is far less sublimity of mind attaching to gratuitous
lethal attack than we can expect of high spirit. Some cruder
property, essentially one of the lower emotions, suggests
itself. The intellectual uncontrol of passion is obviously
reprehensible to Plato. It cannot be predicated of something
as elevated as 'spirit'.
The contrast of eU~o€lonf with ~lA6ao~of, 'intellect-
ual'52, is discussed very shortly afterwards. Plato seems to
be making it additionally clear that there is a characteristic
of unreflectiveness about TO eU~O€lo€f which puts it below
(though often as the helper of)53 the higher faculties:
375 e 1: '"You know that it is the natural habit of
thoroughbred dogs to be as gentle as can be with
people familiar to them, but the opposite to
strangers."
"I do."
"So then this is a possible situation, and we are
not seeking something contrary to nature in the
Guardians."
"No."
"Do you not also think that the individual who is
to belong to the Guardian class ought to be
intellectual (~lA6ao~of) as well as eu~o€l6nf?"
Translators, for eu~o€l6nf 'spirited.temper' (Cornford),
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'high-spirited' (D. & V.), 'spirited nature' (Jowett), 'high
spirits' (Lee), 'spirited element' (Lindsay), 'spirited'
(Spens).
If there were any doubt as to the type of meaning being
attached by Plato to BUPOE18fiJ at this point, it is dispellBd
by its use in connexion with the behaviour of dogs. A dog's
bark, almost its sole vocal signal, ,can no doubt be friendly.
So, possibly, also can a lion's roar. But expert knowledge is
required to pronounce on this, and only those thoroughly
well-acquainted with the dog or lion will risk assuming that it
is friendly when it gives tongue. A stranger, when he is
barked at, assumes the reverse - for practical purposes. The
price to be paid in these cases for misinterpreting anger as
friendliness is too high. By common utilitarian inference,
then, a dog is taken to be angry if it is not silent.
Another and perhaps clearer way of expressing this might be
to say that the transition from calmness to rage in a dog is in
any case so facile that intermediate stages cannot for
practical purposes be taken into account. Fine distinctions
are simply not worth making. That Plato is putting t~e
inteipretation "aggressive" on the term as applied to the guard
dog seems therefore by far the most likely of the various
alternatives. He is most unlikely to be referring to any
subtle kind of courage or drive. The primitive anger portrayed
in the familiar picture of the dog barking is in question. As
a result, the terms 'spirited temper', 'high spirits', etc.
used by translators are too elevated to fill its place.
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b.21 376 c 4: 'So the man who is to be a fine and good
guardian of the city will by our scheme be
naturally intellectual, eu~o£lcnf, swift,
and str ong. '
Translators: 'spirited' (Cornford), 'high-spirited' (D. & V.),
'spirit' (Jowett), 'high spirits' (Lee), 'spirited' (Lindsay,
Spens). Here the standard translation given to eu~o£lcnf is
not suprisingly retained. But the simple absence of factors
tending to compel the choice of another is not a strong
justification for retaining it. Whatever overall English
equivalent is preferred for it - and "hot-tempered" seems a
good candidate - 'spirited', 'of a spirited disposition', etc.
do not provide adequate equivalents. They give the concept a
bias in the direction of the 'higher', more intellectual
faculties which Plato obviously does not mean it to have here.
However, further passages supply fuller evidence for this:
b.22 (At the next point after 376 c at which it occurs,
eU~O€lcnf has at first a not specially definable 'lower'
ingredient.)
410 b: 'He (the Guardian-to-be) will engage in gymnastic
and endurance tests with his mind centred on the
eU~O€lo€f in his nature, and will go in for the
exertions in question in order to rouse that
element rather than to increase his stren~th.'
o
Translators: energy and initiative' (Lee), 'spirited element
in their nature' (Cornford), 'spirited element of his nature'
(Jowett, D. & V.), 'spirited part of his soul' (Lindsay),
'sprightliness of his temper' (Spens).
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Here there is an immediate hint, by implication or
otherwise, of the kind of natural property that is involved.
Unfortunately, however, the hint is somewhat vague. 'Spirit-
edness' could be meant; 'irascibility'; several things. A
translation has to rely on reference to its earlier meanings.
The passage is however interesting in that it can, at a
stretch, be interpreted as meaning that the young Guardian
deliberately labours beyond his strength. This involves a
viewpoint common to militaristic societies. Exertion of
oneself beyond the limits of moderate tolerance, even to
breaking point, is worthy and to be encouraged. The habit is
regarded as laudable for various reasons, some less obvious
than others, by war-like people. And it is probable not only
that Plato was aware of this viewpoint and himself held it, but
that he is making a specific allusion to it here. His founding
of the Republic largely on Spartan practice would exactly
accord with this.
b.23 Then, however, a few sentences lat er 54, he
specifies the extremes which will result if the eU~O€lO(J
property is developed exclusively, to the disregard of the
tempering influence of music. These extremes are
, ~
aYPloTnJ,
'roughness', and aK~np6TnJ, 'hardness'. Here an "ire
ingredient emerges quite definitively.
410 c 8: '"y k d'ou now, on t you, " I said, "the sort of
character one finds in people who go in for
.gymnastic all their lives without touching music
- and vice versa?
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"What are you referring to?"
"Roughness and callousness, and softness and
mildness - "
"I see," he answered. "The ones who participate
exclusively in gymnastic become rougher than they
should be, those who do so in music softer than
really befits them."
"And yet, the eUPOE18ff would produce the rough
part of our make-up; in other words, properly
nurtured it would be courage; whereas, carried
further than it ought to be, it turns harsh and
intractable - or so it seems to " ,me.
Translators' phrases are: 'surely that ferocity is the
i.e. he is
outcome of the spirited element in our nature' (Cornford) (the
rendering in each case of eUPOE18ff is underlined), 'rudeness
is the natural product of the spirited element' (D. & V.),
'this ferocity only comes from spirit' (Jowett), 'it is the
energy and initiative in their nature that may make them
uncivilised' (Lee), 'it is the spirited element in their nature
that produces the fierceness' (Lindsay), 'this rusticity, at
least, may generate a sprightliness of temper' (Spens). In
this particular passage, all the translators except Lee and
Spens render lO eUPOE10ff as 'spirit' or 'the spirited
,
element', and the expressions used by the latter two scholars
are close paraphrases of these. A point of some interest is
that Plato, in the expression used here, seems most probably to
be using 8UPOE10ff as subject and ~YP10V as object.





translators (except Spens) take him, the other way
(
. ~
But even if he were, by contrast, saying using aYPlov
and eU~o€lQ€f as interchangeably generated and generator, as
well as virtual synonyms) that 'roughness' would engender the
eU~O€lQ€f in our nature, and that, properly nurtured, this
roughness would be courage, it would make little difference.
We simply have an even closer tie here between the central
characteristic features of eU~o€lQ€f and the ill-temper of ~YPlOV.
Of the translators, Spens, as we see, is the only one to
turn the sentence in this way. A stock version of eU~o€lonf
seems nON to be ingrained in the other translators' minds. At
this stage they seem to have accepted it exclusively as that
formally classified part of the soul which generates the
general characteristics of 'drive'. As a result, the unexpected
construction of this sentence slips by unnoticed. Even Adam
assumes without comment that the sequence is eU~o€lQ€f as
subject, ~YPlOV as object 55 . Yet the importance of the other
sequence needs little highlighting. Plato, if he is using the
reverse construction, must see - at this point at any rate -
little generic difference between ~YPlOV and eU~o€lQ€f. But
even if he is using the original construction mooted, he cannot
be seeing much more. Otherwise the arguments led above on the
b.24
source from which ~YPl61nf may be derived could not hold.
As regards the translations of the individual word 'aYPlOV.
All of these ('ferocity'. 'fierceness', 'rudeness', etc.)
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represent versions equivalent to 'roughness'56.
, ~ fayplo-rn , when
taken in the present context together with later ones 57 (as also
together with OKAnpo-rnf, xaAETIo-rnf, ~eovof, Sla, etc. 58 ),
suggests a distinct vein of malice. This is expressed
especially in malicious negligence of others' interests, if not
active injustice itself. 'Spiritedness', in contrast,
suggesting in its essence the energetic, perceptive, morally
'good' individual, has no trace of malice. The positive
extreme of spiritedness is rather of the order of rashness.
Yet this too is a rashness in the cause of basically good
ends. If anything, it involves self-sacrifice, as against the
selfishness of negligence. On the other hand, if there were
not most often a definite element of noxiousness, even malice,
in 8UllOf (and so 8UlloE10nJ) at their ordinary level, 8UllOE10€f
could scarcely metamorphose into dYPlo-rnf - much less into
S1a59. The natural extreme of spirit is, as has been observed,
foolhardiness or recklessness. But these are the faults of
energetic, honourable enthusiasm, not of vulgar aggress-
iveness. In proposing 'spiritedness' as a primary source of
&YPlo,nf, the translators again seem content with far too favour-
able'ail,approximation.
b.25 'stirring up', 'rousing' (tYE1Pwv)60 is as applicable
to spirit as to anger. However, from the above considerations
the conclusion would appear to be that the baser element was
there at the ordinary level. 8U llOE10nf still does not here
mean' spirited' so much as 'hot-tempered', 'prone to
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irritation'. The most important feature of irritability is its
aura of menace. The chief interest to others inherent in
reporting of a person that he is irate is normally ~hat ~e .is.
in a state which is potentially dangerous to others. His
irritation is a possible forerunner of incompletely controlled,
aggressive action. 'Roughness' is a quality of essentially
clumsy, and so potentially noxious, individuals. It also often
goes with active ill-disposition, and is capable of spilling
over into serious general harmfulness. In contrast, an
oversupply of 'spirit' is never even remotely conceived of in
this way. It is never even vaguely considered as such. We
regard it as incapable of having adverse consequences for
anyone but declared enemies. That the crude, lowly
quality dYPlolnf could be produced by the development - exclud-
ing as irrelevant the more grotesque maldevelopments - of
'spirit' is impossible to conceive. Of hot-temper, certainly.
Conversely, n~EPolnf6l (gentleness) is not really a convincing
opposite of 'spirit' at the negative pole either. Apathy,
laziness, cowardice, as we have seen62 , fit this category much
better. It may be that they are deficiencies of the 'higher',
more 'deliberate' voluntary virtues. Softness mildness, ,
effeteness may be features of the lower, emotional and more
involuntary level of the human psyche. But hot-temper is, in
that eventuality, their natural counterpart.
b.26 A test for this distinction is elusive. Still, it
could be the case that effeteness,. softness, hot-temper, etc.
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ar e attributes which people are not usually very heavily blamed
for showing. And this is perhaps because they are of secondary
importance to others. Praise and blame are reserved more for
the cardinally important 'higher' mental manifestations. The
importance of these latter lies of course in the fact that they
initiate i~tellectually deliberate, sophisticated and so
maximally serious acts influencing other people's lives. On
been discu
presented with in this
" /
aKA np oinf ':(
• 'd' • ., 63 ) , ~ f\ dpassage Juxtapose 1n contrast1ng pa1rs'~ ,ayploTn an
, I
f, '.,1> I , .,I> _.~----)
and llaAaKla and nllEpoTnf, only ~YPlOTnf ,and 'nllEPOTnf,:have
the other hand, of the attributes we are
ed. These represent,respectively, the opposite extremes .to which 1
eUllOElO€f can be developed. But then, so do the two we have
not discussed, oJ.tAnpOTnf and ~.JaACiJ.tlCi. And these are significantly
less loaded with the 'harmful' coefficient inherent in any word
associated with anger. aYPlOTnf connotes positive harmfulness,
nllEpoTnf the negation of it. llCiACiJ.tlCi, on the
other hand, are more or less neutral regarding harmfulness.
These last two, especially llCiACiJ.tlCi, as 'alternate' extremes of
eUllOElO€f, seem to bring us closer to the meaning' spirited' for
eUllOElOnf than we have ever yet been. Plato does ascribe
llCiACiJ.tlCi to a surplus of llOUOlJ.tn. Nevertheless this would not
It needs
discount a possibility that he is here endeavouring to give the
lower, emotional sense of eUlloElonJ a lift upwards.
now, for present purposes, to approach closer to the
intellectual plane. Such a move will be a natural preparation
for his treatment of it later64 as the ally of the rational
( AOYlO"'l"O~\)). The chol' ce t f th t ' ~ ~ JL TL , 00, 0 e erm Ci\)uPElO is
significant. It provides a 'good' alternate form of
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what eU~OE10nJ ~ be developed into at the positive pole (the
'bad' alternate being 'aYP10J). As such, it then supplies
another intellectual component in addition to the primarily
emotional 'irascible' component.
b.27 In the Protagoras65, Socrates actu~lly equates bravery
with wisdom. The irascibility that can be developed to bravery
is here no longer just a proneness to anger. It has gone
beyond simple passion. An advance has been allowed to a
quantity in which the mind as well as the emotions not only
plays a part, but overshadows the emotions altogether. This
sort of entity, intellectually focus sed 'drive' or 'emotion',
might well do duty as 'spirit', Plato's inclusion of the term
&\JOPEt"CI as a developoent of eU~OE10€J would also seem to be
evidence that what he wants to convey by eU~OE10€J, at that
point, is not just a passively emotional, but Bore a conscious
force 66 • Nevertheless, when we see eU~OE10€J linked elsewhere with
<pd.o\JUi,O\J67 and <pd.O-rl~O\J (both called a 'reproach'68), and
most of all with OUOJ.f.OAlCl 69, we are made aware that it can be a
defectively conscious force. &\JOPE1Cl is then at least as much
of an improvement on it as
,
ClYP10-rnJ is a corruption of it.
b.28 Gosling comment s 70: 'It is not at all obvious what
Plato is trying to isolate with the term "thymos"'. Further,
'either Plato is very confused or else he is using the word
"thymos" technically to isolate a phenomenon for which there is




It sometimes seems difficult to tell
whether we or Plato are confused, although Plato is probably the
less likely, and proof that he is confused almost invariably
turns out to be impossible. But what seems to be happening
,
here is that Plato is not so much 'trying to isolate' a single
natural phenomenon. What he seems to be doing is making use
of eu~6f as it is normally employed, but packing it from time
to time with more matter than it normally holds. The purpose
behind this would seem to be to combine several simple
phenomena into one which he believes deserves to have a single .
compound existence.
b.29 Earlier treatment of the term eu~o(16~f foreshadows
these more 'loaded' instances, in the important passages?l of
Book IV. Even here, however, the loading is at first not
uniformly applied. This is indeed to be expected on first
citation in a passage. The listeners' minds must be prepared
gradually for the 'packed' uses by preliminary normal uses.
The complex versions can then safely be allowed to appear later
on.
b·30 SECOND MAIN DIVISION OF USES - PARAS. 411 - 586.
The next passage containing an instance of eu~o(16~f is the
last prior to Book IV, and in a way introductory to it.
Closely following it in the next book, however, are sufficient
further passages to make the full sequBnce worth taking as a
whole. In all, the passage contains eight instances of
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variants incorporating the stem eu~-.
411 a : Soc.: '"Isn't it the case that when someone conjoins
with music the practice of letting these melodies
we have just referred to as sweet, soft, and
melancholy wail him into subjection, pouring into
his soul via his ears as through a funnel, and
lives out his entire life warbling and revelling
in song, he first of all, if he had any eU~O£lO€J
(1)72 in him in the first place, softens it as
one does iron and makes something useful of what
was useless and hard. But when he carries this
too far, no longer merely relaxing but beguiling
it, he subsequently melts and pours it out of
himself utterly, till he has completely melted
his eu~6J(2) away, and as it were cut the nerves
of his soul and turned himself into a 'spineless
spearman' ."
"He does exactly that," he answered.
"And if," I said, "this happens to a person who
is naturally ~eu~oJ(3) at the outset, his account
is quickly enough settled. If, on the other
hand, it happens to someone who is eU~O€lonJ(4),
it makes the eu~6J(5) weak and easily swayed,
quickly incensed by small matters, and quickly
snuffed out. These people become irritable and
bad-tempered instead of eU~O€lo€lJ(6), full of
snappish ill-humour."
"Very much so."
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"But what if a person works hard at ~ymnastic and
takes great delight in it, but never touches
music or philosophy? Does he not, at first,
owing to his bodily well-being, become filled
with self-confidence and eu~6f(7) and grow to be
braver than normal?"
"He does."
"What of the case when he does nothing else - has
absolutely no truck with any of the Muses at
all? Surely if there was any love of learning in
his soul it must, as far as it gets no taste of
learning or inquiry, become - as it partakes
neither of reason nor of the rest of the arts -
weak, lame and blind through being neither roused
nor nourished, its perceptions left unpurified?"
"Quite so," he said.
"I'm sure a man like that becomes a hater of
reason and devoid of culture. He no longer
persuades by means of words but by brute force,
which he inflicts on everyone he meets, like an
animal, and in his ignorance and oafishness his
life has neither harmony nor grace about it."
"This is how things turn out," he replied.
"For these two entities, the philosophic and
eU~OE18ff(8) faculties respectively," I said, "it
would seem then that some god has given man two
skills, music and gymnastic; not for the mind and




those two faculties, so that they can harmonise
with one another, exerting themselves or relaxing
to the correct degrees."'
Of the translators, D. & V., Jowett and Lindsay use
solely variants of 'spirit' for the 'eu~-'-containing compounds.
As greater expansion on eU~o€10nf and its correlates can
therefore only be obtained by reference to the versions of the
other three scholars, only theirs are considered. Each
version they provide is given after the numbered instance of
the 'eu~-'-compound:
(1) 'energy and initiative of mind' (Lee), (5) 'mind'
(Spens), (6) 'energy' (Lee), (7) 'energy' (Cornford, Lee),
(8) 'energy and initiative' (Lee).
(1) Lee's full sentence is: 'The effect at first on his energy
and initiative of mind, if he has any, is to soften it as iron
is softened in a furnace': The expression 'energy and
initiative of mind' could be one of two things: First, an
adjusted translation of what the translator believes to be an
altered sense of the word eU~o€lonf. Second, it could be a bid
at a more familiar exegesis of the word 'spirit'. At the
outset, it seems as though it might be the first. The
ever-present germ of 'soul' in 'spirit' is displaced in favour
of 'mind', its more ethereal connotations being excluded. That
it is the second of the two, however, is shown not only by its
excessively close approximation in meaning to 'spirit' as the
word has been expanded above 73. (This is so close as to make
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the variation on the normal sense of 'spirit' for practical
purposes imperceptible.) It is also shown by the equal
incongruity of seeing 'energy and initiative of mind' , and
'spirit', as 'hard' and 'unworkable' things that need
'softening'. Energy and initiative would need guidance, if any-
thing; not softening. One could not conceive of them as
obdurate, perversely unbending tendencies. Rather, by
contrast, the hard intractability that needs softening is
looked for in 'hard' people. And these people are, if not
patently cross-grained and irritable, then certainly the sort
who are so to speak "angry deep down". Their 'hardness',
indeed, takes its very definition from their unrelenting
intractability, and the intractability in turn is further
braced by a force of emotion of which the hallmarks are those
predicated of anger. 'Hardness' suggests a chronic, habitual
lack of readiness to confer benefits, coupled with,
importantly, an inflexible urge to inflict privation. This is
the disposition most typically denoted by it. And its core,
the means through which inflexibility is conferred on it, is
irascibility, here of the most unreasoning sort.
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English term 'spirit' as an intelligent as well as energetic
element is strongly etched into it - strongly enough to pass
unquestioned. As a natural colleague now of AOYlOTlKOV, we can
see that eU~O€lC€J is meant-by Plato at least-to be specially
adapted to assisting the rational and intellectual. But even
now it is only a naturally part-intelligent energy source. It
does not come up to the intellectual standard of 'spirit' =
'spiritedness'. That 'spiritedness' should be contemplated as
capable of being, at any time or in any circumstances whatever,
( ' ~ , -'useless and hard', as above axpnOTOu Kal oKAnpOu), puts an
impossible strain on its normal sense. 'Hot-temperedness', on
the other hand, has once again the right element here of
"unfBvQurability" - in this case in particular of obstinacy.
It is an indurated, stubborn, though not utterly mindless, type
of tenacity. And this would call for 'melting down',
'rendering useful'.
b·33 (2) The melting away of eu~oJ involves 'cutting the
nerves of the soul' and turning the subject of this process
, '(' , ~)into a spineless spearman ~aAeaKov alx~nlnV . This suggests
a less complicated meaning for eu~6J, with 'nerve' or 'courage'
as its major feature. 'Spirit' would pass well enough here.
It also would for (7), where Cornford and Lee's 'energy' seems
actually not even as adequate as 'spirit' to cover the general
sense 'resistant mental and emotional backbone' that eu~6J
includes. It has an inbuilt 'bolster' - in a potentially
perfectly good sense - as it were, of obstinacy and intrans-
igence. It incorporates resistance by-natural inclination to
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outer influences, which a purely dynamic quantity such as
'energy' cannot convey. 'Hot-temper', by contrast, has both -
for good or bad purposes.
b.34 ~eupoJ (3) is similarly unspecific;,and adequately·
covered by 'spiritless'. On the other hand, 6uPOE:uSfl1(4), eupaJ
(5), and eUPOE:lonJ(6) point more uncompromisingly to an anger
principle. If music is infused excessively into a 6UPOE:lonJ(4)
man, it makes his eupaJ(5) weak and easily swayed. It is
quickly incensed by small matters and quickly snuffed out (Taxu
~pE:6l~apEVOV TE ~al ~aTaa6E:vvUPEVOV). Such ~en become 'touchy
and irritable'(&~paXOAOl ODV ~al ~Py1AOl).
, ~ ,
We are shown par excellence, by the words a~paxoAol and
OPY1AOl, that eupaJ here bears the meaning 'irascibility'. The
particular sort of 'ire' denoted may be snappishly petty, but
this highlights it even more for what it is not - i.e. a lofty
emotion. Its noun-adjective relation to 6UpoElonJ(4) combines
with the placing of the two words closely adjacent to each
other to lay added emphasis on the existence of their common
stem. Their juxtaposition, suggesting that 6UpOE:lonJ is being
expressly used as the adjective serving as precise counterpart
to 6upaJ(5), obviously here = "(hot-) temper", has an
intentional flavour. Lee translates: 'But if he is a man of
spirit, the effect is, by weakening his spirit, to make him
unstable, a man who flies into a rage at a trifle and calms
down as quickly. His energy has degenerated into peevishness
and ill-temper •••• '. But there is an important admission we
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must make about the cardinal distinguishing mark of someone who
degenerates into a pettily sharp-tempered individual, or about
a faculty of the mind which degenerates into peevishness. And
this is that it is hard to find an accurate single term for
it. A second admission is that, of the single terms that ~
be found to correspond most acceptably with it, 'spirit' is
close enough to escape being misleading. Yet even so a
weakening of the spirit would not naturally suggest, as its
natural outcome, ill-temper or peevishness. Nor,
correspondingly, would peevishness naturally be predicated of
t ' ,degenera e energy. What it would be predicated of is the
degeneration of something resembling a healthy 'capacity for
indignation' .
b·35 Spens I 'mind' for eu~6f is again a much vaguer
version. Perhaps, through that very vagueness, it could
actually be more satisfactory than the more specific ones
'spirit' and 'energy'. But overall 'mind' is really not
adequate. We can imagine the dynamic drive of 'spirit' made,
in a sense, febrile and brittle by weakening. But weakening of
spirit, unless it were a narrowly specified type of weakening,
indeed an explicit alteration more than a weakening at all)
would not so naturally lead to sharp-temperedness as to apathy,
sheer lack of positive drive. What would most naturally, when
weakened, lead to snappishness and petty-temperedness would be
the capacity for stronger, deeper, more 'solid' indignation.
At all events, weakening is necessarily weakening of something
stronger than the product of the weakening (&oe€Vn nOlnoaf
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TQVeUVOv). And, importantly, it would, except in very unusual
circumstances, be weakening of a stronger form of that product,)
not of something generically different from it. That the
products of the weakening here are attenuations of anger is
therefore made especially obvious. From the vocabulary used,
we see that the above conditions are fulfilled. The products
of the weakening are derivatives of XOAOJ and opyn, both of
which words signify 'anger' simplex and never anything else, in
the relevant Platoriic usages.
b.36 At (7), Cornford and Lee both give 'energy' for eu~oJ.
They also each employ a different verb (underlined) from
Plato's 'YlyvETal' (becomes): Cornford: 'The sense of
physical fitness fills a man with confidence and energy and
makes him twice the man he was;' Lee: 'the physical health
that results from such a course fills him with confidence and
energy (~povnvaToJ TE Hat eUVo~) and increases his courage'.
But we must observe that the outcome of the physical health is
that the man becomes braver (~V6PE10TEPOJ). It is not that 'it
makes him' braver.
There is substantial point in disputing these versions.
The argument should be taken step by step. In the first place,
it is to be asked whether increased health will necessarily on
its own make a man braver. This query might reasonably, at a
superficial level, be answered in the affirmative. But, second,
the Greek (E6 ~axwv TO awwa ~pOvnwaToJ Hal eu~ou ~~nl~nAaTal Hal
~V6PE10TEPOJ ylyvETal) simply does not mean that. It does not
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carry the significance 'the sense of physical fitness •••• makes
him twice the man he was' (Cornford), or that 'physical
health~ ••• increases his courage' (Lee). For these phrasings
suggest that it is the physical health that increases his
courage. They discount the intermediate stages. More
importantly, they suggest that it might even do so independently
of these intermediaries - the ~p6vn~a and eu~6f it instils.
The Greek construction is in substantial contrast with these
renderings. It indicates clearly that the increase in courage
is to be seen as a result of the ~p6vn~a and eu~6f which the
health generates, not of the health itself.
b·37 The aim in establishing this now emerges. In regard
to the initial question, whether it is his physical health that
increases a man's courage, we conceded that it seems plausible,
at first sight, that good health or energy would alone make one
more courageous. But Plato is not saying that. The sense of
the strictly translated Greek may well be that it is the remote
cause. But that is something else. It is thanks to the ~p6vn~a
and eu~6fwith which the good health fills one that the man
becomes braver. For instance, food may provide one with the
energy to think, but we would certainly not say that one
becomes more intelligent thanks to food. Further, in regard to
the above translations of eu~6f in particular, it seems far
more plausible75 that courage should be increased by something
with strong emotional content than by mere energy. And this,
after all, is what Plato is saying. He has not, at this point,
talked about energy. He has talked about eu~6f. Energy,even
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in company with confidence, is here patently a mere part, an
ingredient, of eu~6L But because it shows some predominance in
the present context, it has been allowed to supplant the whole.
Three points need to be made about energy simplex. First,
it contains no trace of the emotional content proper to eu~6f.
Second, it is an accurate translation of ~lAOTIOVla, a word used
by Plato76 in the totally neutral sense characteristic of
energy. Third, its link with c!VOP€lO, courage, is so
unspecific that for Plato's purposes it could have made no
point in the sentence. From a superficial semantic aspect it
is acceptable. But if the full implications of Plato's
summation of ~p6vn~a and eu~6f to courage are to be captured by
the translation, it must be more comprehensive. The "irascibility"
fraction is broadly hinted at by the accompanying term (~p6vn~o,
as it is later by u~nA6~pwv)77. There is a strong flavour of
aggressive pride present in these derivatives of ~pnv-, which
would have provided some hint of what Plato was saying. But
none of this is brought in by Cornford or Lee, although some
who give 'spirit' for eu~6f do allolN' for it (e.g. Jowett:
'pride', Spens: 'courage').
b·3B (B), the last instance of eU~o€lonf in the passage,
where yu~vaaT1Rn is said to promote TO eU~O€lo€f while ~oualRn
promotes TO ~lA6ao~ov, has a vaguer, more general sense. Here
we are less fully supplied with circumstantial evidence for its
intended meaning. Lee's 'energy and initiative' is therefore
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at first sight acceptable. However, the very presence of the
word ~lA6ao~o!, which implies in itself something like
'energetic, and possessing initiative, in the region of
thought', makes such a rendering inadequate as well. Plato
expressly says that the two disciplines, music and gymnastic,
do not relate respectively to mind and body 'except incident-
ally' ( E:t lln E:\ napE:PY0\»). They relate to the ~lA6ao~o\) and
6UllOE:lCf! elements78 . This entails that TO 6UllOE:lCf! carries
a further distinct constituent over and above energy and
initiative. We are therefore obliged to translate it as
something more than - at the same time no doubt including -
energy and initiative. Once again, therefore, the translations
are found to be attempts to render the whole by that part (or
parts) of it that seem to have the most felicitous ring at the
particular point in question. But such translations of course
only satisfy as ostensibly logical and readable equivalents.
The full spectrum of technical appendages of meaning belonging
to the word they purport to translate is drastically reduced.
If this is so much the case as to make the word even more
unintelligible than translation makes any foreign word at the
best of times, then Plato's aim has been utterly defeated. As
far as the philosophical understanding of the various Platonic
doctrines hinging on 6UllOE:lcf! goes, a better - though still
not ideal - policy would be to use a more generally accurate
term, e.g. 'hot-tempered', for 6UllOE:lCf!. It might sound less
felicitous. Appearances might in some degree be sacrificed for
the sake of reality. But the overall gain in truth would more




This passage came at what was still a moderately early
stage in the dialogue. It was still too soon, that is, for the
'packed' use (incorporating the 'higher' features) of eU~OE10Ef
to come into full play. Hence, at the first mention of the word to
summarise the characters of the natives of Thrace and Scythia
-(=_Russia ±),-barbariaris traditionally known_and feared for their
vic~ous temper; we find it still-at an emotion~li~low level.~~~ert­
ainly it- is still~withou~_the principle of !conscio~sness' or
'intellect'. These could only be predicated of 'spirit' (=
'spiritedness') proper.
435 e: 'For it would be laughable if one thought that the
eU~OE10Ef element in the cities did not spring from
the individual citizens who are subject to that
reproach, as for instance the folk in Thrace and
Scythia and the northern regions generally; or that of
hunger for learning, with which one might reproach our
part of the world; or again fondness for money, not
least prevalent amongst the Phoenicians and the people
in Egypt.'
To match eUUOE10Ef translators have: 'high-spirited
character' (Cornford), 'the spirited element' (D. & V.),
'passion or spirit' (Jowett), 'spirited character' (Lindsay),
'irascible disposition' (Spens). So far removed here is TO
eU~OE1QEf in sense from anything obviously commendable like
'courage', 'spirit', that haVing it is said to be a subject of
reproach (atTla). This could never be said of 'spiritedness'.
And even if the word a~Tlao~al, to reproach, is used in the
same sentence in connexion with TO ~lAouaeEf (the intellectual
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curiosity of the Athenians), its initially weaker force as tbe
verb is further weakened by its use in the optative. The whole
clause, in short, amounts virtually to a mild joke about
Athenian 'bookishness'. The chief function of this sentence,
incorporating eU~o€lonf, ~lAO~ae€f, and ~lAOxpn~aTof together,
is to introduce simultaneously the three 'forms' present in the
soul. But it also casts a certain amount of light on the
nature of each. And the predominant impression we receive
concerning the eU~o€lonf quality is, as we have observed
earlier, that it is one which people may be reproached for
possessing in excess. That people should be reproached for
being even excessively 'spirited' is hardly even partially
plausible. That they should for being excessively hot-tempered
is very much so.
b.40 A few lines further down 7 9 the corresponding verbs
~ ,~ h
~aveavw, eU~ou~al, and €TIleU~W are conjoined, and we may take t is
as conclusive concerning the 'anger' connexion of TO eU~O€lOEf.
The verb eU~OU0eal means in Greek sioply and solely 'to be angry'
nothing else - and Plato is stating here categorically that this
is what we do by means of the eU~O€lOEf sector. For comprehens-
iveness' sake, the remaining uses must be examined. But the
case for 'anger' may be assumed complete.
In the present passage, we may~
suppose that, as later 80 , eu~6f in this guise is limited in
meaning, and inconvenient for hio to use. From what has gone
before we have to assume that in this passage, at first sight
at any rate, it conveys the meaning 'anger'. The reason he
separates it from learning and desiring would be, to the
hearer, that it is still essentially different from them.
(This is so whether or not it completely fills a void that the
other two leave open.) And that much it certainly is. Anger
is very different both from intellect on the good, and desire
on the bad, side. But it is still a quality which, in the
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guise we may admissib1y believe Plato wishes it to have here,
implies certain defects in the person possessing it. Its
linkage with opyn81 , moreover, confirms its practical identity,
at that point, with the passion of ire. This~appe?rs to
greater advantage in 440 e:
'"We seem to be holding a view of Ta eU~OE\8ff(l) opposite
to the one we held just now. Then we thought it was a kind
of desire; now we say it's far from being that, but much
rather, in internal spiritual strife, throws its weight in
with the rational element."
"Certainly."
"Does it do so as something different from, or as a form
of, the rational element, with the result that there are
not three but two elements in the soul, the rational and
the appetitive? Or, as in the case of the Republic, when
we found three types holding it together - the wealth-
amassing, the military, and the councillors - so, in the
soul, does this third element, the eU~OE\o€f(2), exist as a
helper of the rational part, if it is not destroyed by bad
upbringing?"'
Translators: 'spirited element', 'spirited element'
(Cornford), 'spirited principle', 'spirited principle' (D. &
V.), 'passion or spirit', 'passion or spirit' (Jowett), 'this
third element' (refers back to 'indignation'(l», 'spirit'
(Lee), 'spirited element', 'element of spiritedness' (Lindsay),
'irascible', 'irascible' (Spens). Lee has given 'spirit' for
the second instance of eU~oE\o€f, after translating the first
instance 'this third element'. This 'third element' quite
certainly refers to the 'indignation' by which he has already
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three times rendered eu~6f82 just previously. The 'third
element', in other words, is no more nor less, in his version,
than 'indignation', although the immediate demands of felicity
prompt him to use that ambiguous expression in its place.
b.41 Apart from Lee, Jowett has also made a concession to
the 'anger' factor by his 'passion and spirit'~ Spens alone,
of the six, gives it full value with 'irascible'. And
the indications for such a translation are very strong. First,
we have already had reference to an £loof 'eu~ou Kat ~
•
eu~ou~£ea'83. This places eu~6f in close conjunction with a
correlate eu~ouoeal, which invariably carries the sense 'to be
angry' . As Lee correctly infers, eu~6f here contains a strong
component of ire. Yet for some reason he does not contrive to
bring this out in his rendering of eU~o£lo(f.
Then comes the example of Leontios' eu~6f, rousing him to
anger with himself for wishing to look at corpses84 . The
linkage of earlier eu~ou Kat ~ eu~ou~£ea with later dpyfiv (440
a 5) leaves little room for anything other than rage" here.
Third is the sentence 'This account shows that the ~pyfi
sometimes struggles with the desires, as one distinct entity
with another 8 5'. By plac ing eu~6f in the same camp wi th bpYfi,
which is definitive for 'anger', Plato sets a further seal on
the importance of the status of 'anger' in the constitution of
the word eu~6f. Finally, he now defines the third part of the
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spirit 86 , already named eU~O€lonJ87, as the '€Toof TOU eD~OU
KCtl ~ eU~OU~€eCt'. By means of this expression, 'the form of
the eu~of, and that thing by which we are angry', he provides a
critical link between TO eU~O€lo€f and irascibility.
b.42 It remains now for him to recharge TO eU~O€lo€f with
extra intellectual weight. This will transform it from mere
emotion back into the more intellectually aware emotional force
that he requires. (The relation 'intellect: emotion' is taken
to stand, somewhat inexactly but conveniently, for • Aoyof
eu~of'.)
To do this, he first allows Glaucon to suggest that it may
belong to the lower compartment - desire. He then proc~eds to
extricate it from that lowly station by, as we have seen, the
tale of Leontios88 , who uses it to condemn his sensation-
grubbing desire element. To need extrication at all it must
have seemed to be allied with the avowedly inferior desire-
fraction. It must suggest, on the surface at least, a suitably
humble meaning. Plato achieves its re-elevation by showing
first 8 9 that it never allies itself with the desires if reason
chooses otherwise; lat er 90, that as a lion (as opposed to a
monkey) its aid can be drawn on by the intellect. So, while it
cannot be found to be unified with the rational sector of the
soul, it can certainly not be left linked with the desire
sector. In the meantime, we must concede to Jowett and Spens,




Again, none of the other translators gives due
weight to the 'unfavourable' constituent.
b.43 The attribution of a face-value 'high-temper' to eu~6f
need not lay one open to an accusation of inconsistency after
the earlier postulate that eu~6f is a blanket term covering the
entire nil~-angry spectrun. FroE an inspection of Plato's use of
the word thus far, it seems clear that it refers to an entity
more or less of the nature of a primitive 'humour', constit-
uting, in various concentrations, the cross-section of terms
denoting the various degrees of anger-like emotion. But this
does not exclude it from very commonly and familiarly holding
the more limited sense of 'anger' simplex, which ".spiritedness"
emphatically 'does not. (For 'instance, we mi,ght .observe~:that the word
'emotio ll ' Gin 'English by',itself .normally conveys the ,:sense more of a
tenderness'offe'elingthan' any',other specific' type "of :emotion. Least
ofaL!- does it.convey ;allactive'ly-:'aggressive :-feel:i,ng such :"as 'anger'.
Yet anger is, ';of ·course,.at"least :-as much 'an;emotion' :as ;.pity,
I
sorrow, gladness, or any other 'feeling' in principle allied to
them. TO eu~oe:lQ€f' normal absolute se~se, on the other
hand, lies significantly towards the morally negative end of
the scale.)
b.44 Now, crucially, having amplified and elevated the
the soul's
content of TO eu~oe:lQ€f in order to give it its proper place in
triad, Plato in the remainder of this passage of
Book IV defines the part it has to play in relation to the
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'higher' ErOO!. In its new shape it can properly act as
supporter of, while being subject to, the rational element. It
also acts in conjunction with it as overseer of the element of
desire.
441 e: 'Accordingly, is it not fitting for the rational
part to rule, being wise as it is, and holding a
supervisory relation to the whole soul, and
correspondingly fitting for the 6UllOE: USE! to be
subordinate and an ally to it? '
By this' stage it is easier to agree with translators in their
renderings (which are here uniform) of lO 6UllOE:lOE! as
'spirit', 'the spirited element', etc. There has always been
room in it in a distinct degree for the elevated element, and
at this point there is more room than usual. The morally more
neutral translation 'emotionally energetic' nevertheless
remains preferable as the more accurate one, and should be
maintained.
Translators:
In the same vein, at 442 c 1 we have:
'r think we call a person brave in that quarter
when his eUj.10E:lOEf part adheres amid pain or
pleasure to reason's rather than its own estimate
of what is evil.'
'spirited part of his nature' (Cornford),
'spirited element of his nature' (D. & V.), 'spirit' (Jowett,
Lee), 'spirited element' (Lindsay), 'irascible part' (Spens).
Here Spens alone permits the anger element to remain foremost,
which for accuracy's sake is probably where it should
remain. 6Uj.10E:lOE!' secondary role in this specific instance,




The English terms 'high-spiritedness', 'morale',
'courage' are substantives so closely alike that the importance
of the fact that Plato contrasts their Greek equivalents must
not be underestimated. They have forced themselves on our
notice throughout all six translations of these first four
books, beyond and superimposed on anything we might ourselves
at first have taken eU~OE10E! to mean. Plato's contrasting
them is evidence enough on its own that he takes them to be
importantly different. To translate them, therefore, by means
of terms so heavily weighted with moral, military, and other
'positive' idealism in the modern tradition as the English
versions mentioned must inevitably prejudge a key issue. It
certainly altogether sacrifices what any hearer of Socrates
would have been able to pick up when he heard the Greek words.
For a person to be called 'spirited', a 'man of spirit', etc.,
is an unquestioned mark of commendation in English. The terms
SlCl, <hpaXOAO! and others by contrast connote ire ani
violence. If they are cited by Plato as developments -
corruptive developments though they may be - of eU~OE10E!, they
must force our thinking along a quite distinct track. The
conclusion they suggest is a very different one, yet it is one
at many points clearly intended by Plato. Indeed, they
ultimately compel us to recognise the presence commonly, in TO
eU~OE10E!, of a ground-component of nothing less than the
emotionally crude and inflammable. The existence of this
ground-component has, moreover, a crucial significance. It
signals, in its capacity for 'reinforcing' the lfAEO\!E~lCl (greed)
characteristic, and ~lAOKEPOEJ (the avaricious) generally, that
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TO eU~O€lO€J is the possible major or exclusive origin of
universal Injustice (&ol~la).
The division used so far has been as much a natural as
an artificial one. An earlier series of uses of the word
eU~O€lonJ (up to and including those in Book IV) has been
examined as a whole, prior to those in subsequent books. The
principal purpose of inspecting the earliest uses in Books 11
and III was to try to pin the term eU~O€lonJ down in its most
'unspecial~sed' form. This would help one to see how great a
degree of, for instance, irritability (as also of desire,
intellect, etc.) was normally incorporated into it at that
level, and to check from these findings whether, and if so how
far, its meaning became specialised in Book IV. (The
specialisation continues later when the quality it represents
is formally classed as one of the triad composing the soul.)
The material in these earlier books forms quite substantial
evidence on its own for the overall common meaning of the
word. Nonetheless, the further instances of its use provide
grounds for adjustment (as also for confirmation) of the
previous findings, and in addition help answer certain central
questions about it. For instance, its connexion with lnleu~la,
and the degree to which it can be developed to contribute to
/ .
good or bad, are urgent points for analysis.
fully clarified later on in the dialogue.
These are only
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b.47 One of the principal aims of this extended
investigation has been to show that considerable evidence for a
morally negative constituent in eU~OElonJ occurs further on into
the Republic as well as at the outset. The only translator, as
we have found, who consistently introduces this element into
the text (at the expense, sometimes, admittedly, of a broad
enough rendering of eU~oElonJ at some points) is Spens9l. The
other scholars no doubt feel that, while there is such an
element present, there is also a strong one of disinterested
drive, a~d more so - a" predominantly favo~rable f~rm ofLdrive~ They
regard thi~ as~strong enough~ cl~arl" to make it~netessary to render
it explicitly and uniformly at the expense of the. other element in a
translation~ For the English language (as opposed to; e;g~1 German,
where, we found; Zorn comes very close to do~ng so) just does not pro-
vide a wotd blen~ing both anger (in~an" alm6st~neutral form) and drive.
In" consequence; they ui~ally take the 'high toad' .• They translate
as 'spirited' what ought to be something of lesser calibre, and
automatically its metamorphosis to (or generation of) 'rough-
ness' (aYPlOTnJ)92, 'rancour' (~e6voJ)93, and ultimately
'violence' (81a)94 loses conviction. But it should not lose
it. There should be no such impoverishment of the word. It
should not be shorn in a translation of what it had in the
original. The possibility of a connexion being at all readily
seen between eU~oEloEJ and Injustice must not be virtually
eliminated, as it is. So this consequence is serious if there
is reason to suppose that Plato meant there to be such a
connexion.
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It goes without saying that Plato takes the most important
link between the soul and Injustice to be the lTIleU~lal.
(These, as the 'desires', are the generators of TIAE:O\)E:~la.)
But the eU~OE:lo£J element patently has a most powerful link in
its own right with Injustice. If its role as a lion is chiefly
95 ' e 'to aid justice, and only aid the many-headed beast of E:TIl U~la
when perverted into doing so, not even this is critically
important. The eU~OE:lo£J' exclusive power is to produce random
action ( = injustice and justice indiscriminately and by
coincidence). This, therefore, is the quantity that needs to
be taken into fullest account. And we see the separate stages
of its development in the later books.
b.48 Summed up, the present purpose is first to note the
various versions translators give of eU~OE:lonJ at the
remaining, and essentially later, loci in the Republic.
Second, it is to discuss their various merits, as before, but
in particular to ascertain whether the earlier indications of a
negative or 'anger' overtone in it are further substantiated.
CA similar review is at the same time made of the so-called
'higher' constituent in 'spiritedness'.) The final aim will
then be to settle on the most accurate general meaning - if
any - attributable to the word, in terms of these findings. By
then, it is hoped, there should be adequate ground for such a
determination, given the help also of an inquiry into its
connexion, first with ~TIleU~la, and, second and most
importantl~ with &OlK10.
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467 e 4:
b.49 Two instances only of eU~o€lQnf are found in Book V.
Neither, unfortunately, seems to provide any additional pointers
to its meaning.
456 a 4: 'And one woman will be a lover of learning,
another a hater of it? One will be eU~o€lQnf,
ano ther 'ii eu~of? '
Translators: 'high-spirited', 'spiritless' (Cornford, Lee),
'spirited', 'spiritless' (D. & V., Lindsay), 'has spirit', 'is
without spirit' (Jowett), 'of high spirits', 'of low' (Spens).
The context is, as is said, an unrevealing one for purposes of
determining the sense of eU~o€lQnf. This forces translators to
depend on other uses of the word, and the 'spirit'-orientated
versions can therefore hold their own more or less unchallenged.
Second,
'We must get them onto horseback as young as
possible, and, after teaching them to ride, bring
them along to watch combat on their horses, not
eU~O€lo€lf and war-like ones, but as swift and
easy to handle as can be obtained.'
Translators: 'spirited' (Cornford, D. & V., Jowett, Lee,
Lindsay), 'high-mettled' (Spens). In view of the general, open
context in which 8UjJOE:lonJ is used, 'spirited' here once again
provides a satisfactory enough translation. A version
incorporating a certain 'fierceness', as, e.g., 'hot-tempered',
would nevertheless not be less satisfactory. An aggressive
(let alone an actively angry) horse would certainly not be less
ready to attack than a 'spirited'.
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b.50 Earlier passages in Book IV are more fully committed.
547 e-l: 'So, fearing to put wise men into positions of
authority, since it no longer has this sort of
men in their unadulterated, energetic form, but
mixed, will it not incline towards the eU~O€lo€lf
and more straightforward, the ones better adapted
for war than for peace, and hold in honour the
tricks and devices associated with that? Then,
by constantly making war, will it not acquire
many of the characteristics of those people for
its own?'
Translators: 'with plenty of spirit' (Cornford), men of
spirit'(D. &V.), 'passionate' (Jowett), 'hearty' (Lee),
'spirited' (Lindsay), 'forward' (Spens). eU~o€lonf is here
earmarked as a characteristic of the cruder (but not crudest)
type of person. It is inferior to the intellectual, but
superior to the appetitive. Hence it displays its ingredient
of wrath more decisively, and Jowett's 'passionate' and Spens'
'forward' seem suitably designed to capture this.
b.5l
550 b 3: 'Then the young man, hearing and seeing these
things, and hearing his father's words and seeing
his way of life alongside that of others, tugged
at by both - his father stimulating and
augmenting reason in his mind, the others desire




a bad man, but keeps company of an evil type with
the others, is pulled by the two contrasts into a
middle course, surrenders the governance of
himself to that middle course, the ambitious and
eU~OE10Ef(2) and becomes an arrogant (v~nA6~pwv)
and ambitious man.'
'ambition', 'high-spirited' (Cornford), 'spirited
element', 'hot-tempered' (D. & V. give 'hot-tempered and
contentious' for '~lAOV1K~ Kat eU~OE10E1' - order uncertain -
but as they elsewhere take ~lA6vlKOf as 'strife-loving' (581 c
4), 'honour-loving' (586 d 5), etc., 'hot-tempered' may here be
taken to be their version of eU~OE10nf), 'passionate',
'passion' (Jowett), 'ambition', 'competitive spirit' (Lee, for
~lAOV1K~ Kat 8UllOE:10E:l), 'spirited element', 'spirit'
(Lindsay), 'irascible', 'irascible' (Spens). Davies and
Vaughan, Jowett, and Spens all, as we see, finally show a marked
inclination here towards the an~er-orientated version (though
oddly enough, the reason for their preference at this point
seems actually not very clear).
b.52 The last passage before 572 a has probably the most
striking example of anger-incorporation. Here we find much
firmer commitment:
553 c 1: '"Seeing this, my friend, and enduring it all and
losing all his possessions, he immediately - in
fear, I think - hurls ambition and TO 8UllOE:10E!
headlong from their throne l.°n hl.°s soul and, ,
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humbled by povertYt turns to money-making t
gathering it by grubbing t saving t and husbanding
little by little. Don't you think that this sort
of man then seats the appetitive t money-loving
sector on that throne t and makes a great king out
of it t decking it out with tiaras and bracelets
and ceremonial daggers?"
"Yes."
"And t setting the reasoning and eU~OE18fif parts
on the ground round about it t and enslaving them
to it t he refuses to allow the one to reason or
speculate on anything except by what means he can
make more money out of less t while he forces the
other to admire and honour nothing but gaining
moneYt or whatever leads to that."'
(The phrase '~lAoll~lav (ambition) lE Kat lO eU~OE18£f'
complicates the business of rendering the first instance of lO
eU~OE18£f. Where translators' versions are paraphrases of the
text t the part of each rendering taken to cover ~lAOll~lav is
bracketed.) Translators: 'spir~t (of eager ambition)',
'ambition' (Cornford), 'high-spirited element' t 'high-spirited
element' (D. & v.L
, .,
pass~on t 'spirit' (JowettL 'courage'
('and ambition't but the order in which these are meant is not
clearL 'ambition' (LeeL 'spirited element't 'spirited
element' (LindsayL '(ambitious and) forward't 'ambitious'
(Spens). Variants here from the 'spirit' theme are Jowett's
'passion't Lee's 'courage' (also Spens' 'forward'). 'Passion'
is a familiar enough alternative to 'spirit't but provides a
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most striking contrast here with 'courage', which may readily
be conceived of as cool. That two such considerable scholars
as Jowett and Lee should produce two such strongly dissonant
solutions to the problem of translating eupoEt8€f as "passion"
and "courage" suggests an important consideration. Each must
be concentrating on what he takes to be a distinctly characteristic
ingredient of it. The likelihood nevertheless remains that
their translations at least have some important factor in
common. And this factor (assuming it is there) is evidently
important enough for highly contrasting overtones to seem
admissible without prejudice to a proper rendering. The core
of meaning in question could very plausibly be 'drive',
'spirit' . But whereas Jowett has given it an 'anger-', or at
any rate emotional, component, Lee has perhaps somewhat
arbitrarily introduced the danger-defining feature 'courage'.
In this he may be straying from Plato's meaning to an even greater
ex ten t - t han. hew 0 u1d -i f- h e - ha d- not f r 6 ID the _ve r y ~ beg inn i n g used
!spirit! as .a~standard source-word=for absolutely every
translation of eupof and lO 8UPOEt8€f.
b.53 It was reassuring earlier to be able to establish that
Plato does on numerous occasions use the words 8upof and
8UPOUPGt with meanings strongly stressing anger. This was of
assistance because, as we saw, he at several point s 96
juxtaposes these with 8upOEt8nf as related terms, or as
constituent and compound. The net result of the two of these
taken together is that we are given to understand that he
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regards the constituent as carrying the same semantic value
when incorporated in the compound as on its own. Our la ter
submissions of an anger-element in eU~OE1C€f are now further
confirmed by this.
b.54 The most arresting example of anger incorporation
occurs early in Book IX •
572 a:
Translators:
••. ·when, as I think. a person preserves a
healthful and temperate attitude, and rouses his
reasoning faculty before going to sleep .•.
similarly. having calmed the eU~OE1C€f (1), takes
his rest without falling into rages (&pyaf) with
people owing to the arousal of his eu~6f(2)
'passions', 'anger' (Cornford), 'spirited
element', 'spirit' (D. & V., Lindsay), 'passionate element',
'quarrel' (1), (Jowett:
,
the word 'eu~6f' seems actually to be




'go to sleep after having calmed the eU~OE1C€f
element', 'without falling Elf opyaf with people owing
to one's eu~6f bei~g rouseo',
show that the eU~OE1C€f element, unlike spirit, has at times to
be calmed, and can be responsible for the individual's reaching
a state of fury. Here it not only explicitly contains the
'anger' element, but connotes virtually nothing else.
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Nonetheless, we still need at this point to suspect a
blanket nature of the Greek emotional term opyn. Reference to
'desire' (lTIleU~nTlK6v, 571 e 1) a few lines above (rape,
murder and greed are the three heads) covers lust; and the
, ~
wider senses of opyn,
etc., are inapplicable.
• disposi tion', 'mood', • temperament' ,
still it would not seem reasonable to
suppose that they are displaced altogether by that of anger.
(Significantly, opyn, like eu~6f, also denotes an emotion-
range. A mood of anger is, however, its commonest meaning, and
If ' 'f "e~ b . • .here, in the phrase El opya EA WV, pro ably 1tS OOID1nant
term eU~OElO€f in this passage may, then, more or less
unequivocally be attributed the meaning anger element'. )
one. The
b.55 Taking this into account, the English version closest
to the significance of the Greek seems again to be that of
Spens. Cornford and Jowett leave a vaguer impression, with
introduction of the notion of passion. Otherwise they seem
nearer the mark than elsewhere, as well as providing mutually
consistent renderings of both words. On the other hand, Lee,
while deciding on 'temper' for eu~6f, remains content with the
'spirit' asociation in his version of TO eU~OElO€f ('spirited
part'), and is accordingly partly inconsistent. In turn,
Davies and Vaughan and Lindsay, conceding still less with their
renderings 'spirited element' and 'spirit', may be thought




581 a 9 fortifies earlier evidence, if it adds little
'"Well, don't we say that Ta eU~OE18~J aims
constantly, and in its totality, at dominating,
defeatirig, and gaining repute?"
"Yes."
"So, if we called it contentious and ambitious, we
wouldn't be far out?"
"Quite the reverse."'
Translators: 'spirited element' (Cornford, Lindsay), 'spirited
part' (D. & V.), 'passionate element' (Jowett), 'element of
spirit' (Lee), 'irascible' (Spens). This passage, like some
previous ones, is again somewhat thin in material for a
definition. Dominating, defeating, and gaining repute are aims
proper to 'drive' in a fairly wide sense, and do not shed much
light on what special type of drive is envisaged. The
character of Ta eU~OE18~J as 'drive' is amplified still further
( -by the word wp~naeal. There is no clear link between aiming
energetically at dominating, etc., on the one hand, and a
specific emotional state on the other, whereas on the contrary,
as has been seen97 , the word eu~6J is radical for emotion. But
the essence of eu~6J is that the drive it produces is
emotional, ranging morally from the 'goodness' of spiritedness
through neutrality to the 'evil' of rage.
b.57 A more significant piece of evidence materialises
shortly after this. In the ensuing commentary on it we quote
the most important collection of phras~s, for the purpose of
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this thesis, in the whole of the Republic.
586 c 7:
Translators:
'Must not a similar situation obtain in regard to
the eU~OE1C€f element, when someone indulges it
to the full in envy (~eo~of) because of vanity,
in violence (Sla) in the cause of aggressive
ambition (~lAO~lKla), or in eu~of through
ill-disposition (cuoKoAla), pursuing a surfeit of
honour, triumph, and Su~of without reason or
intelligence?'
(for eUllOE1Cnf, SUllof, eUllof respectively)
'spirited element', 'outbursts of passion', - , (Cornford),
'spirited element', 'anger'~ 'anger' (D. & V.), 'spirited or
passionate element', 'angry', 'satisfaction of his anger'
(Jowett), 'element of spirit', 'ambition', 'ambition', (Lee),
'spirited element', anger (Lindsay), 'irascible part of
the soul', 'anger', 'anger' (Spens). Numerous examples98 are,
as we have seen, available in the dialogue of the root terms
SUllof and eUlloUllal being used with the respective, explicit
meanings 'anger' and 'being angry'. E.g. a person acts SUllw,
owing to ill-temper (CuoKoAla)99. Or we find eUllof, numbered
with lust, desire, pleasure, and pain, clearly meant as a
passion lOO , and only translatable in the context as that of
'temper', or more accurately 'bad-temper'. Now, again, at 465 a,
we have:
~ , '" f"'" '" f"IITTO~ ETIl llElsOU a~ 101 oTaoEl, If someone is anf,ry with
someone else, then, satisfyin~ hl.·s SUI10"'f b .
- b ~ Y appOsl.ng hin, he
will the less proceed to worse conflicts."
These words are crucial for this thesis. It is plainly _
and only - some aggressive feature of the aggrieved party, his
-. >~ •
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resentment or ire, that will be appeased by his "taking up arms"
physically against the offender. No aspect of 'spiritedness'
can answer here. But now, on top of all this, we have constantly
man;
had indications that eu~6J wells up irrepressibly in a
that in this context it causes the aggression-urge which
is at the basis of all injustice. Here is Plato's prescription
for dealing with it. Now, by obviously controlled contest
(&~UV€aeal), men will TIAnp€lV ('satisfy' - i.e., in the
context, 'tap') their eu~6J. Aggression-urge will lapse, and
injustice be terminated.
This germinal finding receives fuller treatment in later,
concluding chapters. To return temporarily to the current
point concerning eU~O€lonJ' fuller meaning eU~We€lJ is, at
536 c, clearly enough 'angry' even without being coupled with
These meanings are not really questioned by
anybody. What is questioned is again the most general meaning
of the word eU~O€lonJ, often placed alongside them, and of
which they presumably contain in common the principal
constituent.
b.58 In the above passage (586 c), the eU~O€loEJ element of
the soul is associated by Plato particularly with ~lAovlxla and
~lAoll~lalOl. In turn, these two are coupled with ouoxoAla.
The eU~O€loEJ element, the archetype of these propensities,
gives rise, through them, to, respectively, ~e6voJ, Sla, and
eu~6J. _ ~e6voJ, 'envy' or 'rancour', carries a large weight of




Usually in the form of rape, it
includes all other types of violence, and involves at best
arrogant but less intense violence inflicted on an unwilling
victim, at worst serious and illegal on an unwilling. It is,
in short, an act performed in consequence of uncontrolled
passion. This can be of anger, lust, or greed.
Here, obviously, is a strong emotion-component. There is
nothing 'high' about it. That is clear enough. Still, to
supplement any 'higher' 'spirited' element that might be
thought to be present, we have an unexceptionable guarantee for
a specifically 'ire'-orientated meaning of eu~of in ouaxoAla.
oUaxoAla is standard Greek for peevishness or ill-humour, and
it is more naturally the generator of ire than of any other
emotion. We have abundant reason to envisage its meaning here
as the indulgence of untrammelled spleen. All three of these
dispositions, envy, violence, and anger are now directly laid
at the door of eU~o(lonf. And with them are their originators,
ambition or vanity, contentiousness, and ill-humour.
b.59 This is no high destiny for eU~O(lonf. All the above
characteristics are totally ungenerous, quite remote from
'spiritedness'. Admittedly, they arise from the individual's
indulging the eU~o(lo€f faculty 'without reason or intelligence'
(~V(U AOYla~ou L( xat vou, 586 d 1), and in this respect they
are rather parallel to the aYPloLnf and aXAnPOLnf resulting
~II-===------~~---:--~==--------
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from participating too much in gymnastic at the expense of
music. Still, they are the accepted fruits of TO eU~O€lOEf in
its own right. They can emanate from it when it is unqualified
by outside influences, and as such they do not by any means
present a favourable impression - which 'spirit' invariably
does.
b.60 Lee's rendering 'ambition', by extensively altering
that impression, is misleading. 'Ambition' in modern usage is
overall a noble, not a mean, thing. The 'anger' and 'angry' of
Davies and Vaughan, Jowett, Lindsay, and Spens are clearly
closer to the true denotation. Though even 'anger' is more
respectable than the peevishness that oU0KoAlo demands.
Cornford, with 'outbursts of passion', gives the nearest to an
exact rendering of the sense the Greek indicates.
To suggest that 'spiritedness', even an unregulated
'spiritedness' permitted to run amok, could produce such base
mental or emotional phenomena as envy, violence, and bad temper
is to humble it beyond anything that its traditional meaning
could imply. To come so low, it must, as has been contended,
have at least the germ of baseness. Bu t 's pi r i t e dne ss', to
reiterate something already frequently stressed, just does not
have that germ. A translation of TO eU~O€lOEf incorporating at
least 'irritability' is essential. And while Lee's rendering
'ambition' therefore seems a radically unwarranted departure,
the others, with_the exception of Cornford's, though less wide





At another point l02 , we have seen eu~o€18nJ presented
as the opposite of 'manageable' (€DnVl0lUlOV). One can read a
good element into unmanageability and headstrongness in a
horse. It may be hard to hold because of its eagerness to be
in the thick of the fighting. But it seems doubtful here that
this will do to pull the quality off the border-line of the
irresponsibly 'hot-headed'. In contrast to 'spiritedness',
'hot-headedness' is necessarily somewhat directionless.
Instead of possessing the implicit element of intellect l0 3
guiding the spirited individual, the hot-headed individual
suffers from diminished responsibility and mental power. He is
not totally without mental power, but as his eU~O€10€J is
unsupplemented by sufficient logistic, he is intellectually
inadequate, and veers in whatever random direction his passion
happens to turn him. Correspondingly, at 547 e, the eu~o€18nJ
individual, better at making war than keeping peace, is
constantly associated with the deceits and tricks of war. The
urge for heated action as such is predominant in him. The
wisdom or unwisdom, justice or injustice of that action takes
second (or no) place. These uses further reveal the claim of a
'lower' component, 'irascibility' ,
, . ,
lre , etc. to a
far more pre-eminent status in the make-up of the word
eU~O€18nJ than it has so far been accorded.
b.62 THIRD MAIN DIVISION OF USES: - 588-590.
We now approach the celebrated interlude (588-590) of the
many~headed beast, the lion, and the man in Book IX. ,This
section contains perhaps the most interesting material of all
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regarding the breadth of meaning of eUVo€l onf. In the parable
of these three beings, standing for 'desire', 'hot-temper'I04,
and 'reason'105 respectively, there again seems to be - as is
only characteristic of his open-mindedness - some conflation of
terms by Plato. Still, the lion may be assumed to be meant at
this point to correspond more or less exactly with the
eUVOE10nf sector of the ~uxn. Actual identification of the two
is, in fact, found in the very first passage in which they are
juxtaposed, although less clearly so afterwards.
590 a 9: '"Do not insolence and peevishness come up for
blame when this lion- and snake-like element
proliferates and asserts itself inharmoniously?"
"Yes."
"And are not luxury and effeminacy attendant on
its slackening and relaxation, when it instils
cowardice into the man?"
"Yes."
"Are not flattery and mean-mindedness found when
a person subjects this same 6UVOE10€f element to
the many-headed beast, and accustoms it from
youth, by being abused for the sake of
money-making and the beast's insatiability, to
become a monkey instead of a lion?"'
Translators: 'the heart's high spirit' (Cornford), 'spirited
animal' (Jowett), and 'that same element' (Lindsay, referring
to the lion and the serpent elements, which indeed seem to be
taken together as forming eUVo€lo€f). Then finally 'spirited
element' (Lee), and 'irascible part' (Spens).
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LO eu~o€18€f and the lion here are, as we see, presented by
Plato as explicitly one and the same thing. One inconsistency
only seems to occur regarding such an identification in that,
earlier on, the eu~o€18€f is said never to come to the aid of
the tTIleU~nL1K6vl06, while the lion does, at times, at least by
implication. As in the following passage:
588 e 3: 'Let us say to the person who says that it is
profitable to this man to be unjust but
unprofitable to be just, that he is saying
nothing other than that it profits him to feast
the many-headed beast, thus making him strong, as
also the lion and whatever has to do with the
lion, but to starve the man and make him weak, so
that he may be dragged wherever either of them
hauls him, while neither accustoming them to each
other nor causing them to become friendly, but
allowing them to bite at each other and consume
each other in their struggle.'
The beast and the lion tear each other when left to
themselves. Or alternately they tear the man, or all three
tear one another - the construction leaves all these
possibilities open. But it is specially remarked that all
three can also be made friendly (~lAa,etc.)107, and in
particular that the man can make an ally of the lion if he
wants. We can conclude from this that, if he did not so want,
the other two could make allies of each other against him.
Their ability to cooperate is, however, not clearly asserted
here or elsewhere, and is a subject for speculation. In
addition, whereas earlier it was LO eu~o€18€J
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that developed into dYP10lnfl08 , here it is the beast of
£nleU~la, not the lion, that produces ~YPlal09. The lion is a
technically neutral, though in practice higher force - it is
significantly a lion rather than a monkey. In its neutral
guise it can theoretically be enlisted to support reason ~
desire. ' But it is definitely more explicitly linke~ to reason
(589 b 3 au~~axov nOlnaa~£vof), and in serving this end it
comes up, and with it brings lO eU~o£lo€f up, closer to the
level of the English term 'spirited'.
b.63 Our aim is of course in the end to try to get as close
as possible to discovering what sort of force Plato
contemplated overall in eu~o£18nf. One aspect of his treatment
of it - the use of an illustration like the lion to represent
it as a department of the soul - sUf,gests an interestine
inquiry. Indeed, his use of animals at all for this sort of
purpose is worth looking into more closely.
Separation of the soul as a totally distinct entity from
the body, while not Homeric, is indeed seen early on 110.
Plato is to use (or if the Phaedrus is earlier than the
Republic, and it is probably later lll , he has already used) one
important animal parable in his examination of the soul. This
is the well-known illustration of a chariot driver l12 holding
the reins which control his two subservient horses, one good
and the other bad. The use of animals for this purpose might
not in any case seem strange. Animals are so prominently live,
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dynamic things which have a willed, directed dynamism. In this
they are a great improvement on the less clearly intelligent
natural forces such as winds, waves, volcanoes, etc. Yet their
more-elemental-than-human behaviour ideally represents the
different grosser aspects of the human behaviour-spectrum. On
the same account, the Pythagorean notion of the transmigration
of souls into the bodies of humans or animals probably also
comes in here. The animal types chosen correspond in their
behaviour with the various 'levels' of advancement the soul has
achieved. Such a belief would naturally have prompted to Plato
the pairing off of parts of the soul with specifically animal
types. In as far as he shared the Pythagorean views, we would
readily expect to find an appetitive beast on the epithumetic
level. Then, next, would be a less appetitive, militarily
nobler, animal at the purely thumoeidic. The most 'spiritual'
type - the man - would be at the logistic. And this is what we
do find. The many-headed beast takes up the ideally 'lowest'
compartment, the lion the intermediate, man the uppermost.
b.64 The tripartite division of the soul is alluded to by
Plato often enough l1 3. The suggestion of Pythagorean connexions
is prompted by the allotment of these animal labels to the
three parts. But this mention of the doctrine in passing is
such as to remind us that, so far from regarding himself as
having originated it, Plato assumes that his colleagues in the
discussion are already easily familiar with it as a piece of
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There is no reasonable doubt that its origin
Posidonius made this claim for it l14 , and itis Pythagorean.
would presumably in turn stem from the Pythagorean doctrine of
stock formulary.
the 'three lives'.
Plato is concerned, in classifying Guardians and
non-Guardians, to give some account also of the physico-mental
make-up of man. He would therefore draw on Pythagorean theory,
as on other previous doctrines, to supply his own t~eory-with
illustrative images. This on its own is a fairly satisfactory
explanation of his choice of animals for illustrative purposes.
But arising out of that, we have a further interesting
question. Why should it have been three parts, and three
animals, that should have been chosen? Admittedly Pythagoras
had also had that arrangement. But Plato also clearly prefers
a neat, systematic classification of the parts of any whole,
where he can conveniently achieve this. And traditionally
aphorisms concerning the middle course between two extremes,
totalling three, had given the number three an inherent
attraction l15 . Apart from that, there was the number's own
symmetry and mathematical interest. We have observed that he
probably liked the tripartite division for its neatness and
mystical significance, apart from anything else. But, as has
. been observed before, he does not allow consideration~ like
this to dominate his inquiry. And this is proved by the
emergence of components of the triad that do not fit in with
that systeml16 , but which he forces into it in spite of their
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awkwardness. For instance, as we mentioned, the importance he
attached to knowledge of the ideal forms leads him in the
Republic to introduce above the Guardians the fourth class of
philosopher-kingsll? These "super-guardians", so to speak,
are not just ~lAo~ae€lJ, that is, do not just possess standard
wisdom. In addition, they are acquainted with the form of the
Good. As philosopher-kings, they are not really (in spite of
Taylor)118 a generically different strain from the ~lAo~aenJ
type. They are only a somewhat advanced version of it. But
they nonetheless have a distinct status of their own within
that type.
b.65 Similarly, in the Phaedo ll9, we are shown two
distinct, separate types instead of three within the type
proper to the lowest sector. There are those who become asses
(the gluttons and drunkards), and those who become wolves,
hawks, and kites. What seem to be meant to be exactly
correspondent pairs - parts of the soul and human types - are
therefore not, in Plato, invariably pedantically pigeonholed.
This only happens where he finds that exact pigeon-holing still
provides an adequate account of the reality as he sees it. The
epithumetic sector of the mind may correspond easily with the
moneymakers of the state. But when he comes to the Guardians
of the state he finds that there is a problem. These men
cannot be identical with the €TI1~OUPOl, and exclusively
eU~O€lo€lJtbecause they are also strictly scheduled to be
~lAo~ae£lJ. They appear to correspond with the highest
sector puch more than with the middle~ But then, again, they
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~ fare also different from that highest sector. When the aPXOVT€
themselves come under consideration, they then occupy, as we
have noted, not the highest, but the 'super-highest', position.
b.66 In the Phaedo we have clear reference to the
epithumetic (81 e 1) and the philosophic (82 b 10) kinds of
person. However, the thumoeidic man has metamorphosed. He is
no longer the dynamic, vigorous person typefying the genus, but
one who merely pursues civic virtue (82 a 11), and shows
temperance and justice without philosophy or intellect. A
phrase strongly similar to the Phaedo's '6v€u ~lAoao~laf T€ Kat
vou (cf. Phaedo 82 b 2) occurs at Rep. 586 d 1: '6v€u AOYla~ou
tE Kat vou. In the latter, Plato is clearly portraying the
typically pure (extreme) type of eU~o€lonf individual. To
suggest that he means that this sort of man is still possessed
of true temperance or justice, or that he could simultaneously
be cultivating civil virtues, would be trifling with the text.
There are unquestionably two different types of individual
at issue. That they are both made to fall technically into the
'intermediate' group is no detraction from the system. It just
does emphasise that the compartments overlap. The triads are
not exhaustive. Different blends of the three parts of the
soul, and correspondingly of the three basic types of
individual, have to be reckoned with. More than this, even the
very archetypes in the soul (i.e. the ~nleU~nTlK6v, eU~O€lo(f,
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AOY10T1KOV) seem to be conceived of as existing in some degree
in combination. To take one instance, the character of the
eU~o€lo€f compartment is (as mentioned)120 mostly conceived of
by Plato as having an intellectual rather than appetitive
leaning. The lion can - if we adhere strictly to the text -
only tear the many-headed beast (589 a). It certainly does not
seem readily able to work in harness with it 121 • But it can
readily be made an ally of the man. It leans preferentially
towards cooperation with the higher element.
Again, in the Phaedrus, the one horse of the chariot pair
is KaAof and aya8of l22 , the other the reverse. There may be a
correspondence - however slight - intended here between the
soul compartments discussed in the Republic and those in this
dialogue. But, if so, we see not so much an endowment of the
eU~OE10€f sector with unalloyedly good qualities, as a simple
combination of eU~o€lo€f and AOY10T1KOV into a single whole.
b.67 Little further weight on the 'higher' side of its
scale, as against that where anger predominates, is provided
for TO eU~O€lo€f in the Republic beyond Book IV. A balance is
maintained explicitly, where it is termed "~€oov" between
lTI18u~nT1Kov and AOY10T1KOvl23. Moreover, the suggestion is
not lost that, just as in 440 e it is closely linked with
AOY10T1KOV, so, by Plato's immediate viewing, it is closer to
the higher than to the lower member of the triad. Admittedly,
at 586 c, ~lAovlKla, ~lAoTl~la, and ouoKoAla are said to
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generate envy, violence, and anger. Yet, in spite of this,
competitiveness and ambition would, we might think, normally
have a higher station than that. To be originators of such
undesirable propensities as envy and violence is not an exalted
fate. Yet they do not have that higher station. Spiritedness
is, of course, light years away from these defects. e.g. at 548
c (taken together with 547 e 3 - 548 a 1, and earlier, 347 b 2)
the clearest hint of baseness again occurs.
548 c: 'For it is mixed (the republic type being
discussed),' I said; 'but one thing stands out
really prominently when the eU~O€lO€J element is
in control: ~lAovl~lal and ~lAoTl~lal'.
For Plato's ~lAovl~lal and ~lAoTl~lal, translators have:
'ambition and the passion to excel' (Cornford), 'party-spirit
and love of distinction' (D. & V.), 'spirit of contention and
ambition' (Jowett), 'ambition and the competitive spirit'
(Lee), 'rivalry and ambition' (Lindsay), 'contention and
ambition' (Spens).
These are scarcely vilificatory terms. Indeed, some would
say that they were virtually commendatory. Yet Plato's clear
intention here is obviously to set ~lAOV1~lal and ~lAOT1~lal
down as thoroughly undesirable. The renderings of Jowett,
Davies and Vaughan, and Spens are the only ones which
incorporate, in 'contention', 'love of distinction', even a
possibility of the disreputable feature pointed to. Depending
upon how his words 'passion to excel' are taken, Cornford's
version may admit it, in part. On the other hand, it may deny
it even more decisively than Lee and Li~dsay. The latter both,
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in 'ambition and the competitive spirit', and 'rivalry and
ambition', give the term an uncompromisingly lighter turn.
b.68 Here it is worth requoting the complementary passage at
547 e 3: 'And, fearing to put the wise men into positions
of authority, since it no longer has this sort of
men in their unadulterated, energetic form, but
mixed, will it not incline towards the 8UPO€lO€lf
and more straightforward, the ones better adapted
for war than for peace, and hold in honour the
tricks and devices associated with that, and,
making war all the time, acquire many of the
characteristics of those people for its own?'
(Translators: 'with plenty of spirit' (Cornford), 'men of
spirit' (D. & V.), 'passionate' (Jowett), 'hearty' (Lee),
'spirited' (Lindsay), 'forward' (Spens).) This repetition of
the passage (cited at 50) is useful in consideration of the
importance of bringing out more fully the unvarnished
irritability ingredient that is so often and so cl~arly
contained in TO 8UPO€lO€f. Even Jowett and Spens with
'passionate' and 'forward' hardly give it due value. To be
suited for tricks and devices, let alone for war, is a
disgraceful mark of aggressiveness.
b.69 More directly we have, at
347 b 2: 'Do you not know that ambition (TO ~lA6TlpOV) and
etousness are said to be - and are - an object of
reproach?'
cov-
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The lowliness proper to envy and violence would be
especially appropriate if it were not for one thing: Their
primary originator, TO eU~O€lO€f, is kept most of the time -
carefully separate from TO lTIleU~nT1K6v124. Envy, and a
tendency to violence, are passions very close to the baser
types of desire. But in contrast, as was mentioned earlier, we
tend conventionally nowadays to think of the will-ta-win
(~lAovlKla), and the wish-for-honour (~lAOT1~la), as perfectly
reputable qualities. We might well regard this association by
Plato of ~e6vof and 81a (envy and violence) with them as
somewhat extreme, a deviation from his ordinary treatment of
them. Still, against this we have to lay the already familiar
fact that the most normal senses of ~lAovlKla and ~lAoTl~la in
Plato's work simply are derogatoryl25. Once again, the special
nature of the Greek attitude towards certain human qualities,
here 'contentiousness' and 'ambition', is enlightening~y
revealed. Or at any rate, whatever they most accurately mean,
the Greek concepts ~lAavlKla and ~lAOT1~la are as different
from ours of 'will-to-win' and 'ambition' as that of TO eU~O€lo€f
is from ours of 'spirit'.
Socrates uses these words ~lA6vlKOf and ~lA6Tl~of a great
deal. It is too easy to ignore the to us at first strange
point that there is indeed almost never anything commendatory
about his way of using them. This is so throughout the
dialogue, and even when he classifies them as higher than
desire, that he thinks of them in general as possessing any
particularly 'high' qualities must be strongly doubted. The
fact must be faced that, as we have seen, he starts out early
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with the direct comment that being ~lA6Tl~OJ is a ground for
reproach (~V€lcoJ)126. It is even ranked along with the
thoroughly vulgar trait of being ~lAapyvpoJ, fond of money.
Again, ~lAovlKla and ~lAoTl~la are the main features of a state
which is a mixture of bad and good (with the 'bad' put first -
by Socrates)127. This is the state 128 which, inclining towards
the eV~O€lcnJ type of person, admires, by virtue of that
inclination, the tricks and ploys of war 129 • There are further
examples in the other dialogues (see s.v., Liddell and Scott)
of this degeneracy attributed to it.
The aura of discredit clinging to these two terms ~lAovlKla
and ~lAo1l~la pervades Plato's writings. Yet the conventional
tendency in English, or indeed overall modern western tradition
is, we have noted, towards seeing good in 'ambition' and
'competitiveness'. The terms have strong connotations of
'aspiration', and 'honour-seeking' is, by the very flavour of
the word 'honour',commendable 130 • (Their opposites,
'unambitious' and 'uncompetitive', certainly have markedly
derogatory overtones, as though implying sloth and apathy.)
The temptation to translate eV~O€lonJ by these words, the most
familiar available in our language that convey the approximate
meaning required, is certainly a ready one. But, equally, the
temptation to see them as favourable then becomes absolutely
automatic. It simply takes over from individual
measured assessments of the word in its various instances.
Accordingly, the moral status of ~lAovlKla and ~lAoTl~la is
raised out of all due proportion to its proper value.
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b.70 The reason for the 'higher' status apparently
subconsciously allotted by modern western translators to the
words no doubt springs from the cultural conditions at present
t Th . n to 'amb;tion'prevalent in the wes. e sense g~ve ~
higher than it has been. For one instance, the Roman
has very much closer ties with '~lAoTl~la " and with
alone is
'ambitus'
essentially low aims of self-advancement, than modern
'ambition' has. The instance of the translators' conceptions
concerning eU~OElOnf itself, compared with that of the Greeks,
is a case in point. As to Plato's reading of it, it may be
that, in the atmosphere of the Greek democracy, where fewer
legal checks probably existed to self-advancement by foul means
than exist to-day, a struggle for high office implied a greater
likelihood of crime. With its resultant harm to others, it was
therefore suspected accordingly. Or, in contrast, it may be
that Athenian culture had a more just appreciation of the sheer
folly of ambition - for fame o~ self-aggrandisement at least. The
probably-. less mature current Wester.u viewpoint has no. doubt not yet
had the time to prog~ess' that, far. Certainly in current (1985)
Eng·l.ish',· to call a man 'ambitious '. may note be praise, but !t depends
*on the context. And:. to call him 'unambitious} is without doubt even
less like praise. The words 'ambitious' and 'competitive' used abso-
lutely have a stronger implication in modern conventional usage of
sheer energy and industry than of any other particular quantity. They
are therefore, to that extent; no~ a just representation o£ the! -
Greek ~lA6vlKOf and ~lA6Tl~ofi where we can be confident that
Plato is also using them in their conventional, unspecialised
senses.
At any rate, then, the concept of an undesirable type
of ambition or competitiveness is, at the present time, conventionally
b.7l
*
The remark "He wishes to make the world a better place" might quite
aptly draw the reply, "He is ambitious".
11
virtually "out of date".
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Because of this, we may feel we can
scarcely avoid being reduced to using out-of-date words to
express it. We may, on the other hand, also feel that it is
probably not much use trying to escape the discrepancy by doing
this. After all, it only involves enlisting the help of
somewhat dusty words like 'vainglorious', 'contentious', etc.,
which might in a technical sense translate the Greek terms more
accurately, but sound too modish and clumsy to satisfy. The
.
proper course would seem to be to try to achieve a compromise
between accuracy and topical impact.
With this in view, 'vain' might, for a start, well be a
better candidate than 'ambitious' for ~lA6Ll~of. ~lA6Ll~of
seems limited to the sense 'loving of respect'. 'Ambitious' on
the other hand conveys a glimmer of the sense 'eager for more
concrete rewards' as well as the former.
But there is room, as we have seen, for reflection on this
from a reverse viewpoint. Since Greek culture was in many
respects so far advanced, we could expect many of its concepts
of the 5th Cent. B.C. to be eQually far advanced. Accordingly,
so far from looking for obsolete words to translate certain
Greek terms, we could far more plausibly expect to find them in
avant-garde material. Certainly in the case of ~lA6vl~of we
have a much more topical word than 'competitive' or
'ambitious'13l. We have, in short, nothing less than the
already several times Quoted common-or-garden word 'aggressive'.
To the extent that it not only has a fairly uniformly bad
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sense, but also implies a constant tendency to attack, it is
also more accurate than they. Yet it also has, modernly, a
perversely 'good' sense. It is no doubt a shade too strong to
meet all instances. The search undoubtedly cannot yet be
presumed over. But the really 'impossible' candidates are
steadily being eliminated.
b.72 The word 'contentious' as an 'overall' translation -
if such, a~ain, is possible or desirable - does suggest itself
very persuasively. Atopical though it may be, the term has a
more suitably moderate content of the element of anger Plato
I
gives evidence of requiring than any other. In the
circumstances, it may be best to fall back on it, at all events
temporarily. Using the words 'vain' for ~lA6Tl~of and
'contentious' for ~lA6vl~of, we then, in this particular
passage, avoid falsely high-sounding impressions, which is all
we can hope for from words like 'ambitious' and 'competitive'.
As such, these simply do not fit in with Plato's use of the
A man who is eU~o€lonf is pugnacious;
better suited to war than peace 133 ; apt to become boorish if
not given proper (musical) educati on 1 34; inclined by nature to
savagery and violence135. It would be strange if he came in
for any serious sort of commendation. And that which is
allowed him is allowed only because the '~A€y~alvouaa'
('inflamed' - i.e. with greed), aggressively fighting
republic 136 was fixed on as the norm. But if Plato decries
him, how can we commend him - in the context of Plato's work?
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b.73 The quality eU~O€lO(J was only initially needed at all
in the interests of bravery for purposes of making war
successfully. Socrates holds no brief for war 137 , so it is not
surprising that TO eU~O€lO(J should so regularly have a
somewhat deficient moral flavour. _ If we wonder how, in spite
of all this, Plato can still, if not quite equally regularly, attribu
certain high qualities to it, the defence may be~made that these qual
ties are allocated relatively. They are situated within the framewor
of a republic subject to certain of the surrounding world's
imperfections. For instance, Plato implies l38 that the war
type of gymnastic is the best because the simplest. Given
that, it is quite natural to suppose, granted other 'good'
concomitants, that war must also, perhaps in itself, have
something 'good' about it. But to suppose this is to ignore an
essential fact. The level of gymnastic required for war lies
within the framework of the state's adaptation for war. The
ideal republic would, of course, be a state permanently at
peace, unless fighting in its own defence. There would be no
grounds for it to make aggressive war at all. It it were not
for men's greed l39 , it would never have become concerned with
strife in the first place. But, seen also, in Plato's overall
dialectical context, as a unit engaged in rational striVing, as
well as a unit for self-defence,it is inevitable that it should
somehow be so concerned.
The result of this is that Plato's saying (404 b) that the
war type of gymnastic is best does not really present a
problem. It is no doubt, in effect, a 'natural' use of 'best'
- like saying that a type of instrument which criminals find
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ideal to break open locks with, silently and illic~
itly, is the 'best' instrument for that
purpose. This does not detract from the fact that no
law-abiding society would ever need this 'super-excellent'
instrument. But the instrument still deserves recognition as
'good' within its own framework.
Similarly, in a peaceful society, gymnastic of the
intensity required by actual ~ would, it appears, not be
specially needed. Plato would, of course, want gymnastic even
in the perfect society for purposes of health. He would just,
we might suspect, not want an intense a degree of it. What is
at first perhaps a little difficult to see is why he should
take the trouble to suggest at all that it is the "war" type
which is by way of being the simplest and the best.
b.74 The answer to this problem is perhaps more straight-
forward than it seems. There can be no doubt that he has
tacitly abandoned as impractical the 'bests' of the hypothetical
peaceful Republic first postulated. Again, an alternative
answer might be that he genuinely means that he thinks the
specific type of gymnastic required by war the best for young
men to practise in peace or at any other time. Third (which
seems less likely but which the sense allows of) is this.
He starts off by saying that the best type of gymnastic is
simple, and a sister to simple music. In saying thi~ he is not
necessarily implying that it is the war type that is best. He
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is just saying that it happens to have something in common with
the best, namely a particular need for simple music. However,
this third possibility seems far-fetched. It is hard to
believe that he would say that war-gymnastic has a notable
characteristic of the best type of gymnastic unless, at the
same time, he also meant that it is itself particularly good.
And as he does not describe any other 'best' type, it is in
fact the only candidate.
The point may seem to be laboured. Still, it will soon
appear how fully the importance of gymnastic justifies this.
It must certainly be admitted that to say that the war type of
gymnastic is good (404 b) is by no means the same thing as to
\
say that ~ is good. It is Plato's suggestion that concentrated
gymnastic would be of ~enefit in a permanently peaceful republic that
t
- I
is so extremely intere.ting. In fact, ~t is radical td
!
this thesis, and comes up fo~ serious discussion lat er l 40. But
it is more than a coincidence that all the very virtues most
prized by Plato for the original peaceful republic
should be those picked on as most suitable for the warring
Guardians. Intelligence, moderation, simplicity, abstinence,
sobriet y l 41, and finally gymnastic - all are included as apt
qualities for fighting-men. One point at least that he
must be implying is that the state never has much chance of
being perfect. There are always people like Glaucon who demand
the things which make it defective. One inference is of course
that it must always be striving rationally towards that
perfection, and this, if little else, does suggest a view of
~ Jepw on the socio-political level. But a good deal more must
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also be inferred, and in particular the material concerning
war-gymnastic, if an at all fully meaningful solution is
finally to be reached concerning TO eU~O€lO€f.
b.75 At all events, to resume the previous argument, some
transfer of thought has occurred. The Guardians are 'perfect'
beings, but only as opeEating in an imperfect syst~~. They have
imperceptibly merged with the rulers of the 'inflamed' cit y l 42 ,
and their characteristics a~~ requirenents vis-a-vis war are held
in common with such rulers. Yet Guardian training is at the
same time to be the basis for dialectical research on
Justice 143 .
These considerations lead to a reassessment of the first
possibility regarding Plato's treatment of the republic he
chooses to discuss. This was that he is now explicitly
concerning himself with a lower level of morality - a morality
within the framework of an imperfect system. The system, that
is to say, is one in which an overall grossly unjust thing,
aggressive war, has to have 'just' and 'unjust' aspects
allotted to it 'within', as it were, its own context (the
rational striving concept here being excluded) precisely
because it is unavoidable. It is as if Plato were saying:
'War has to occur. Granted this, the state must possess a
system for dealing with it. Accordingly, citizens shall be
called 'good' to the extent that they are effective within that
system.' We must now take .him to have passed into this
different milieu of good, since his calling the Guardians'
11 - 173 -
warring qualities 'good' is otherwise unaccountable. S~ictly,
in terms of the original 'good' (where rational striving was
not aggressive, but directed towards ultimate Good), we would
expect them to be called something like 'bad but necessary'.
Given that the good Republic was one framework, and the real
Republic another, he would be saying that contentiousness was
'bad vis-a-vis the one', though 'good vis-a-vis the other'.
(Actually he makes the transition without giving us notice of
it. He does not make it altogether clear that he is moving in
the new framework.)
This distinction of frameworks is, of course, in any case
unnecessary. As has been said, it is hard - just to give one
example - to tell whether he seriously means to call the war
type of gymnastic 'good' even out of its capacity as
gymnastic-for-war, or not. But his ultimate general meaning
stays unquestionable. The 'extreme' type of gymnastic is of a
very outstanding kind; it is a very good thing overall.
b.76 To sum up on the question of gymnastic, we can on the
whole probably insist on the validity of this final conclusion
on these grounds: the reasoning, after all, ran, 'The best
gymnastic is a sister to simple music'. The conclusion to this
is clear enough: The gymnastic of war is especially good.
Plato virtually implies by this remark that it is the best ,
since, as we observed, he mentions no other that could be
better. But we can let that pass for the moment. Even if a
less thorny interpretation could be prQposed, namely that the
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gymnastic of war is a variety of the best gymnastic, the manner
in which the passage is phrased demands more than that. It
stands out that what is really meant is that it is an
exceptionally good type of gymnastic. And even if he does not
say outright that it is the best, why should he make such a
point of saying that it is so specially good?
Since he does, we have to adjust our own view to accommodate
this. The adoption of a 'common-sense' norm was inevitable,
since to talk about a practical republic with one's terms of
reference constantly those of an impractical would
introduce a factor of clumsiness which any writer would wish to
avoid. Plato would particularly have wanted to avoid it. The
influence of Sparta could not be more evident, and we must take
account of that here as well.
b.77 A fourth just possible explanation for the comment's
apparent looseness could be worth mentioning. Plato may be
neither tacitly abandoning the criteria of the original peaceful
Republic, nor moving onto a new, lower level of morality. He
may just be treating gymnastic with a properly lessened degree
of gravity. As he has just previously pointed out, bodily
well-being is decidedly secondary to mental 1 44. The body does
not by its excellence make the mind good remotely as much as
vice versa. Gymnastic, being a bodily concern, does not
therefore, on the social level, have that vitally fundamental
importance for the political system that mental fitness has.
It is not unthinkable to speak of it in association with a
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thing like aggressive war. Socrates is, in any case, just
giving a broad picture 145 of man's corporeal requirements.
may, as regards goodness or badness, be a somewhat indeter-
minate quantity (373 e), but, bad or good, its special type of
gymnasti~ has limits. It not only does not therefore have to
be strictly good or bad with war, but its146 goodness or
badness is not very important. It happens to be, as Socrates
observes, good. Indeed, it is superlatively good. But it is
lTI1TIOVO!147, laborious, like all the rest of its genus - and so
merely indirectly productive of good, not good in itself.
b.78 After these considerations, we may perhaps scarcely
see~ to need to decide all over again which of these
possibilities concerning gymnastic seems the most likely.
Still, some marshalling of a definite conclusion is not only in
order, but an absolute priority. On the whole, the weight of
preference seemed to lie in the direction of the first. This
alternative allowed of Plato's using a new level of good -
adopting a practical attitude (whereby survival now becomes a
primary good) to the concomitants of war. He had taken a
practical view of war itself. Why not take one of what
inevitably goes with it? In the first place, although Socrates
has said that immense ills arise from war148, he has not CODwitted
himself to saying that war is itself good or bad. One simple
reason for this would be that defensive war is obviously
justified, but also, importantly, that striving simplex is
something he sees as not only inevitable, but right, if only
within the defined context of ~pwJ. There still remains our
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own certainty that for purposes of transcendental dialectic he
must think any kind of gratuitous aggression extremely wrong.
But we have to remind ourselves of the new, ~A€y~alvoucra system
in which he is moving. Given, at all events, that war in these
circumstances is inevitable, it is fair to regard him as
supposing that those things which conduce to one's success in
it are commendable.
He now proceeds to deal in different levels of good. He
has already specified different levels of true eXistence149:
ideal, physical, and represented-physical. Accordingly
(through Glaucon), he divides good into good per se, good both
per se and in bringing about good, and good in simply bringing
about good 150 . Gymnastic is duly singled out as a member of
the third categoryl51. It is good purely in consideration of
its good consequences - one of which would be survival in war.
He interestingly regards it as laborious (~nlnovoJ) - so very con-
trastingly with modern views - so it incorporates some evil in
itself. But, as was mentioned, this has little
relevance, much less whether it is associated solely with
things evil in themselves, since the good effects do not depend
on its intrinsic goodness.
b.79 Our final conclusion, resulting from all this, on
war-gymnastic could be that its being exceptionally good carries
no implication for war at all. It need not necessitate that
either war or war's concomitants be good, whether in themselves
or indirectly (or even that gymnastic is good, except as a
means to good). If this is kept in mind where lO eU~O€lo£J is
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commended, e.g. said to be helper of an avowedly good property
~a AOYla~lK6v152 - the inconsistency that had seemed to arise
falls away. The quality 'being 8UVO€lOnf' is not necessarily
being said to be good in itself. It is merely being said to be
good as a means, because it is forming a source of help to ~a
AOYla~lK6v. Indeed, in itself ~a 8UVO€lO€f is, as was observed
earlier, strictly merely neutral. Or perhaps, to describe it
more aptly, it is an ambivalent force, since it is able to be
steered to good or bad ends. As far as it can be steered to
good ends, it is (indirectly) good. As far as it can be
steered to bad ends, it is the opposite. But the question of
whether it is good or bad is in any case not the cardinal one
about it. Its chief point of interest is that, as it
unavoidably wells up in man, it must be catered for in such a
way as to suit man's purposes best. That is, it must be
handled in a way that will prevent it from running to the bad.
In the connexion in which we are at present viewing it - that
of war-gymnastic - we may thus conclude that what makes
war-gymnastic so specially good is its special suitability for
catering for 8UVO€lCnf.
The way in which it would cater for it would be by tapping
it through ethically neutral, but maximally intense, activity.
This is critically important for ~a 8UVO€lO€f' part in
injustice. The reason for what might well have seemed an unduly
lengthy discussion now emerges. The exact attitude Plato had
to aggressive war and related activities had, for explanatory
purposes regarding 8UVO€lC€f, to be extensively canvassed. It
now begins to bulk clearer. Where 8UVO€lCnf is designated
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'righteous indignation', there is the limiting feature that
righteous indignation only really comes in to play to counter
acts of injustice. It would not be needed if there were no
injustice. But if (as we hope to show) TO eu~o£tO€J itself
contributes centrally to injustice in the first instance, it
can obviously cancel out its own good consequences. In the
ultimate issue, its gross accomplishment can be nil. The
crucial question is, does it form the chief, or virtually
chief, contributor to injustice? If so, how? Third, how is it
to be restrained?
b.80 The importance of trying to decide whether Plato
thinks the war type of gymnastic absolutely the best, rather
than just the best in the context of suitability to a warring
society, was essentially in the fact that it is an extremely
strenuous form of gymnastic. Indeed, it is clearly in his view
the most strenuous type of all. If, now, it is supposed to be
suitable whether people make war or not, then there must be
some special benefit that it secures for man which has no
essential connexion with war. To all appearances, as we have
seen, it looks as if this function were the critical one
strenuous gymnastic taps off the ever-accumulating fund of
eu~O£tO€J which would otherwise sublimate in war. If such a
fund of absolute energy were intelligently channelled, it could
on release result in a beneficial version of the energetic
conduct it promotes.
This view is set out provisionally here for its estimatedly
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high potential importance. A further examination of the
genesis of contentiousness supplies a fuller foundation for
it.
b.8l The examination of TO eU~O€lO€J so far has shown that
it constitutes a morally approximately neutral drive towards
activity absolute. The balance, in accordance with Plato's
varying emphasis, is tilted at times to good, at times to evil, but
with cl C net a ppro x i mate. eve n ri es s of. d i s t ributi 0 n i n 'th e outcome . The
activity, just or unjust, prompted by TO eU~O€lO€J, is such in
accordance with whether the reasoning part predominates
adequately over the appetitive or not, and whether it has
sufficient discriminatory powers or not. Plato's rationale for
drive towards any end is expressed mainly in terms of desires
(~TIleU~lal, 580 d 8). These require satisfaction by
"pleasures". There are pleasures proper to all three parts of
the soul (580 d 7), and corresponding desires for corresponding
pleasures. All creatures, however, desire the good l 53. And
Plato is careful to state - and does so on several occasions l 54
- that the good is distinct from pleasure.
careful to distinguish evil from pain.
In parallel, he is
b.82 A second crucial point may now be broached. Plato
seems actually to have implied that pain as such could be
desirable whether in the shape of strenuous gymnastic,
aggression, or punishment - in short, emergency. At least part
of the reason it is desirable must clearly be then, , that by
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its own intrusion it relieves the pain caused by accumulated
thumoeidic urge.
This must form a subject for more serious consideration
than any other yet broached. Clear enough is the point that
true pleasure can by his doctrine be to some extent an ultimate
end, and true pain an object of avoidance. Less clear is the
suggestion that some things hitherto thought 'pains' can be
proved to be enjoyable. For to this extent they could not,
therefore, actually be pains at all.
This poses an extremely profound question. Later on we
investigate it to the farthest limits we can achieve. However,
a third point which arises, and which must for the moment take
our attention, is the seemingly trite one that some painful
things can be desired because they lead to the avoidance of yet
worse pains - just as some pleasurable things are avoided
because they lead to the loss of yet higher pleasure. This,
which is another matter altogether, has much to do with our
immediate problem. The question of the exact nature of
eU~O€lonJ hinges on it in the following connexion.
First, the eU~O€lO€J forms a drive towards activity which
is characteristically of a strenuous kind. That is, it prompts
what is by tradition technically 'painful' activity, and the
incurring of pain generally. Second, since all activity must
be one of either just or unjust, this activity must be closely
monitored if one wishes to keep it just. Third, if the
thumoeidic man seeks by this activity,-as he must, a goodl55
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proper to the eU~o€lo€f element present in him, i.e. an, as we
conclude, painful activity, but one apparently relieving him of
a greater pain - the discomfort of his thumoeidic urge - then
it is going to seem logical to him to engage in it. In short,
if all these things are so, then the thumoeidic man will embark
on the activity concerned in the face of all but invincible
opposition (and perhaps even that - opposition being, after
all, just one more version of what he is seeking in the first
place). And only one thing can ensure that, out of just or
unjust, it will be just: namely, wisdom. Alternatively, utter
exhaustion, via neutral media excessively tapping the eU~o€lo€f
will, at least, ensure an avoidance of injustice. It will also
involve a neglect of justice (through that sheer apathy of
exhaustion), but the central aim would, we might say, have been
attained.
b.83 However, not much further progress seems likely to be
made in analysing TO eU~O€lOEf' position with regard to
injustice until, first, its relation to pleasure, and, second,
its relation to the good, are analysed. Pervading these two
topics, and clouding them as long as it remains itself
unresolved, is the supreme problem of the relation of the good
with pleasure.
Some discussion of the ultimate Platonic criteria of good
could clear up the motives through which people seek the good.
In particular, it would throw light on the motives which cause
markedly eU~o€lo€lf people to seek the good proper to TO
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eU~OE10€J. But most importantly of all, since numerous
eU~OEloE1J people seek injustice, it might provide some
indication as to how they can think injustice a good (since, as
we have accepted from Plato, all people seek 'good'l56).
b.84 Relegation of the factor of pleasure-profit to the
background in respect of the 'good' generally sought by man is
unrewarding l57 • Indeed, Plato equates - if no doubt (?) playfully -
pleasure with good in the Protagoras (354 b), and equates
seriously desire for 'standard' pleasure with desire for profit
(tTIleU~nL1KOV = ~lAOKEPO€J158). He also states that he regards
justice as more profitable (KEpOaA€Ol€pOV) than injusti ce 159,
and the way he does this does not seem cynical, since he is
here not dealing with justice in its transcendental form. It
suggests that he means KEpOaA€oJ (profitable) to be, if not
precisely of the same substance as good itself, then somehow of
the same 'family', if one might so speak.
It is remarkable also that Socrates at least suggests, in
his story of what awaits malefactors in Hades, that the
ultimate un-wanted thing160 is pain161 • Elsewhere, for
instance, he also stresses that goods provide noovn162
(pleasure). Further, very importantly, as we have observed, he
has established that justice is more profitable 16 3 than
injustice. At the same time, nonetheless, he denies
strenuously (excluding his possibly tongue-in-cheek arguments
in favour of the opposite attitude, such as are given in the




Plato's theory that an Idea of Good exists at all is
no doubt one which costs him much difficulty. Socrates indeed
altogether abandons the unequal struggle of working out what
the highest Good is, choosing to postpone his investigation
into it indefinitely. His simple explanation for doing this is
that he doubts his own ability to find it out 165 • In fact,
when he does hazard a definition, he is forced into tautology,
saying at one point that things that are harmed become more
evil (X€lPouJ)166, at another that evil is what does harm167 •
The idea of Good is a thing we must unceasingly try to acqui~e168.
That much he does tell us. ~pwJ has no other aim. But
apparently this has to happen chiefly in order that one may
thereby discover how justice, fineness, etc., are good 169 , not
so obviously for its own sake. Its great importance is made
out here to be in its application. Except by reference to the
application, he does not, as we have noted, show how one is to
discover what the idea of Good is.
We could approach this from another angle. By Platonic
ethic, the only real ultimate harm that can be sustained by a
human is to his soul. There is less reality to the body than
to the soul 170 • But Plato does not pin down the abstracts
'good' and 'evil' and their operation on the soul further than,
as we have noted, to say tautologically that they make it
'better' or 'worse'. By a chain of reasoning (of which the
pivot is at 610 e) he establishes that the soul is immortal and
indestructible as well as disembodied. Where he produces a
disastrous stumbling-block for us is in assigning painful, i.e.
presumably evil, penalties to evil people in the after-life.
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There is an aim to be pursued in living a good life, namely
close association with the ideal Good 17l in the after-life.
But pain seems to be chosen by Plato as a presumably corres-
pondingly 'bad' reward for the bad. Pythagorean 're-living' of
lives until attainment of perfection, as also the ancient
Pythagorean lore of the after-life, may be mingled here in
Plato's treatment. We should not confound Platonic evil and
pain too soon. At all events, there is something apparently,
from at any rate Socrates' viewpoint, so very corporeal about
pain, that not only is pain all he can prescribe as a penalty
for nalefactors in Hades, but the only "painful"
penalties he can devise are brutally physical 172 . Interest-
ingly, and not surprisingly, when speaking of the reward of the
just, he seems to be forced towards, but actually to avoid, the
word noovn (pleasure)173 altogether. The unjust suffer
&Aynoov€f174 • The just are rewarded 'suitably on the same
lines'175. They must, of course, presumably receive the
opposite1 76 of pains, but we are not told what it is that they
get. We do not discover whether it is a kind of pleasure, or
indeed anything else. As to the possibility of subtle,
spiritual pains such as mental TIoAUTIpay~oauvn177 or TI01~lAla178,
which might be taken to be a fair counterpart to receiving (the
'pleasure'(?) of) the supreme 'Good', these may be hypothesised
by the reader, but Plato does not make any specific mention of
any. Indeed, at no stage in the whole Republic does he
directly make the point that certain pains should be regarded
as specially of a subtle, spiritual kind, or, contrastingly,
apparently discarding Orphic doctrine in this respect, that any
pleasures whatsoever, subtle or unsubtle, are experienced in
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the afterlife. The crude bodily pains that are mentioned,
those suffered by gross offenders in Hades, are purely the
pains suited to crude bodily offences. Even the really
cardinal, i.e. spiritual, offences, including oath-breaking and
lying, are penalised by the 'most agonising and fearful' -
again, clearly corporeal179 - pains.
b.86 It might be possible to argue a way round this doubly
one-sided impression. Proposals that ~p6vnalJ, or again
*nOQVn , could be the good 181 were quashed by the need to admit
that some pleasures were bad. ~p6vnalJ, in turn, had to be 'of
the good'. The problem of what we actually get from the good,
except of course finally the Good itself, is not disposed of
here or anywhere else. And yet this is obviously quite
acceptable. It would be natural, now, that what we got from
evil should be multiplex, vulgar, and explicable. The ultimate
Good - being uniform, spiritual, and divine - is beyond
explanation.
Similarly, one could maintain that the punishments of Hades
were subtle, but, being for other entrants to Hades to see and
take note of, had also to be of a visible kind (cf. esp. Gorg.
525c). Plato might not have meant them to be purely physical.
The suffers might simply be supposed to show inner, mental
agony in their outward expressions, where observers could
detect it. (Or again, the allegory might not be intended to be
pushed too hard in any case.) But while this is not
impossible, it seems odd. And the fact that Plato himself
* (c f. e s p. Go r g i a s 180.)
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gives not the slightest hint that it could be the case makes it
less convincing. Moreover, his outstanding argument in the
Gorgias distinguishing the good from the pleasurable still
does not prompt him to try to escape from the need to assess
why the good should be worth having. The proposals that
~p6vncrlf, or again noovn, could be the good were, as we
saw, annulled by the need to admit that some pleasures were bad,
etc.
b.87 Socrates does at one point give something that looks
for a moment very much like a definition of the good. It is
'that which every soul pursues and for the sake of which it
does everything'182. But merely to point out that everyone
seeks the good is not to indicate that its nature may be
discovered by examining what people seek. He is not calling
things good because people seek them. And even if he were
pointing that out, the question would still remain: 'What is
it essentially about the good that makes a soul wish to have
it?' We have to admit the objection 183 that the term 'good'
cannot be wholly replaced by any other term or terms. But we
may still inquire what characteristics are regarded, here
particularly by Plato, as constituting, or at any rate specially
contributing to, good.
b.88 Plato's objection to a close linkage of good and
pleasure is, we have seen, well established. Notwithstanding,
he can at one point, perhaps - we hav~ to concede _ playfully,
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treat pleasure as effectually constituting an ultimate end 184.
The main difference he makes between the various pleasures is
in point of reliability, durability. The participants in the
dialogue agree that those pleasures which occasion health,
strength, and excellence in the body are the ones to be
sought185. But his position now is that the pleasures are
sought subject to acquiring a good. Good is the thing that is
sought, not pleasure. Everyone wants good 186 , but good is
wanted apparently simply because it is good. It is not good
because it is pleasurable, or because it is wanted. The
health, strength, and excellence of the body, which are a
good 187 , are indeed regarded as pleasurable in themselves 188 .
In fact, we are admitted by Plato himself to get more pleasure
from them, ultimately, than from those intense pleasures that
would rob us of them 189 . But the question inevitably follows
whether they are wanted and regarded as good because they are
supremely pleasurable (or would lead to what is supremely
pleasurable), and may be so defined, or whether there is some
other more correct way of defining what they provide. Yet,
after all that, it would then still remain to run that
mysterious quantity 'good', this thing that is distinct from
the pleasurable, to earth.
b.89 In the first place, at all events, it might, in a
reductio ad absurdum, justifiably be claimed that this 'wanted'
quantity could not conceivably be pain190 • It is also
notorious that uninterrupted 'hedonistic' pleasure is not what
is ultimately wanted. But this is not, presumably, because it
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would not be wanted if it were possible to have it permanently.
It just happens to be common knowledge that intense hedonistic
pleasures never do go on permanently. More than that, all are
defective when indulged in to excess - sometimes even normally -
leading to worse pain than they can outbalance. It is by
reason of the pain they involve that ~TI1TIo~a are ineligible as
'direct' goods l9l • The crux is here of course whether we can
find Plato equating, or coming near equating, the 'thing
ultimately wanted' with the 'truly' pleasurable. Certainly by a
paradoxical corollary, if pleasure were at all comparable with
pain in being an unwanted extreme, we should expect an excess
of pleasure to be as unwanted as an excess of pain. It could,
and here we come to a crux, indeed legitimately be inquired why
wrongdoers who proceed to Hades should not be penalised by a
permanent excess of 'pleasure'. This should, after all,




no suggestion of their experiencing anything of the sort. No
doubt it would seem just as incongruous to Greek as to English
ears if there were. That being so, we might legitimately
conclude that Plato regards 'pure pain' as more of an evil than
'pure pleasure'. It may be suggested that, by such implication
(taken in conjunction with the description Socrates gives of
Hades), he lays before us the conclusion that true pleasure may
be the greatest good. To say that some pleasures are badl92,
and therefore that we seek a good beyond pleasures, does not as
we have seen, discount this.
Yet all these conclusions still fly in the face of Plato's
steady refusal 193 to identify any kind .of pleasure explicitly
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with the ultimate Good. He insists that pleasure, 'true' or
'non-true', is not an end in itself. It is a concomitant to
goodness, which is. We could submit that he implies that
attaining ultimate Good involves attaining ultimate Pleasure -
pleasure, that is, of the highest kind. We could argue that he
could hardly have objected to calling this 'Pleasure' the
ultimate end. But, in short, we can submit many things. He
does not say them.
b.90 A question that arises from this problem and
illuminates it is this. Why is pain less sought-after than
pleas~re? Why are people more careful about avoiding excess of
pain than they are about avoiding excess of pleasure? After
all, both are evils. Are they unequal evils? An explanation of this
c6uldfacilitate progress towards analysing th~ ditference Plato makes
be tween pleasure and the good vis-a-vis the '6u!J:0eI, oec; •
Unfortunately, there are no words that go further to
describe the immediate state of 'wanting' something than simply
that one 'likes' it (or 'desires', or 'longs for' it, etc.),
that it is 'pleasant', 'desirable', and so forth. These words
are at the most basic level, of course,c of: desire:, indication,
and we cannot answer the question with the help of any others.
No doubt we want 1 94 a thing because of a phenomenon
in our being which occasions us to want it. But alternately we
may just choose to omit as logically irrelevant any such extra
causal hypotheses (which introduce an infinite regression).
Illumination as to why we want it can now only be obtained by
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an inspection of accepted external concomitants of wanting, or
again external concomitants by which pain's effects might be
gauged. The latter are much more clearly present. Very
painful things normally have an immediately dangerous effect on
our health. This can less often be said of any very
pleasurable thing, where ill consequences (if any) are normally
more delayed.
b.9l We can assume that Plato ha4 observed the coincidence
that most things that maim or kill us cause pain. Again, we
can take him to concede that it is the pain, and not their
lethal nature, that originally makes us avoid them, and that
this is the basic reason why we survive. These are obvious
enough points, even in ancient circumstances. But there is one
thing he may have missed. One paramount factor may have
prevented him from acknowledging pain's particularly important
status as an undesirable thing:
The whole ancient world assumed an absolute need for
endurance of severe pain. For survival purposes alone,
~urgical, military etc. pain was 'indispensable'. The fact,
for instance, that pain might not necessarily have had to be
felt at all for a successful operation to be performed could
naturally never even have occurred to the ancients. No-one
knew about anaesthetics apart from alcohol, which was only
partially effectual. Pain was regarded as an intrinsically
inevitable concomitant of surgery, or of any kind of wound,
disease, etc. Plato can hardly be expe~ted to have had any
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inkling of alternate possibilities. At the same time~ he will
have observed that pain holds pride of place as the thing which
men will least tolerate. It is certainly a strong contender
for the title of 'evil' if men always seek the 'good'195. For
pain (except for the thumoeidic-type 'accumulation-tapping
pain') is (even ac. Plato) what men most particularly do not
seek. To total all this up, we nevertheless find that Plato
has, almost incredibly, actually left room for such things as
anaesthesia. That room is supplied very simply by his flat
affirmation that 'some pains are good, some evil, therefore we
avoid not pain but the eVil'196. Chief point of all, he has
left room for the rationale of thumoeidic 'pain-seeking'. Is it
I
this which causes his doubts about pain's equivalence with evil?
b.92 Socrates' enigmatic remark that what is shameful
(a{oxpov) is so either through pain or evil or both 197 concedes...........
a great deal when conjoined with Gorg. 474 cd and 477 d. In
Gorg. 474 d Socrates suggests that he believes that the words
, ~ ~
aloxpov and xaxov have the same meaning. (However, he later
makes the above point that what is atoXpov is afoXpov through
being either AUnn or xax~ unEPBaAAOv or both 198 .) This is to
At first sight this may seem a distortion of logic. If we
say, 'All hateful things are either painful or bad', this does
not, by our original thinking, entail that all painful or bad
things are hateful, since there are some 'good' pains.
However, we have now established that the so-called 'good'
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Inpains are even by Plato's doctrine only indirectly good.
themselves, they are bad. What is being said is therefore not
'All hateful things are (either) painful (or bad)', but 'All
hateful things that are painful are hateful because of their
painfulness'. In full, this totals up to 'All hateful things
are hateful either because of painfulness or because of evil'.
Or, in other words, pain, like evil, is an agency which in its
own right makes things hateful. But if (as in Gorg. 474 cl)
'hateful' tends in any case to be regarded by Pl~to as the same
thing as evil, then clearly he tends to see pain as in itself an
~vil, despite the apparent distinction he draws in the sentence
" ••• either through pain or evil or both." And this, of course,
cannot just entail that there are only certain limited kinds of
painful qualities, which we ~ight call 'hateful-painful' qualities,
that make hateful things hateful, i.e. evil. All painful qualit-
ies do. This conclusion is reinforced by corresponding Platonic
statements about good 200 , and pleasure or benefit 20l • Fro~ them
we may legitimately conclude that, on a parallel interpretation
of Plato, the converse - that pleasurable things are good in as
far as they are truly pleasurable - applies.
b.93 The link of good with ~covn is even closer at 588 a.
Here excelling in pleasure is said to go directly along with
excelling in Eucrxn~ocrvvn Blou, xaAAof, and ~PETn. No doubt it
is as a 'bonus' supervenient on them. They are the actual
goods. It is, so to speak, a 'secondary' concomitant good.
But as xaAof has the same value as &ya6oJ202, excelling in
f~ ~
nuovn has potentially the saGe weight as excelling in goodness.
However, any number of supposed proofs that Plato is
'strictly'
vain.
saying that pleasure can be the thsame as e good are
Any number of allegations that he may 'legitimately be
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construed' as saying it, etc., do not satisfy. The simple fact
is that they cannot stand up in the face of his explicit
statement203 that the pleasurable is not the good. There are
good and bad pleasures 204 and pains 205 • Points at which the
doctrine that the painful is not the bad is stated are no less
indisputable206. In these circumstances, we cannot but ask why
Plato insists on this. We can accuse him of inconsistency if
we wish. But at the same time we may have an elusive sensation
that he is not being inconsistent.
b.94 For his conviction that pain is not alw~ys evil to be
so deep-rooted, a general contingency must obtain. One
possibility (excluding 'indirectly' good pains now) is that
various things called painful (but sought after apparently directly,
without a view to anything else) cust, as he sees them,
not be genuinely painful. Putting this in another way, there
must be things which, in his view, people enjoy although they
are apparently 'genuinely' painful in the normal sense of that
word, since they seek them. And this would be so where the
evidence (if any) that they drive out a yet greater pain is too
lacking in obviousness for it to be possible to define what
that pain could be. The nature of that greater pain, (if it
even exists,) is too elusive.
To suggest that Plato has any theory involving the more
complex modernly developed psychological features of pain might
seem fanciful. That he should have speculated on its at times
apparently 'inherent' desirability may seem to be 'expecting
too much' of him. On the other hand, w.e may be certain of one
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thing. He is trying to find a system which will account for
what he observes. And from what he says about eU~O€lO€J, it is
quite clear that he has observed that what seems to be
'genuine' pain is sometimes actually, to all appearances, being
sought after. What is more, it is being sought after with no
apparent ulterior aim in view, e.g. of getting rid of a worse
pain.
It may be that his sole reason for distinguishing pleasure
from the good and pain from evil is a wish for terminological
strictness. 'Pleasure', for instance (or at least 'pleasures'),
is, in Greek, as much as in English, a class of particularly
intense vehicles of euphoria. It is not the term given to
means of milder enjoyment. Plato would, of course, not wish to
seem to be saying that the other categories of things we want
are unpleasant, but just that they are not in the same class as
the t h i n g call e d 'p 1 e a sur e ' • The pIe a sur' e 0 f, say,
learning 207 , is not quite a part of 'pleasure' simplex. But it
is a more elevated member of the class of 'pleasures'. Usage
demands these restrictions, and Plato is no doubt possibly just
respecting usage. He takes for granted the already frequently
cited truism that we avoid 'bad' pleasures because they end up
in less pleasure than the choice of 'better' pleasures would
have produced. He cannot have overlooked the fact that if a
'pleasure' may be defined as what is pleasant - however
'mildly' - to us, then good health alone is an immense
'pleasure'. Indeed he says exactly that 208 He is just
maintaining that, bad or good, these are still 'pleasures'. We
at times avoid them, and therefore 'pleasure' can not be
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synonymous with the 'good', which we never avoid (except in the
case of a smaller good,to acquire a greater).
b.95 This particular subdivision of different senses of the
word 'pleasure' still does not, however, bring us very far. We
perhaps catch something closer to Plato's thought in the
passage on 'true' pleasure 209 . He variously distinguishes true
pleasure (the kind which would provide 'the best'210 for a
person) as being 'pure'211, 'trustworthy'2l2, 'durable' 2l 3,
'proper'2l4. No-one would fail to admit that, if health is a
pleasure, it is trustworthy and durable. But they would also
add that it is very mild. Most of the time, if we are healthy,
we do not even notice the fact. This too was of course obvious
enough to Plato. He does, then, seem overall to want to say
that in our aim for the good we are aiming at something we
'want', but that that thing, though pleasurable, must be a true
rather than a false pleasure. It must be lasting. It must
also, incidentally, apparently be consistent not only with
uninterrupted €uoal~ovla2l5, but with prolonged life 2l6 . In
favour of these two last, we will, if necessary, sacrifice
intensity, variety, and other less crucial qualities. On this
evidence, it may not be too drastic a step to conclude that, by
his requirements of trustworthiness, purity, durability, etc.,
Plato is seeking to stress as best those pleasures which will
promote indefinite prolongation of a temperate life 2l7 • At all
events, he indicates that we should seek pleasures in much the
same way as we seek the good.
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seems to
No doubt a short cut to this is just to seek the good.
But, as regards the good, he has made it clear that intense
pleasures do not count as such if they are 'bad'. Complement-
arily, he suggests that 'bad' means 'adverse to health',
'transitory', 'causing later disproportionate pain', etc. In
other words, he seems to be saying simply that pleasures that
are bad are bad in as far as they are 'prejudicial to true
pleasure' •
b.96 Let us briefly look past this at a possible deeper
emanation from his treatment of pleasure and pain. A point
central to the present topic is involved. It is certain that
he recommends in the first place the regular endurance of
discomfort to prolong healthy life 2l8 • In the second, he
advises acceptance of judicial penalty (which is by implication
painful) as beneficial for the 'cure (and presumably
prevention as well) of injustice in oneself21 9. These are just
a pair of several prominent references he makes to pains
through endurance of which we in turn obtain goods. As such,
they deserve analysis as items he occasiona11j very strongly
mea n are a c tu a 11 y a Is 0 a t t i m~sap pa 1," e n t 1 j wan t e d ',f 0 r 'th e i r
sake'. He seems, in short, to class them, however hesitantly
and provisionally, as at times wanted irrespective of any
further benefit.
Such a finding would have crucial significance for lO
eU~o€lQ€f· For if we reiterate that it is a very elusive and
indefinable source of malaise, then we can see that Plato may
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easily merely have strongly suspected the existence of that
malaise. If it were not there, he would reason, then the pains
sought would be sought not to avoid it, but 'for their own
sake'. His integrity of thought and rational powers forced him
to leave the possibility that it was not there open. For
although he could not, it seems, yet absolutely pinpoint its
source and nature, he was obviously confident of its existence.
The pain, then, had seemed to him quite clearly, in every
event, to be sought.' That it seemed to be sought directly as a
good was a further critical possibility. But, if a pa~~ could be a
direct good, th~n clearl~ pleasu~e and good could ne~~r con~eivably bE
the same thing. Still, he was not certain on the question. He
simply had a strong inkling of the existence of a thumoeidic
Lalaise which could occasion the search for that pain.
b.97 To sum up. Regarding the status of eU~O€lOEf in
respect of Plato's account of the good and bad activities of
man, then, we may now say that if one pain were necessary in
order to avoid another apparently worse 'thumoeidic' 'pain',
the former pain must obviously, in Plato's view - to the extent
that he leaves the question open - merely have been the lesser
of two evils. Now, summating all his allusions to this
malaise, we may attribute to him a theory which includes it,
and asserts exactly that: That pains sought by the
'thumoeid~c' person are 'lesser evils', and they relieve him of
the worse pain of thumoeidic malaise.
To enlarge more generally on the topic: eU~o€lc€f was
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initially needed for war purposes 220 • For the purposes of the
original peaceable, simple state it was strictly superfluous,
let alone a recognised good, except in as far as it fuelled
defence and rational striving. In short, there is by Plato's
treatment very often much evil about it. By his system for the
~~Ey~atvouaa state it is, however, also a good of the third
type 22l • It is a means - a faculty necessary for winning the
wars which have to be fought for tbe aggrandisement of the
greedy nation. And his conversion of military-type virtues in
fighting Guardians to absolute virtues in ruling philosophers
and mankind generally222 involves the transfer, in turn, of
positively good features to TO eUWOE10€J. For it is this
property which fosters the military virtues. The highest human
and military faculty is intellect (~oYlaT1K6v). As an
assistant to intellect 22 3, TO eUWOE10€J must therefore come in
for some ~egree of reflected glory. On the other hand, it has
against its 'good' part the derogatory uses mentioned. And if
it is not included with certain €TIleuwta1 224 among the vicious
natural propensities of man, then its products 225 , when it is
left unqualified by ~oualKn or ~oYlaT1K6v, certainly have
, ~ J ' ~ ,aYP10Tn and avo~la in common with those of the ETIleu~tal
concerned.
Finally and most important, however, it is hinted by Plato,
as we have seen, that TO eU~OE10€J may generate the 'will-to-
pain' discussed above. This would cause the individual
concerned to aim deliberately at pain as such, in order,
eVidently, to obtain a satisfaction through the release from
greater pain. And this satisfaction is of course to be
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classified in a rank similar to that of pleasure, though not of
the 'truest' kind. Intellect promotes intelligent channelling
of this thumoeidic urge. The result is the salubrious dynamism
of justice. Finally, the eternal striving-according-to-reason
(~pwf), which all harmoniously functioning states must
practise, receives its mainspring from the vital source TO
eU~O€lo€f.
We have now come round, if by a long (but necessarily)
tortuous route, to the kernel of the present thesis. Plato
allows of the hypothesis that a certain kind of pain is
produced by an individual's accumulating eU~o€lo€f resource in
him. This pain, furthermore, is so great that the 'painful'
methods he has to use to release it are relatively, to him,
'pleasurable'. The fact that all exertion, according to
Plato's usage as opposed to modern, ranks as 'painful' says
much for subconscious modern acceptance of the 'releasing'
faculty of exercise. But other accepted media for eU~o€lo€f
-tapping mentioned above (e.g. judicial penalty) are also
modernly recognised as painful, At least, they are regarded as
quite obviously nothing like pleasure. So that, even to us,
pain is here quite obviously being sought as a positive gain,
or as a pleasure overall.
The reason this point has hitherto not been adequately
observed in Plato is very easily accountable when we
consider that .the observation by moderns of the 'eU~o€lo€f'­
accumulation phenomenon is only recent. In consequence, for
moderns as much almost as for Plato, there has also been
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failure to notice other finer points, such for instance as the
discrepancy between the size of the pain of the accumulation,
and that of the exertion or pain that relieves it. Because it
desperation. They are actually sought after by man.
end, it seems that anything is preferable to enduring unrelieved
eU~o€16€f accumulation. Yet an instinct of caution seems to pre-
vent its adequate draining until a state of desperation is reacherl,
when "explosion" occurs. Then injustice and war amount to pleasures,
however incongruous this nay sound. They are deliberately pursued
to that end.
Four conclusive facts are of interest. The pains these
two things - injustice and war - cause are invariably vastly
greater than man ever apprehends prior to embarking on them.
He has therefore - obviously- subconsciously shut out previous
knowledge of such considerations. Second, this same fact of
their vastness, often resulting in his debilitation (let alone
mass death as a social animal), produces not adequate, but
excessive - inordinate - drainage of his eu~o€l6€f. This has
taken the shape of the utter collapse, rather than 'peace',
which regularly follows on war. Third, if, instearl of that above-
mentioned inadequate tapping of eU~o€lo€f-urge that does
normally occur, genuinely proportionate tapping could be
substituted by the logistic, then a true ~pwf would be achieved
in individual, society, cosmos and the forms, and true justice
reign throughout. Fourth and finally, if it can be shown, as
it has appeared possible to show, that the eU~o€lo€f-urge can
lead, for practical purposes, to as much evil as good, and if,
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second, the term 'spirited' is demonstrably good and nothing
but good in all its connotations, then its use as a virtually
uniform translation of eU~oElonJ is wholly unjustifiable.
The problems of pleasure and pain, good and evil,
justice and and injustice ~, of course, be seen in terms of
the overall dialectic of strivin~ for the Good. No other basis
is acceptable. In accordance with this, certain things that
are good on one level may be evil on another, pleasurable on
one, painful on another, etc. But when Plato concerns hinself
with goods that nay be,~, pains that may be pleasurable, etc.,
on the sane level, an additional, more analytical treatment
appears necessary. SOLle explanation must be tendered. And it
is on this account that the above analysis has been considered
essential.
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1. (Examples do not in fact appear before Book 11.)
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Homerische Seelenglaube, p. 261; OHll..lITS, p. 44.
4. Ed. Chart. VIII, 621 (1) (Ed. Bas. V 135). But re position
between lungs and neck: Timaeus, 70 a.
5. cf. Iliad, 9.600, 22.296; OnIA...1'{S, ch. 1.
6. By Plato's time already separated from the body, cf. Epitaph
on Athenians fallen at Potidaea, 432 B.C.: 'The ether has
taken their souls, the earth their bodies;' cited in POHLENZ, M.,
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Gorcum, 1973 special number of Phronesis; also ,,-6yoc; - '!rUXTJ
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14. ibid. 411 c 6. (TAYLOR, A. E., R~ato, p. 282, warns against
identifying'to eUlJ.oeLe~c;with 'will'; cf. ref. to
Schopenhauer 's doctrine of the Will,' thesis-para. a. W. )
15. ibid. 548 c 6. cL Timaeus, 69 d: eulJ.ov et euo7ta.pa.IJ.UeTj'tov
7 0 a: <P L"-6 v LXO V •
16. It is distinguished (375 b 4: 'tou CHkllJ.a.'tOc;) from '!rUXTJ.





both 6uj.L6<; an.d ljfux,;, the term 'soul' is here mos tly reserved
forljfux,;, and 6uj.L6<;is called 'emotional drive', or just 'drive',
but if the sense of 'spirit' seems clear its use seems justifiable.
(FRIED~fDER, Plato, ch. 9, p. 193, referring to Phaedrus,
246 a, renders 6uj.L6C;; 'vlill', 'drive'.)
572 a 5.
19. 580 d. It is fair to suppose that Plato uses 6Uj.LOUj.La.L, 'I
aB angry', and 6uj.L6c;;with conscious collateralism (439 e, 440 b).
20. e.g. 411 c 6Uj.L0€LO€t'c;;contrasted with EtXpaXOA.OL and OpyCA.OL.
21. cf. also Timaeus, 70 b 't'~ eUj.LOU j.LfvoC;;.
22. 529 b 5, 585 b c.
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24. 440 e 4.
25. 439 e 5.
26. 440b cf. also Timaeus, 70 b d.
27. 585 d 1-3.








absolutely favourable, but to be kept calm (572 a);
Timaeus, 70 a: 'to j.L€'t'fxov ••• 6uj.LoU ••• 'to 'twv
t~L6uj.LLWV Xa.'tfXOL yfvoC;;.
32.440 e.
33. In addition, NETTLESHIP (e.g. Lects. on the Republic of Plato,
ch. XIII, p. 304), CROMBIE, GOSLING (Plato), more or less
uniformly adhere to 'spirit' as their preferred version of 'to
eUj.LO€ LofC;; • (All instances of 6Uj.LOE L0';<; occurring in
the Republic ~lill be cited.) On the existence of ljTuX-n in
various parts of the body j.LuEA.6<;, Timaeus, 73 b seq., 91 b.
34. To give 6Uj.LOELO';C;; the t:leaning 'alive' would of course not
be allovrable.
35. 375 a.
36. cf. 456 a, Cfeuj.Lo<; given as countel~ to 6uj.L0€ LO';C;;.
37. 411 c 1, 572 a 4, 586 c.
138. e.g. 548 c,
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and <pLA.6'tLIJ.O~ as well as l)uOXOA.O~.
39. The Republic of Plato, p. 62, 1.5.
40. 411 c 1.
41. See esp. 590 ab: 6<pe:wl)e:~.
42. The singular form -~~is used here for simplicity in some cases.
43. cf. thesis-para. b.t9.
44. 375 b 9.
45. 456 a 4.
47. pace CORlHDRD, p. 58.
48. 375 a 11.




'Is necessary', 'needs', uncomnitting futures, gerunds, etc.,
are used throughout, e.g. 1tPOO€OOV~a.L (373 a 2), l)e:L (373 b 2),
tlJ.1tA.Tlo~€a (373 b 3), 1tpool)e:Tlo61le:8a(373 c 4).
374 d 8, e 8.
375 e 10.
53. 440 e 5, 589 b 3.
54. 410 d.
55. ADil1'I: note on 410 e
spirited element'.
'the source of ldldness is the
56. GOSLING gives· 'violence' (Plato passim); cf. XOA.~ IlEA.<ll,va.
producing a.YP"O~ lxwp : Timaeus, 83 c.
57. e.g. 572 b: oeavov xa.t a.YPLOVXa.t O;VOIJ.OV
contrast with oCxa.La.
589 b 3
58. 410 d 1, 586 c 8.
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60. 410 b 6.
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/62. Thesis-paras.
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62. Thesis-paras. b.1'8, 1-9.
63. ·410 d.
64. 440 b, 440 e.
65. Protagoras, 350 c.
66. 411 b 6.
67. 581 c 4.
68. 347 b.
69. 586 c 8.
70. Plato, p. 41.
71. 435 - 442.
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72. The separate instances of 6ulJ.- variants have been numbered in·
the passage, so that translations where cited may conveniently
be traced to the relevant Greek.
73. Thesis-para. b.8 seq., 'spiritedness'.
74. cL ocpew6e<; (590 b).
75. Taking as source I,F.E's and COR}illORD's 'confidence' ('self-
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of physical fitness' that they advocate.
76. e.g. 535 d.
77. 550 b 7.
78. 411 e 7.
79. 436 a 9.
80. 439 e.
8t. 440 a.
82. 6uIJ.6 C;;, 439 e 3, 440 b 4, c 5.
83. 439 e 3.
84. 439 e 3, 7.
85. 440 a 5.
86. 439 e 2 - 4.
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96. e.g. 375 a b, 411 a b, 465 a, 586 c.
97. Thesis-paras. b. t - 16.
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100. 606 d.
101. 548 c, 581 a.
102. 467 e 5.
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109. 589 b 3.
110. Thesis-para. b.2 (note 6).
111. cf. TAYLOR, Plato, ch. 12.





Phaedo, 81 a - 82 c, Phaedrus, 246 a b,
/114. cf. BUfu~ET,
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His regard for the mystical significance of certain numbers is
strongly apparent in the Republic alone (e.g. 546 b c).
cf. both Republic and Phaedo.
389 b 7.
118. Plato, p. 282 , subsect. 10.
119. 81 e - 82 c.
120. Thesis-para. b.7.
121. It has constantly to be reconciled to it.
122. 246 b 2.
123. 550 b 6.
124. e.g. esp. 440 e.
125. e.g. 347 b 2, 548 a 1, c 3. cf. also thesis-paras. c.27 - 30.
126. 347 b 2.
127. 548 c.
128. (thesis-paras. c. 27 - 30.)
129. 548 a 1.
130. Translators use 'honour' for ~L~~, while the Greek seems to
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131. Translators use 'ambitious' for both (j)l,A.6VLXOC;; and <pLA.6~I.~OC;;
almost impartially.
132. Close relation - up to virtual identification - of <pLA.6vLXOC;;




136. 372 e 8.
137. 373 e.
138. 404 b: ~ ~EA.~Ca~~ yu~vaa~Lx~ ••• a~A.~ ••• xat ~aA.La~a
~ ~wv ~Ept ~ov ~6A.E~OV.
LEE contrarily tra~slates: 'a. physical training that is simple





'especially training for war.
139. 373 d; cf. 572 b for his inborn defects.
140. Thesis-paras. c.18, 19 (cL also b.18).
141. 375 e, 403 c - 406, etc.
142. 389 b.
143. 376 c d.
144. 403 d.
145. 403 e 1.







153. 438 a, 505 d, Meno, 77 d 5, etc.
154. e.g. 509 a T - 9, Gorgias, 500 a 2 - 3, d 6 - T.
155. 505 d.
156. 438 a, 505 d, !'leno, 77 d 5, etc.; 519 a : oocpot ?tovTlPoC.
157. cf. 354 a; Protagoras, 354 b c.
158. 580 e.
159. 345 a 3 cf. also 354 a 8 - 9.
160. 505 d: good is the most wanted thing.
161. 615 b 5; Gorg., 475 b T.
162. 581 d, 586 d; also, as CPI,'A.oxEpbTj, = l?t1,8uIJ.Tl'HX6,,
xtpbo, 'l'Tould be equivalent to -r,oovTj (581 a), and calling
justice 'A.UOI,'t"E'A.Tj, (354 a 8; cf. also 344 e 2) close to
calling it i]bu,.
163. 354 a 8; by 580 e, 'more profitable' = 'more pleasurable'.

















597 b (God made the ideal bed); also €~7ta;e€c~ (615 a 3),
efCL«; cilJ."X6.vou~ "t'o X6.AAO~ , beautiful sights, etc.
cf. also Gorg., 526 c.
JI )., JI
172. 616 a. Though cf. 363 e 3 : (LAAa. Oe- OUX €XOUOl,Y.
173. 615 b 7.
174. 615 b 5; also Gorg., 525 b T.
175. XCL"t'a. "t" a.~"t'a. "t'T)Y a.~ Ca.v XOIJ. C~o l, Y"t'O •
176. 583 c AU7tT) is the opposite of 1,00Y';.
177. 434 b 9.
178. 404 e 3.
179. Gorg., 525 e.
tOO. Gorg. , esp. 499 d - 500 a.
181:. 505 b e.
182. 506 d.
183. ef. HARE, Language of Norals, II, 5.4
Ethica, p. 7.
MOORE, Principia
184. 581 e - 588 a.
185. Gorg., 499 d 6, Rep., 357 b T, 404 e 4.
t86~. 438 a, 505 d, Gorg. , 500 a.
187. 357 c 3, 5.
188. 357 e 3.
189. 583 c 13.
190. Evil is the opposite of what is sought (505 d). As Grate
observes (Plato. vol. II, p. 41), 'Hen punish for the purpose
of prevention'. If there is to be any comprehensible reason
/why prevention
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why prevention is maximally effected by pain, it is that all
men maximally rash to avoid pain.
191. ac. Glaucon. (357 c 7).
192. Gorg., 499 e 4.
193. esp. 509 a 9.
1.94.
195.
ADIans, f·leri t and Resuonsibili ty, p. 273, comments that Plato
can only claim to have proved (Gorg., 500 a) that a man ought
to seek a.ya.e6. for himself rather than pleasure, bu:t (Adkins)
does not carry the analysis further.
(505 d 11).
196. Gorg., 499 e.
197. ibid., 475 b.
198. ibid. , 475 b 1; cf. also ibid. 477 d, 498 d 8.
199. aL a xp6f; seems to make better sense as 'hateful' or 'loathsome'
than 'shameful'.
200. Xa."A.6f; = a.ya.e6f; e.g. Gorg., 477 a 1.
20L 474 e 2.
202. cf. Gorg., 477 a 1.
203. 505 b, 509 a, Gorg., 499 e 2, ibid., 500 d 7; all in
spite of Protag., 354 c 4. Or he might be allowing that pain
is ahmys evil in itself, 'Vlhile maintaining that it ca..Tl produce
an overbalance of pleasure and so be good overall (Prot., 354 c 7).
204. Gorg., 499 d.
205. ibid., 499 e 2.
206. e.g. 357 c 7: gymnastic is ~1tC1tOVOf;, and so not gone in
for for its own sake; 380 b.
207. 581 d.
208. 583 c 13.
209. 584 - 588.
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215. Gorg., 494 d 7.
216. If health is a prerequisite (401 - 406).
217. 619 a: fJ.€oo<; I3Co<;.
218. 357 c 6.
219. Gorg., 477 a.
220. 375 a 11.
221:. Thesis-para. b.78.
222. 401 - 406: oWCPPOOUVT\, Q.vope: Ca;., etc.
223. 440 e, 589 b.
224. 572 b.




ASPECTS OF THE eUVo€lo€f CONCEPT.
c.l A desirable next step would be to try to resolve as
completely as possible - if possible totally - the problen of
exactly how Plato saw thumoeidic objects of action. Did he
conceive of them as direct goods, or as lesser evils? A
convenient next step might,however, in view of the immense
difficulty of this project, be rather to compare the various
aspects from which the eU~O€lo€f element is viewed by him.
These can for immediate purposes be divided into Cosmological,
Anthropological, Socio-political, and Transcendental. The
central considerations just advanced concerning 10 eU~O€lo€f
can then be reapproached from these points.
c.2 COSMOLOGICAL ASPECT.
Whether the unit whose eU~o€lo€f element is in question is
state, individual man, cosmos, or the realn of
transcendental Forns nakes,in essence, little difference to
Plato. He sees all Four as One through the Principle of
Identity. This principle pervades his thought, and is quickly
detected in the Republic. We find it, for instance, almost
straight away in a critically simple assumption on Socrates'
part: the truth about what applies to a collection-of human beingsl
can be taken to apply with complete parallelism to an individual man.
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We must, however, quickly make one proviso. It would
clearly be as obvious to Plato as to anyone else that a
collection of people does not bear any strict resemblance,
physically, to the person of a single human. Even less, at a
more exaggerated extreme, can numbers of microscopic 'little
people' ('homunculi') "inside" an individual's thinking
centre be believed to carry on the activities of his sou1 2 •
The principle must apply in at least one major sense.
Collections of individuals are, basically, collections of
fundamentally uniform individual beings. When numbers of
people act, their actions cannot be planned upon any other
principles than those which they share in common as
individual humans. But this is as far as it goes. When an
individual acts, his thumoeidic or epithumetic or logistic
centre can be thought of as affecting him much as though a
thumoeidic, epithumetic, or logistic 'homunculus' were
operating inside his "soul". But the Principle of Identity
is not based on humans. It is based on those sectors of
which all that is essentially dynamically alive in the
Universe, from Forms to grossest matter, can be seen to be
made up. The actions produced by these sectors will then
differ in as far as they are variants within a single
"species", but the infinite regression produced by the
concept of epithumetic, thumoeidic, etc. "beings" inside the
soul, and others inside those, can never have been intended
by Plato.
The anthropomorphising of cosmic events into such
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entiti~s as Love, Strife, Greed, Phlegm, etc., by his famous
scientist predecessors has, of course, inevitable results for
Plato. In the absence of almost all authentic scientific
knowledge, he necessarily had to read the principles of human
conduct into cosmic principles. The scientists had virtually
identified the latter with the former. He proceeds a step
further, and does the same in reverse. To them, the cosmos
appeared to behave like a live individual. To him, the
principles by which the individual is ordered show harmony in
the same way as the cosmos. Cosmic harmony can only occur if
the astral bodies move with due orderliness. To Plato,
order in the distinct parts of the inner human soul must
correspond, and following that, social order.
c.3 In all, this principle to which he consistently
adheres can be simply termed. It is that by which the
plurality can possess nothing that is not possessed by the
individual. If the parts of any whole are all of the same
uniform type, those principles of conduct found in the part
must similarly be present in the whole. The early
philosophers had been compelled to explain the cosmos by
means of the forces found in man, because these were the only
forces they knew at all intimately. Plato takes it as
self-evident, on his Principle of Identity, that the same
laws must apply to man in one direction, and the·Forms in
the other, as to the univer se3. He can, he assumes, apply
them throughout. We would be on difficult ground if we tried
to find actual directives from Plato himself as to the nature
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of the logistic, thumoeidic, or epithumetic sectors in the
cosmos. These points tend to be left by him for us to
infer. The nature of the ultimate creating agency (through
which Ideas, etc., come into being) is similarly not expanded
on. He might possibly have conceived of it as the 'mind' of
Anaxagoras, or as pure AOYOJ, or just as a totally
inscrutable entity. We have no explicit data. But while the
three sectors of man's inner being are reflected in the three
different sectors of the population, the cosmos, and the
forms, it is straining the point of the doctrine to pry
further. For the moment, at any rate, we may be content to
have reached this stage - and Plato, indeed, gives us good
reason later to be content.
What the log i s tic, t hum 0 e i d i c, and epit hum e tic f r act ion s
of the cosmos in particular may be is a matter that can, in
fact, readily enough be deduced. If the originating agency
is taken as the logistic, we can proceed from there to
rationalise the elements of fire, water, earth, air, etc. in
accordance with it. Corresponding roles can be given to
these four essences, linking any suitable two to make the
total three. Or we might take such a tale as Plato puts into
the wouth of Protagor as 4, where, as the great sophist
expresses it, the gods were first in existence; next,
creatures made of earth, fire, and various mixtures of both
elements, came into being; then finally a marriage of the two
occurred. At that point, Protagoras relates, Prometheus,
finding that Epimetheus had left only the humans naked and
defenceless, stole for them the vital third element, the
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wisdom-of-practising-the-arts which belongs to Athenaand
Hephaestus5. Together with it he also stole fire, for it was
'impossible for wisdom to be available or useful to anyone
without the fire'.
Let us for the moment leave out any conclusions on the
glaringly significant consequences of the parallel evident
here, by which logistic, for Plato, becomes useless without
~ Jthumoeidic to combine with it into £pw . The legend in
itself would show a very fair parallel between individual and
cosmos. The individual had presumably in the very beginning
been made out of earth alone. Wisdom and fire must then
stand, without question, for logistic and thumoeidic, later
added to man by divine indulgence. Earth now naturally
corresponds with the epithumetic sector. Consistency is
complete enough here for no further inquiry to be needed.
The four Empedoclean elements of air, fire, water, and earth are
again easily squared with the triple Platonic formula. For
the combination of fire-plus-water, as in the fiery-and-moist
nature of the eu~6J, can certainly be considered as a single
unit. Air is logistic, earth desire, and the vitality and
drive of fire the thumoeidic. If blends of these elements
are worth speculating upon, then warmth and/or moisture in
all life, vegetable or animal, most closely resembles
thumoeidic.
A garnishing of intellectual power is added to fire in
the Promethean legend, although intellect had been taken as
III - 217 -
separate from it. But certainly this blend corresponds most
compellingly with the combined energy-with-intellect which,
we will find, Plato attributes to the eU~o£lc£J element.
c.4 The lack of explicit universalisation in all these
departments can be simply enough explained by Plato's
knowledge of the familiarity such matters held for the
everyday listener. This simply caused him to take them as
"read". He would have regarded current science as so
perfectly obvious a backdrop for Greek minds, that no further
explanation was needed. His tripartite unit would, on his
own assumption, necessarily been seen against it. No further
details were required. The scientists had already provided
full enough explanations of the cosmos. It was not for him
to involve himself in new alternative explanations. He
simply used their already established data. Importantly, he
also used it, however, as a basis for an examination, on the
Identity Principle, of the nature of the soul. And the
possibility, as we have mentioned, with which he was
concerned was not that anyone could fail to understand that
what applied to man applied to the universe, but the
opposite. One further thing they might not have grasped, he
no doubt felt, was not that the logistic-thumoeidic-
epithumetic division applied to man. It was how it applied.
This was what he now had to explain.
He therefore in the ensuing pages gives a detailed
account of the way in which these sectors coexist and
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interact. In giving it, he reinforces again and again the
foundation of the Principle of Identity. This concept is
fully in the spirit of the scientific findings, for these had
sought always to discover a unifying, fundamental element
from which the various constituents of the cosmos were built
up. For this reason, its chief message was not, as we
mention, in the fact of the principle's existence. It was in
the manner of its application to the mind. The three
elements of air, fire-plus-water, and earth were quite
adequate to explain the elements of planning, energy, and
vegetativity in the cosmos. These three principles were in
evidence everywhere. It remained only to expound the nature
of their application to the human soul.
Plato's answer to the question 'For what purpose does man
exist?' was 'To attain perfection by rational striving
(~pwf)'. This must then be the same in regard to the
cosmos. The thumoeidic element in the cosmos is its
dynamism. It is the energy, most noticeably of fiery heat,
through which the cosmic processes of life, the seasons, and
other natural phenomena are kept in operation. The aim of
this dynamism is to promote the ultimate attainment of
perfection, and perfection can only reign once the
intellectual element (air) has achieved ideal harmony of the
other two elements, and of itself with them. This harmony
will then constitute cosmic Justice.
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c.5 Dialectically, then, the process involved in
attaining Justice would in general be related to the two
primary opposing forces, the Dionysiac ind the Apollinian.
This relation would be by way of two parallel entities, the
epithumetic and logistic sectors of the soul. The dynamic
drive of the third sector, the eU~O€lOEf, a force-orientated
"compromise" (at first sight) between these two, will in turn
now be represented as a third element. It is apparently
shared in part by both others, but this is from now on no
detraction from its individuality, since they are without a
'force' ingredient. The rational striving of the two
principal opposites towards perfection has to be energised by
such a 'drive'. This 'drive', the 'third' or eU~O€lOEf
factor and the rational striving it institutes, now, by
primary link with the logistic, becomes ~pwf. The striving
is considered as a participation of the Dionysiac
element with the Apollinian AOYlaTl~6v. Such Rational
Striving towards perfection, by which alone Harmony (i.e.
Balance, Justice) is achieved, becomes then, to Plato, the
only genuine rationale for existence.
We may feel obliged now to make a distinction between TO
eU~O€lOEf and ~pwf. If so, it will probably be that the
logistic factor in eU~o€lo€f does not seem as marked as in
~ f€Pw • But the share each has of logistic is varied by Plato
Only
himself, and the point is not essential. What is essential
is that the logistic gives rise spontaneously to the love for
the Aoyof, or ultimate form of the Good. And by means of TO
eU~O€lo€f, the logistic is empowered to seek that Good.
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through this Rational Striving can authentic existence be
achieved
t
and the idea of KaAoKaya61a realised.
This, we recognis~, isth~ .ai~ of education. ~Unde~·the
aspect of Reason, the virtues appertaining to the various
components of rational striving - epithumetic, thumoeidic,
and logistic - will respectively be ow~poouvn, &vcP€la, and
oo~la. When these are in balance (harmony) with one another,
C1KalooGvn (justice) will prevail. The same dialectical
relationship applies to the human soul and to the state of the
cosmos, and to the forms, when reason is in the ascendancy.
And in this way the Principle of Identity holds all systems
together.
,
The process of Rational Striving constituting £pwf is,
then, dialectically the only acceptable form of existence.
~pwf can, however, only be effective if the logistic element
is sufficiently strongly represented. otherwise it will be
directed to incorrect ends. Such incorrect ends will then
result in disharmony and imbalance - in short, Injustice.
KaAoKaya61a (moral and spiritual excellence), and the
approach to the ultimate state of perfection inherent in the
realm of the Forms, is achieved only by effectual striving
towards that end. An early forerunner of Schopenhauer's
doctrine of the 'will' may indeed be seen in the eventuality
that an unusually strong thumoeidic element may compensate
the higher deficiencies of even a relatively inadequate
AOY10T1KOV. The added force afforded will carry the whole
through to that ultimate end, in spite -of its intellectual
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disability. Conversely, a particularly strong logistic
element may compensate a feeble thumoeidic. In each case,
however, if one of the two components is not simply weak but
entirely lacking, no true ~pwf can result.
c.6 No discussion of the Dionysiac-Apo11inian relation-
ship will be complete if we do not totally reconcile the
double-triple conundrum of Dionysos and Apollo as against
logistic, thumoeidic and epithumetic. The Dionysiac element,
embracing as it does all irrational forces, must, in short,
constitute not only the thumoeidic, but the epithumetic
element as well. These are the less rational sectors, and it
can safely be taken to constitute the sum total of these
humbler forces, whether on anthropological, socio-po1itical,
cosmologica1 or transcendental planes. It is the means by
which the Apollinian element obtains the energy to transform
itself into ~pwf, and proceed towards the Forms. The
epithumetic element, on the other hand, totally without
logistic power as it is, must take second place in turn to
the thumoeidic. In an inspection of the anthropological
aspect of the question we obtain greater insight into this
correlation.
c.7 ANTHROPOLOGICAL ASPECT.
The cosmological pattern can now be paralleled with the
one immediately below it on the scale. In this section, the
approach becomes less general. In examining individual man
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in contrast with the cosmos, Plato's first concern had to be
with the obvious springs of human action. He had to
elaborate on how the thumoeidic and other 'urges'
(concentrating here on the thumoeidic aspect of their nature)
are accountable in terms of these.
The inquiry begun in the second chapter centred round the
question of the links between the leading motivatory forces.
The good and the pleasurable, the bad and the painful were
related to the thumoeidic urge and its fulfilment from the
anthropological point of view. A particularly illuminating
point now presents itself. Plato states in so many words, as
we saw in the previous chapter, both that all humans in their
desires aim at some good 6 , and that, at the same time, their
desires are automatically for nooval7, pleasures. Now, the
q>lAOV1KOV (= eUjlOE:10€f), element, in just the same way as the
£1TleUl-In-nKOV (= CP1AOKE:PO€f), does not only have
, ,
E:1TleUl-Ilal
(desires) associated with its . It is in its very character -
, 9 ' e 'as a cplAla - a type of E:1Tl Ul-Ila. Accordingly, we may rank
it, in the present context, with the other desires.
From a wider survey of Platonic doctrine, we know that
the goods that men seek, and the nooval they desire, are not
identical. There is a very strong link between them, in as
far as pleasure is taken by Plato to be supervenient on good.
Technically, however, they are quite separate. Correspond-
ingly, when everybody avoids evil, and pain with it, they are
primarily avoiding the evil. The pain, being supervenient on
evil, they are also avoiding, but on a secondary level. We
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may further hypothesise, with Plato, from this beginning,
that "good but painful" expe~iences, e.g. of surgery,
exertion, etc., can only be indirectly good.
That is to say, they are good solely because of their
subsequent good effects lO • Painful experiences which do not
have good effects are on the other hand necessarily utterly
devoid of good. Pain, in short - and these are Plato's own
*words - makes things 'worse'll. The conclusion that their
painfulness is what is bad about them, i.e. that pain qua
pain is bad, is compelling. Plato would very probably have
openly concurred with this had he been prompted to discuss it
specifically. The more important issue is nevertheless that
the only sense that can be made out of an apparent actual
desire amongst humans for pain - the kind they show in their
thumoeidic tendencies - is this: the particular pain sought
presumably, as we saw earlier, in some way prevents or
diminishes a worse pain. This is at any rate what Plato's
verdict increasingly appears to be in the case of TO eU~O€lo€f.
c.8 From this and what has gone before, we get a new
insight into Plato's view of pleasure. We have seen that his
distinction between pain and evil, and between pleasure and
good 12 is easy to preserve only if pleasure is treated as a
secondary, rather than a primary, end of desire13. Pain, in
turn, is regarded as a secondary, rather than final, end of
avoidance. But considerable elements of an explanation,
hinted at earlier, of why Plato is unwilling to identify
pleasure and good, pain and evil, may be found in his
treatment of TO eU~O€lOEf.
* cf. p.192, the findings of which are conclusively confirmed by this
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We have seen, first, that he does make pain an important
object of avoidance. At the same time, he is reluctant to
identify it with evil, although the latter seems at first not
made out to be a specially more important ultimate object of
avoidance. This reluctance, we concluded, could very possibly
have sprung from his experience, as far as TO eU~o£lo£f is
concerned, that certain pains can function as ielievers of
worse pain. The problem that he had begun to face was the
suggestion that sone pain ni~ht actually be'pleasurable'.
Such a suggestion of course invites a very delicate
paradox. And in fact he at no point makes it explicitly.
The hypothesis that certain of what had traditionally been
thought 'pains' might actually be felt as absolutely - or
even overall - 'pleasurable' no doubt presented vital
possibilities. Still, we just do not find him clearly
alluding to anything quite as specific as this.
Whatever his view was, we can certainly not read him
as retaining the 'good' as the sole and exclusive end. For
this implies total neglect of his most explicit statement
aforementioned that each desire has a specific pleasure (or
at least 'diminution of greater pain') in view 14 • And, for
certain highly important purposes, we want to be extremely
careful not to neglect this.
Setting aside for the present whatever problem there may
be in resolving the duality of desire for pleasure as well as
good, attention may helpfully be paid to two statements of
Socrates'. First, that each desire aims at a pleasure 1 5 as
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well as a good. Second, that the pleasures aimed at are
those pleasures proper to each respective part of the soul l6 •
These statements lead roughly to the following
conclusion. If each desire is automatically for a pleasure
as well as a good, then all people, in desiring anything at
all, are aiming secondarily at a pleasure. They may be
aiming primarily at a good, but they also have the pleasure
in mind. The pleasure involved will, moreover, in each case
be proper to the agency desiring it. For logistic people it
will be proper to logistic, for eu~o€l8€lf to TO eu~o€l8€f,
etc. This, in other words, carries the consequence that - to
take thumoeidic people as an example - they are going, by
virtue of this quality, to have a desire proper to TO
eU~O€l8€f. They will aim at a good, but also at a specific
type of pleasure, which will be obtained through the specific
type of behaviour proper to TO eU~O€l8€f.
A point centrally affecting the present thesis arises in this
connexion. What pleasure is it that these eU~O£lO£lf people
aim at? What do they actually get out of thumoeidic
activity? They are, after all, the pugnacious and violent _
the warriors l 7. They must, therefore, aim at pleasures
inherent in pugnacity and violence. Or in an alternative way
of putting it, they must either gain positive pleasure from
these things, or be released by them from a worse pain. It
might at first be argued that it is not pugnacity and
violence, in short strife, that they aim at, or find
pleasurable. Rather, it is the possessions obtained by means
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of strife. The strife, it might be said, is solely an
indirect good, painful in itself but producing good.
However, this is obviously not a satisfactory verdict. The
pleasurable features of possessions are proper to the
epithumetic, not the thumoeidic element. The three elements
are distinct. Their ~lAlal 18 (loves) are also distinct.
The thumoeidic element, therefore, necessarily seeks as its
pleasure solely those things peculiar to, and incorporated
in, pugnacity and violence themselves.
c.9 A preliminary factor supplying empirical support for
this proposition in the Republic is the incidence, cited
earlier, of war. We can, in fact, make fruitful use straight
away of this rather specialised earliest example of Plato's.
Wars arise from man's imperfections. The ultimate end of war
is ostensibly peace. Seen in the context of the whole,
thumoeidic man occupies a reasonably comprehensible position
in rational strife. But then, war is always, unilaterally at least,
irrational. And if it constitutes an aggressive pursuit of what are
conventionally taken to be non-essentials, we can no longer
say that peace is its final end. We may, of course, be
speaking of a specialised 'internal' peace for the society
and/or individual. But this has so far only been touched on
by Plato, not expanded upon in such a way as to suggest its
applicability here.
To follow the sequence out: nations that initiate
aggressive war are as often as not defeated. They are in any
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case normally subjected at best to serious suffering, often mass
death. Nevertheless, they had chosen originally to enter
upon war. A favourable outcome was presumed to be
predictable. Why? There are seldom even the most tenuous
grounds for such predictions. Or provocation was alleged.
Yet there are seldom the most vaguely convincing instances of crucial
provocation to be found, if an at all deep investigation is
made of war's root causes. There is almost never even a
valid-sounding reason for embarking on direct aggression. It
might, indeed, be said that people often enter upon war in
ignorance. But only the most grossly ignorant individuals
could be unaware of the fatal risks attending upon
war-making. And to claim it as mere coincidence that whole
nations should repeatedly accept that degree of risk as often
as they do would be absurd. There can only be some other
rationale for their behaviour. There can only exist some as
yet unelaborated explanation of it.
Accordingly, we must follow out somewhat further the
concept of gratuitous war (i.e. war for non-essentials). Let
us first concede that several other reasonably convincing
accounts of the facts exist. For instance, it is sometimes
supposed that the wise in a nation are slowly but surely
thrust into needless war by the sheer masses of the
war-lusting ignorant. (Why the ignorant lust for war exists is not
stated.) Or, second, individual extremists are said to
persuade nations to seek war where they would otherwise not
have done so. But even if these considerations are allowed
to affect the argument, one point remains: the thumoeidic
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man, however ~uch or little lOYlGTlK6v he may have, must, in
as far as he is eV~o€lQnf, be seeking, by making war, a
pleasurel9 proper to TO eV~O€lQEf. This pleasure must be one
achieved solely by his specifically thumoeidic behaviour.
The pattern of CjnlovlK1Cl, CjnloTl~lCl, QVGKollCl, etc. must
provide it. It must be a pleasure peculiar to, unique to,
the thumoeidic faculty. It can answer to nothing less than
the particular ~lllCl20 of that faculty. The thumoeidic man,
for instance, in the shape of the ~l16vlKof, by definition
loves to win. But his love, as being that peculiar to a
~l16vlKof individual, is not for gain, but necessarily solely
of the process of winning for its own sake.
We have already shown that Plato maintains this. The
love of the ~lA6vlKOf man for contest is not concerned with
the final attained victory. If this were otherwise, he
would, at least in the first case - of material benefits _
have to be £TIleV~nTlK6f as well. Yet the thumoeidic Guardian
is not permitted to be anything near epithumetic
Socrates' classification of the soul in its three
sectors 22 has included two unconnected at first sight with
desire. Yet it has not implied an absence of desires in
them. These, we have seen, are incorporated in these
sectors, and centre on the specific objects23 of the sectors'
activities. This means that, although only one member of
their class is strictly that of 'desire' proper _(the
, e ' , ,
€TIl U~nTlKo~, all can be described as €TIleU~lal of a kind.
III - 229 -
Each constitutes a desire for a particular type of activity
as well as a tendency towards it. And these activities,
again, provide the pleasures 24 specific to those sectors.
Learning25 is the highest category of pleasure, high- or
hot-tempered behaviour 26 the second, bodily pleasure-taking
the lowest. The potential these considerations may have for
advancing our knowledge of TO eU~OElC£f may now be
investigated.
c.10 There has, of course, been some natural conflation
here by Plato. The three parts of the soul must to some
extent have the universal 'desire' aspect of the third or
epithumetic part attributed to them. This is simply because
they cannot easily be thought of in any other way. The
logistic element obviously "wants" to learn, the thumoeidic
to compete, etc. So whereas at first it seemed that the
three might purely be distinct faculties by which we
respectively "happen to" learn, vent emotional energy, and
satisfy passions 27 , Plato has seen through this viewpoint to
the actualities of the case. Possibly wishing, for reasons
which may later become clearer, to present them not only as
natural tendencies but as agencies of desire for their
specific objects, he has at all events in that respect
transformed them. The epithumetic sector as such was of
immediate importance for the Guardians from at least one
point of view: to be effective, they had largely to ignore
it. It constituted the third, baser element which was the
prime agency of desire. By a transfer -of thought, however,
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it apparently seemed better to Plato, since the epithumetic
sector has disreputable nooval associated with it, to allot
C .r 'to the other two categories 'higher' nuoval. One could then
regard them not just as faculties by which those higher
things were done, but as faculties by which those higher
things were desired. Besides this, a step further, a
correspondingly higher pleasure was taken in doing them.
Epithumetic desire had at first been mentioned somewhat
deprecatorily28. It was solely connected with bodily
pleasures. Indeed, Socrates suggests that, although the
three sectors of the soul are all strictly parts of it, only
the ~lAOcrO~OV is truly s029. The verdict that the good was
not pleasure because some pleasures were bad30 did, however,
necessitate that some pleasures should be good. This gave
pleasure the wider and improved status we have seen it assume.
c.ll To sum up: We discover that the logistic, thumoei-
dic and eipthumetic parts of the soul not only handle
thinking, competing, and appetitiveness respectively, but
desire them as pleasures. And it is a not unnatural progress-
ion. Once again, there is now no question that what each
element 'really' likes is something beyond the particular
activity proper to it. The object of liking is that
immediate activity. Nothing else. The object of liking of
TO AOYlOTlKov3l must necessarily be, directly, mental
activity. That of TO eU~oElofJ must be contest. That ~f TO
~nleU~nTlKOv conventional gain. The enjoyment looked for by
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the AO~lallK6f will lie in the actual thinking process, not
in anything else that he may achieve by it3 2 • Equally, that
sought by the eU~O€lonf will lie precisely in the activity of
contending. Whether in the outcome the contest he takes part
in is technically 'successful' or no~ (i~e. results in
material gains, etc., or net) will be a ~atter purely for the third
part of his soul. The competitive element in him will not be
affected by it. As far as the thumoeidic element is
concerned, whether contest turns out gainful or disastrous is
not the critical consideration. Its outcome is successful
from the individual's point of view on one condition only.
It must have been strenuous and/or hurtful to the right
degree.
In the shape of military activity, contest is indeed very
likely to be strenuous and hurtful. To be military at all,
it necessarily involves discomfort. First, gymnastic, an
~TI1TIovof, laborious, activity, is one of its compulsory
adjuncts 33 • Second, campaigning and combat are by definition
at best stressful, normally also painful. These two,
campaigning and combat, are, on a varied scale, part and
parcel of 'contest'. Contest and campaigning of all kinds
are made up of them. They are indeed their virtually
exclusive ingredients. It follows, then, that, in liking and
wanting contest in itself, the thumoeidic perso~ both likes
and wants stress and discomfort as such. And our conclusion
as to why he wants them now poses its problem.
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c.12 Let us expand on the above. One consequence of
Plato's refusal to allow that pain is always an overall evil
(since some 'pains' can be indirectly good34 ) is as follows.
He has i~plicitly conceded that the presence of pain
disqualifies a thing from being good in itself35 • This
suggests, as we have seen36 , that pain as such is probably,
in Plato's view, always an evil. (He has, in fact, elsewhere
more directly called it that 37 .) Second, however, even if he
does not mean it to be quite that, it still in his opinion
derogates from the goodness of a thing to the extent that it
transforms it into an inferior type of goodness 38 .
Gymnast{c, to take a standard instance, is a good only
because it leads to improved health39. Improved health is
good in itself, and pleasurable40 ; but the means to it
belongs to the third type of good. It (the means) is of the
type which is itself bad as such; but it leads to good which
outbalances that bad element. The thing connected with
gymnastic which is good in itself is the pleasurable health
to which it leads. Its predominant pain and laboriousness is
regarded as lowering its own status to the third level, the
TplToV ••• EToo!4 1 , of good.
Now, the citations in this passage serve as eVidence42,
first, that pain in Plato's view invariably adds to evil.
But then, as we have noted 43, when he insists that it is not
always totally evil, he means not that it can be good in
itself, but that it can sometimes be a good in the third
sense. i.e. it can lead to greater good (or lesser evil) than
it counterbalances.
.' "
III - 233 -
This observation shows up in added relief the to us
particularly important respect in which discomfort may, from
the standpoint of the eU~OElonJ man or sector of the soul, be
an indirect good. It is the laborious and uncomfortable
process of strife (not necessarily rational) that the
thumoeidic person wants. He very probably wants it in
exactly the same way as the unjust man "wants" (however
subconsciously) the discomfort of penalty by which he
benefits 44 , or the offender the pains of Hades by which he is
purified45 . At all events, he wants the strife in a way very
closely allied to these. For argument's sake, let us for the
moment presume that he wants it because it relieves him of a
greater pain. However it is taken, a pain which, during the
time that it is felt, is relieving us of a greater pain, can
of course consistently be termed a pleasure overall, i.e. a
pleasure of the secondary type.
Plato has, in short - and this is critically important
for the present thesis - a suspicion that some so-called
"pains", traditionally accepted as such overall, are in an
important sense not pains. He supplies little evidence that
such a supposition was doctrinally important to him. Perhaps
this is because he has not as fully clear a concept of it yet
as altogether satisfies him. Still, as he has prepared the
ground for its derivation, a good deal of caution is needful
before we conclude that he did not think it worthy of
attention.
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The application of this finding to the Principle of
Identity, and therefore specially to ~pwf, is crucial. It
~ f "Iwill in the first place be that €Pw is now a more eaSl y
explicable phenomenon. Embodying as it does the dynamic
interaction of the epithumetic-thumoeidic (Dionysiac) with
the thumoeidic-logistic (Apollinian) in a process of reasoned
effort towards the Good, we see now that it is also a
positively desired effort. If the All created by the
Demiourgos is to be accorded any comprehensible meaning,
Rational Striving must be continuous. The thumoeidic sector,
as the energy-possessing sector par excellence, is the agency
which irresistibly forces that striving. Its success - the
degree to which the Good is attained - is desired and
energetically pursued. But here a salient point enters in.
~hat success can only result from adequate guidance by the
logistic. If the logistic is not strong enough, then a
strong thumoeidic will run adrift. It will persevere in
forcing a search for its own specific good and the pleasure
with it, but will grope towards these ends along erroneous
and random paths. The mangled outcome of this activity will
mainly constitute disharmony, imbalance, and, in short,
Injustice.
To review once again the part of TO eU~O€lOEf in this re-
trogressive process. Identifying the directly good with what
is directly wanted (individual goods being kept strictly
distinct from the ultimate Good), we face a paradox. If a
certain type (or types) of "pain" could be an absolute good,
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the painful, qua painful, could at times be wanted as an end
sufficient in itself. But this can surely only be applicable
to pains falsely so called. It would be far-fetched -
virtually a contradiction in terms - to suggest that pain, in
the strict interpretation of the word, can be a thing wanted
absolutely. It can only be wanted - as far at any rate as
our understanding takes us - if it alleviates a greater pain,
or leads to an outbalancing good. In short, if the painful
things in question in regard to the thumoeidic element were
absolutely wanted for themselves and nothing else, then they
could not, overall, be genuinely "painful".
Where pain or discomfort is the only common factor
present, no other conclusion than this seems possible. In
the case of expenditure of the thumoeidic element, all else
seems clearly fanciful. We have shown however that the
situation is certainly not as it has been taken to be. The
pain experienced in thumoeidic drive-expenditure most
probably reduces a greater pain - namely the pain or
"malaise" of thumoeidic accumulation. Nevertheless, the
picture is not yet completely clear. Further investigation
must be made.
The conclusion that some "painful" (i.e. traditionally,
not genuinely overall, painful) things could be wanted purely
because they are painful probably cannot, as has been said,
be drawn from Plato's writings at all. Certainly not without
much circumspection. He at no point at any rate formulates
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this in so many words. But what he does say occasionally
appears to accord with it. Indeed this is the case to so
great an extent that it could amount to reading him
incorrectly not to draw the inference.
As we see, the position needs the closest scrutjny. His
resolute refusal to allow that the painful is evil except
precisely qua painful, does not encourage the supposition
that he believed it could ever actually be a good in itself.
Yet he does insist so very strongly, on the other hand, upon
pain's potential for being an indirect g09d in senses less
obvious than those of surgery, war-wounds, etc., that we are
forced to go yet further in our search. Plato is obviously
certain that the thumoeidic person wants his "painful"
activity. What he is less sure of is exactly why he wants
it. If it relieves a greater pain, what is this obscure
"greater" pain? Uncertain as he is of its nature, he
is basically convinced that sonething of its
kind exists. As a result, grounds have been given us by him,
when we consider the sort of activities sought as pleasurable
by the predominantly thumoeidic individual, for suspecting
that what he meant is not that it is actually genuine pain
overall, but that it is a means to good by alleviating
greater pain. And though he himself does not explicitly make
this last finding, he allows us to make it on our own. We
are strongly invited to draw the relevant conclusions. We
may infer, therefore, that the very pain of contest, as it is
being felt, alleviates a 'greater' or in some other manner
'worse' pain - the pain of thumoeidic acumulation.
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In the first place, then, this "pain" of contest, or
penalty, etc., is not felt overall as pain. Therefore it is
not, overall, a genuine pain. In the second, the 'greater'
pain eliminated by contest can be nothing less than this
thumoeidic accumulation. It torments the individual, and he
takes the readiest way out. This is standardly in the shape
of the counter-irritant pain of violent action.
c.13 The doctrine of penalty accruing to unjust action
alluded to above 46 is, then, as we have shown, based on the
same principle as that of contest. It is not an identical
but very similar phenomenon. Penalised people, that is, are,
as Plato states, not wretched. This is to say that people
who have been subjected to a painful penalty (and only pain
can, according to him, be effectual in releasing one from
injustice 47 ), are, by a paradox that is solely apparent, in
fact suffering pain, but experience an overall satisfaction.
The penalty, in its discomfort, parallels, to that extent,
the experience of exertion. The exertion, for its part, is a
"satisfying" discomfort (TI~npWv T~V eu~6v48), obtained by a
man who "fights it out" with his opponent. A contest may
easily be guessed not to be "comfortable". The contestant
nevertheless gains overall satisfaction by the process of
undergoing it. And this, of course, again applies quite
independently of any conventionally "concrete" results.
Similarly, pain in the judicial penalty acts as a medium
whereby people approach a good outweighing the evil the pain
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represents. Unjust people presumably do not, of course (and
Plato does not suggest that they do, merely that they
should), consciously seek penalty in their injustice. They
ostensibly seek the profit that they hope will ensue on
committing it. This is, of course, because they are stupid,
or they would not initially have embarked on unjust methods
of gaining their ends. They reckon on not being detected,
and, given good luck (their dependence on good luck further
confirms their stupidity), they will derive gain. But they
normally get their relieving penalty. Were they not, then,
subconsciously seeking that as well? It is an unsatisfactory
'reward' to the extent that it is invariably much greater
than they required, but that is another natural result of
their stupidity.
As a strange variant, now, we can more easily consider at
the same time the apparent existence of wise people who are
unjust 49 • We have to account for some alleged and plausibly
absolute inclination towards Sla, ~e6vof, and eu~6f in all,
even the most intelligent - but of course especially strongly
eU~OE10Elf - people. The existence of this absolute inclination
is totally convincing. For if it can be shown that the general
tendency in all humans is ultimately towards war, whether
gain may best be assured by war or not, we have to concede
that there must be much more than gain in the eye of the
really aggressive individual. There must, in short, be
vastly more if at a certain stage even highly intelligent
individuals have trouble in finding just methods of tapping
the total inclination adequately. The allegation that even
III - 239 -
wise men seek injustice is therefore incontrovertible - yet also
in a sense fallacious. For the reality after all is simply that
they are not wis;~ enough to cope justly with
the thumoeidic urge harassing the~ when it has reached a
particularly intense degree.
Concerning the "goodness" of the results of thumoeidic
ac t i vi ty, in as far as any object sought satisfies a need,
and satisfies it justly, it seems so far that, by Plato's
criteria, it can be called a good. It is therefore owing to
penalty's association with TO eU~OE10€f that it (penalty)
also becomes eligible for a clai~ to goodness. That this
goodness is there, direct or indirect, and whether in the
shape of penalty or conventional thumoeidic activity, can for
the present be taken as settled. A problem that presents
itself nOli is whether the act of injustice is a consequence
of the ' , only, of the eU~OE10€f only, ofETIleU~nT1XO\) or or
both. Is injustice caused by TO qJ1AOXEpo€f, TO qnAO\)lXO\), or
both? On this will depend the link between '- eU~OE10€f andTO
injustice, the very fact that such a link exists at all.
c.14
Plato.
There are various types of injustice dealt with by
Some are handled explicitly, others by allusion.
Traditionally, at all events, injustice seems to be the
result of epithumetic desire. Thrasymachus outlines the most
basic areas of desirability in his speech50 . Variously, he
refers appraisingly to TO 0U~CP€PO\); TO' cn~n4J 8€AT101:0\); «'6eE\)
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aOlOt ~~€AnaOVlal; being €toal~Wv; having more than the next
man; not being ~oXenp6J, and not being hated (~TIEXe€aeal).
In sum, however, all injustice is to him ultimately one thing
only. It is TIAEOVEKlElV5l - 'getting more'. The greatest
exponent of aOlKla, the tyrant, apparently only does one
thing worthy of mention: he takes (~~alPEllal52). He takes
wholesale. This to Thrasymachus, this taking (including
"taking", enslavement, of people), constitutes injustice. It
represents to him, without any shadow of doubt, the 'whole
sum' of it (lnV ~Anv ~olKlav53). Glaucon later tells us that
'every nature' pursues TIAEovE~la as a good 54 • No doubt he
assumes (fairly justifiably) that as a human motivatory force
it is so invariable as to be almost the only one worth
talking about. He outlines Gyges' exploits:
~ , .... , ....
~olXEuaavla ••••• aTIOKlE1Val, lnV aPxnV •••• KalaaXElv: adultery,
murder, seizure of power. Indisputably, for all their
supposed variety, all aim at gain. Even .the adultery has
less to do with lust than with gaining control of the state.
And if that were not so, it would in any case still come
under the head of gaining so-called 'pleasure'. Further,
control of the state, in turn, is clearly scarcely thought of
as desired from the point of view merely of ~lAoVlKla. It is
borne in mind solely for its contribution to the cause of
TIA€OVE~la. Ownership is the reigning purpose. Power over
the state implies power to acquire as one's property all
objects and persons in the state that present themselves to
one's fancy. The question now arises: What, in all this, is
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actually desired? ~ it purely K€pcof, gain, that is desired
in this injustice? Or, again, is there (and this is the
viewpoint postulated in the present thesis) some other
pleasurable feature of it as well? And is it this or the
former that, largely, prompts people to commit injustice?
Direct evidence that Plato conceived of a pleasure of the
novel type inherent in the "pains" of exertion, labour, or
penalty is in fact .not altogether absent. It is simply, we
have found, very elusive. Socrates applies epithumetic
desire most especially to the fields of food, drink, sexual
satisfaction 'and their kin'55. Later he specifies
~VCiAWT1KCil (wasteful: e.g. aq>POC1010) and XPllj.lCiT10T1KCil
(useful: e.g. eating, drinking)56. These are the dispensable
and indispensable desires 57 respectively. Again, nOlK1 ACi1 58
desires are unfavourably contrasted with ~nA6Tllf of appetite,
but the limit is still to olTo! (plain food), '6ljJov
(delicacies), and &q>POC101o(sex), The same limitation is
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OOWT1Ci profligacy), and OVCilC€lO
(shamelessness). There is, however, an important deviation
when we come to the high-flown designations these types of
excess are dignified with by the misled youth. For added to
, s -,' -'




In OVCP€lO we have a quite new ingredient. It is
one which causes us to take a much closer look at ~ValC€lO.
A shamelessness which can be passed off as manliness,
courage, has a great deal more common ground with TO
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eU~OE10ff than with ~TIleu~ta. It involves reckless behaviour
gone in for on its own account. It is a boldness, albeit
regardless of laws, which is i~plemented for the sake of its
own special and intrinsic consequences, not for purposes of
appetite or lust.
c.15 Significantly, avoPEla was the first and leading
characteristic 60 allotted to the thumoeidic element of the
soul. And here again, perhaps reminiscent of the greed-
inflamed (~AEy~alvouGa) state, Plato is allowing an overflow
of desire into the territory of TO eU~OE10€f. The experiences
involved in bold conduct can be, he maintains, precisely
'wanted' • They can be objects of positive desire just as
food, drink, and sexual contentment. Glaucon was originally
inclined to think of TO eU~OE10Ef as more closely linked with
TO lTIleU~nT1X6v than with TO AOY1GT1X6 v61. Perhaps the
common ingredient eu~6f in the two words prompted this. A
root similarity was also suggested by the fact that both can
.. '.. 62lead to TO ayplov .
We have already found that there is a category of desire
outside and embracing the three departments of the soul of
which formal 'desire' is one. Indeed all three departments,
we concluded, appear to incorporate, in a sense, types of
desire 63 . But the wish to possess well-defined commodities
of 'gain' or enjoy easily recognisable pleasures is clear
enough. Almost equally clear is the one to indulge in
intellectual pursuits. The de s ir e to -ind ulge 64 in thumo e id i c
11 rll~==~--"""'-----'._-~!!lIU.'.jA= _
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types of behaviour is not so clear. -Their desirability,
because of their strenuous or unfamiliar flavour, is very
hard to see. Yet how, in spite of all this - if they are so
substantial - can they be discounted?
Whether any of the thumoeidic type of activities are
believed by Plato to be enjoyed precisely because they are
uncomfortable is a point on which, we may repeat, he is not
explicit. If he had been totally silent on it, the case for
the present thesis could not have arisen at all. But, as we
have interpreted his comments so far, he seems, at first sight
at any rate, to be saying that the pain is enjoyed because
during the actual experience of it a worse pain is removed.
Somewhat more illuminatingly, however, we do later find
what looks like a more concrete stand taken on thumoeidic.
This is the point where he makes an outright reference to
fighting 'for the mere sake of fighting'65. There still,
indeed, seem to be riders. The people involved are also
acting ~VEKa ••••• TIlEOvE~taf, for the sake of gain,
, '\ 'aTIAncrTlav, owing to insatiability, etc. But Plato does
now explicitly separate the two categories
distinguishes them quite unequivocally as discrete sources of
pleasure 66 • He speaks outright of the desires appertaining
to each with distinction of each respective compartment. No
overlap or interdependence occurs between the two. And in
doing this he commits himself more fully to the doctrine that
conquering, acquiring Tl~n, and venti~g anger 67 provide a
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nAnO~OVn, fulfilment, in themselves, on the same principle as
the objects of standard £nleU~la do.
Yet, while he makes allowance for all this, it seems that
he still cannot quite accept the conclusion as it stands.
The tendency towards kicking, butting, and killing
,. ' '')(AaKTls€lV, KUP1TT€lV, and anOKT€lV€lV in the brute animal
is still in part referred back not to desirability of these
actions themselves, but to ulterior objects of desire. This
is to say, assuming that t€\i€Ka and Ola in '€V€Ka nA€ov€~laf
d .r ',,, to th f • d' t f •an ul' anl\nOTlav mean l.n e cause 0 an on accoun 0
respectively (rather than 'as a result of'),as they most
, ,.
probably do , that nA£ov£;la and anAnOTla are not just
background "fuelling" sources of the "real" trigger -
thumoeidic. They are the trigger. Plato is therefore still,
in part at least, maintaining here that contentious activity
is indulged in because people want the food-drink-sex type
pleasures which it is a means to getting. They may also want
it for'some consequence specifically confined to it, but that
consequence has in its vagueness to share its status with
them.
Adjustment may be made of the sense of nA€o\i£~la and
" ,.anl\nOTla t? 'repletion'. But now, even if the ~\i€Ka and Ola
could be stretched to meaning 'as a result of' instead of 'in
the cause of', the situation is not much better. The aggress-
ion seems then to be made a mere overflow of the excess
indulged in. It resembles the aimless kicking of a corn-fed
horse. So we are back where we started, because it is clear
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that they cannot, in fact, be rendered as that. The last
paJt of the sentence 68 shows that the random aggressiveness
is occasioned by failure to satisfy urges by these methods.
The urges continue unappeased because the objects used to
appease them are 'unreal' (O~Xl TOl! o~crlv)69. Accordingly,
thrown back on the first translations ('in the cause of', 'on
account of'), we have to accept Plato's more apparent meaning.
These persons, that is, who, like beasts, unac~uainted with
intellect or excellence, indulge in the less real pleasures70
(those characteristic of ~TIleU~nTl~6v and eU~O€lo€J),actually
kick and gore and kill one another in order to gain never-
f ]I ~endingly greater supplies of the standard nuoval. These are
the things Plato means when he says that, being unreal, they
never provide genuine satisfaction. We could, indeed,
suggest that he does not exclude the thumoeidic "pleasures"
from them. But he does not include them either. We must
therefore in~uire further.
c.16 To reach a satisfactory conclusion - if this is
feasible - concerning what Plato meant here, we have to take
further note of various of his references to the three soul
sectors (AOYlcrTl~6v, eU~O€lO€!, and €TIleU~nTl~6v). Unless,
that is, his correlation of these three is more clearly
defined, we cannot expect to discover how he meant ~lAla71,
and noovf]72 (arising from the ~lAlal), to apply to the
thumoeidic part of the soul.
A primary point is that these three initial soul parts
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are made separate by virtue of their distinct activities.
The division is almost imperceptibly introduced by scattered
references 73 , then in full 74 • Justice has initially been
proposed75 as a system of balance. It is the medium through
which each class of person, man, woman, child, in the city
performs its own specific work without interference. This
proposal leads naturally to the discussion of what happens
when there is interference. Groups whose mutual non-
cooperation and intermingling would be even more catastrophic
are brought up. These comprise the xp~~a~la~nf, nOA€~lK6f,
and 80UA€U~lK6f76. (Later we find this nomenclature varied
to xp~~a~la~lK6f, ~ 'f€nlKOuplKO , ~UAaK1K6f77, or again
qJlAOK€ponf, ~lA6vlKOf, qJlA6ao~of, etc. 78 ) Socrates now
comments that, just as in the city one has the aw~pwv,
aVOP€la, and ao~n sectors, so does one in the individual
man. His separate mental sectors correspond. This being
as much departments in the mind as they are in the city.
We now have a more explicit grouping of the three. These
are again the complementary parts:
~lAOxpn~atov80. The list is followed by their formal
definition, which designates them as those parts comprising
the soul with which we learn (~aveaVO~€v), are angry
(eU~OU~€ea), and desire (£nleU~oU~€v)8l. A full discussion
of the separate but independent roles 82 of these parts in
the soul is added.
On the strength of this account we -might well come to the
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fairly reasonable conclusion that each of these three parts
carries out exclusively the function in connexion with which
it is named. I.e. the logistic would control only thinking
and nothing else, the thumoeidic contest and nothing else,
the epithumetic desiring and nothing else. But, so far from
this being the case, a hint of something more, as we saw a
little while ago, came with the ascription of pleasure to the
logistic83 • It was here that the eU~O€lOE! could begin to
lay claim to be considered alongside it in relation to this
important finding.
c.17 To expand further on this. Pleasure had even
earlier not been referred to as absolutely of the epithumetic
sector 8 4. Desire was, as such, ascribed to one part of the
soul only. And pleasure, indeed, is presumably only possible
from things one can desire. But it seemed that the desires
associated with the epithumetic were limited8 5. They are
described as 'those concerned with eating and sex, and
related genres'86, 'certainpleasures'87, 'the so-called
pleasures of the body'88. We are, therefore, not altogether
unprepared when a distinct pleasure is suddenly ascribed to
the wuxn. But wuxn is taken here in the sense 'rational
(logistic) part of the wuxn'. How can it conceivably be
associated with vulgar-sounding 'pleasures'? Yet Cephalus
had spoken early on of the desires and pleasures of the
mind. There existed in his view, the n€pt TOU! AOyQU!
kTIleu~tal T€ Hat ~Oovat89. And later, too~O, we have mention
of them. Similarly, though reference to pleasures of the
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thumoeidic sector is not as full, it is made quite clear that
this soul element also seeks them. Here, then, we are being
shown something quite revolutionary. A distinct pleasure can
be predicated of activities by no means ordinarily associated
with the pursuit of pleasure at all.
This does not really fit in with the original scheme. In
fact, it seems an almost inconceivable departure when we find
Plato allowing a formal metamorphosis of the three departments
of the soul from functional to what seem at first like
virtually appetitive units. The reason for his instituting
this new approach seems also impossible to understand.
Perhaps, however, we may get some arguable glimmering of his
intention if we take the following stand-point. It is
possible that, in following this line of thinking, he may be
trying to account for what appear to him to be elements of
'drive' present in these units. Such elements would indeed
make them deserving of a status as partly 'desires' in their
own right. Earlier, he had attributed to eU~O€16€f the
principal element of drive found in the higher sector9l. But
the dynamic 'thrust' by the epithumetic sector towards things
it d~sires is just as concrete. It may seem less violent
than the thumoeidic's, but it is no less surely there. And
the urge to learn is equally real.
Conceivably, the epithumetic element alone, without the
thumoeidic, might have provided the logistic's motive power.
W~ might ask why it was not enlisted to do so. But there
could be a good reason for this. Plato recognised that there
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was a very real desire for intellectual activities in
'superior' people. But at the same time he might have been
most reluctant to assign this desire to the same agency
(epithumetic) as desired such lowly items as food, drink, and
sexual repletion. He had already called the epithumetic the
~OXenp6LaLov 'most degenerate', part of the soul92. Any
agency he could condemn in terms of that sort would hardly be
suitable as an associate of the highest. And this highest
part, the logistic, may, too, have seemed to embody a type of
desire different from both the epithumetic and the
thumoeidic. After all, it is more refined, less intense
(a~6opoJ)93. Its source scorns bodily desires94.
Nevertheless those desires had to be allotted to some
source. It may have seemed natural enough - certainly
convenient - to turn it into a composite unit. It would
engage in, but also enjoy and desire, the pleasure proper to
it95. And this would be on direct analogy with the other two
sectors of the soul.
Perhaps the problem should be looked at in concordance
with other passages (cf. the Protagoras)9 6 , where noovn is _
perhaps not as ironically as is believed by some scholars _
singled out as supposedly the supreme good. Plato may be
wishing to emend, or at least compromise on, a score on which
he is not entirely satisfied - the possible underrating of
the status and importance of pleasure. Consideration of its
applicability to the higher pursuits would certainly suggest
that he is not altogether happy with its "low" grading. He
can, however, only correct the situation by raising pleasure
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from its predominantly sensual association to the level of
concomitant of higher pursuits. It has to be elevated first
to coverage of competitive, second, and ultimately, to that
of high intellectual, activity. If it could be found to be a
sufficiently noble thing, there would at any rate be less
hindrance to its being considered as an aspect of the
ultimate end - the Good. And this elevation he at all events
goes on to consolidate in subsequent paragraph s 97. Here he
maintains not only that there is a certain 'high' pleasure
attached to intellectual activity, but that such pleasure is
the only 'true' kind.
Whether or not to serve as an introduction, then, to this
contention, he brings in two new proposals 98 • First, three
respective pleasures and desires exist, corresponding to the
three parts of the soul. Second, these three parts may, by
virtue of this, be designated in each case to particular
things as loves (~lAlal), and hence termed plAoao~ov,
PlAOVlKOV, ~KEPO€f99.
In assigning to each part an appetitive aspect, he
establishes that each faculty will seek the enjoyment
appropriate to the activity with which it is particularly
concerned. And for the thumoeidic part this means variously
KpaT ElV, V l Ka V, dJ 00 Kl ~ ElvI 00, induI gin g 0 ne' s eu~afl 01 ,
exerting Sla, and feeling ~eovof.
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c.1S The first suggestion that enters one's mind on
seeing the term ~lAOVlKOf or ~lAOll~of is that it is the
victory gained, or the honour ~, that is the object of
desire. This is a point we have already gone into quite
fully. At the outside, it could be the processes of 'being
victorious', or similarly of 'being honoured', that are
desired - but these seem somewhat artificial. At all events,
what it does not appear to be is the actual laborious process
of fighting to win victory or honour. Correspondingly, in
the case of lO ~lAoao~ov and lO ~lAOK€POEf, we would say that
the most likely candidates for the object of desire are
respectively knowledge and the standard KEpon(money, bodily
pleasures, etc.) We would not imagine that it might be the
burdensome process of gaining these, the strenuous efforts
that must go before actual enjoyment. But, first, we must
make some further observations in this connexion.
To take TO ~lA6vlKOV as a preliminary instance. If it is
supposed to be V1Kn, the completed victory, that is liked by
the ~lA6vlKOf, not the process of VlKav, 'conquering', there
are still highly unsatisfactory features of the situation.
The essence of the question here is clearly the same as in
the instance of ~poof, discussed earlier. In its capacity as
primary Dionysiac energy-source in the Dionysiac-Apollinian
dynamism of 'Epoof, TO eU~O€lOEf has one salient character-
is1ic. It constantly places the problem of its disposal on
the Apollinian sector. Unless the Apollinian aids it in
this, the eU~o€lo£f' relatively inadequate intellectual
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component cannot make the grade. It falls short, and fails
to achieve justice. The result has, inevitably, been that we
~ Jhave proportionate failure of direction. The €Pw process
goes astray, because the interaction of rational and
irrational which it embodies is not consummated. With the
intellect of the Apollinian rational no longer harnessing the
energy of the Dionysiac irrational sector, the pursuit of the
Good collapses.
Only the Apollinian sector*can truly know and desire the
Good. And the Good in this case is not only its own
particular object of desire. It is the sole justifiable
" Joverall object of desire that €Pw can have. The two
branches of desire which are proper to the Dionysiac (or
'thumoeido-epithumetic') sector are on the other hand not in
themselves justifiable candidates as overall goods for the
" J€Pw process as a whole. They are specifically and force-
fully sought by these two elements. Certainly, too, they are
essential goods. But they are merely subsidiary, and exceed-
ingly limited in their scope. The importance behind them is
that, limited though they may be, they provide the fuel by
means of which the struggle towards goodness by the logistic
can be carried on. Further, if that logistic is not
sUfficiently developed to distinguish the right way to the
Good, the thrusting violence of the Dionysiac sector will
nonetheless assert itself. Its effects in such circumstances
will, in sad contrast, be disharmony, llnbalance, and so
injustice.
* ( .aSsum1ng this to be adequate)
III - 253-
In a word, the aim of the Dionysiac sector per se is to
satisfy the urges proper to it. For '€pwf to be successfully
implemented, the Apollinian sector must guide these urges in
coordination with the overall search for the chief Good. If
it is successful, harmony, balance, and so justice will
result. But these Dionysiac urges are on the oo;a, or even
total ~yvwola, level. They are quite unconcerned (except
partially, in the case of TO eU~O€lo€f) with the aims and
aspirations of '€pwf. We might therefore regard vl}tT'\, or
Tl~n, eU~OUOeal, etc., as 'commodities' ready-won and
possessed. The fact of possessing them, rather than the
process of winning them, is, we might propose, what is
enjoyed. But this, once again, does not help. We are up
against the old problem. Why, for instance, is the
thumoeidic person said to aim 'continuously and totally' at
mast ery l02? Why does he not let up except presumably over
al~ost negligible "rest periods" following strenuous
contest? Quite clearly because the bid for Vl}tT'\, Tl~n, and
ouo}toAla is incessant. It parallels the bid for food, drink,
and sexual repletion in the case of the epithumetic sector
and seems at times similarly almost wholly devoid of
intellect. There is never any question of getting enough.
Its ravenous appetite runs ahead unchecked. This perpetual
insatiability was initially the case only with uncontrolled
, ~
But as it is proper to the anAT'\OTla of the
lowest desires, it applies in great part to TO eU~O€lo€f by
analogy. It does so, no doubt, but more slightly, even to
the logistic. For ultimate knowledge may certainly satisfy
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permanently, but it still, presumably, has to be dynamically
maintained. Of course, Plato offers an explanation of why
the search for both of the former classes of things is
unremitting. It is that the objects concerned never
satisfy. And the reason they do not, is, as we saw l04 , that
they are 'unreal'I05. Perhaps a more modern way of putting
this would be that, since the urges they satisfy are
biological, they are constantly renewing themselves. They
cannot be permanently stilled. And this tones in perfectly
harmoniously with Plato's findings - provided that different
degrees of intensity of the urges are allowed for.
c.19 We have established that one cannot, at all events,
claim that the ~lA6vlxOJ, in seeking VlXn, does so because he
wants subsequent material gains which are derived from
victory. This desire is proper to the ~lAoxpn~al0J
(tTIleV~nllx6J). Nor can we confidently take him to be
wanting the accomplished fact of being victorious, or of
being paid honour (rather parallel to receiving material
tokens of honour). The reason for this is that he no sooner
conquers than his efforts to conquer, it is specifically
stated, are renewed. He never even takes a substantial -
least of all a permanent - rest. Not even after a decisive
conquest. This may be because, as we have observed, his
special object of desire is, in Plato's technical sense, too
'unreal'. (The proviso here is always that the VlXn
concerned is of the common vulgar material type, which it
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must be, unless adequately guided by logistic). But this is
in any case a different kind of 'unreality' from that of
material objects. It is even different from that of the
semi-abstracts 'honour' and 'victory'. We can accordingly
begin to consider again the possibility that it is not the
vtxn but the actual exertion of attempting to attain vtxn
that is in itself for him the desirable thing. Moreover, for
the eU~O€loEJ element to discriminate on its own between good
and bad victories and honours is putting too high a demand on
its relativ~ly less developed intellectual ingredient. It
must have guidance from the logistic. As eU~a€loEJ element
pure and simple, it can therefore only desire action limited
~ the gain of vtxn, 11~n, and OuoltoAta. (These are taken as
being on whatever level, with the bias at times towards the
higher, at times the lower, types.) It follows that, now,
for ~pwJ to be successful, its logistic (Apollinian) sector
must be adequately equipped to rule over the two lower
"' , "'sectors, eU~a€lO€J and €TIleU~nl1ltOV. Yet the fact of the
matter is that it is not invariably supplied with adequate
AcyoJ.
This is what makes the struggle a real one. A less than
perfectly capable Apollinian Aoya! is tried and tested to the
utmost. The aim behind this is to bring its irrepressibly
dynamic lower sectors into disciplined line; to fuel it in
its pursuit of the Good. It does not always succeed. (This
is proved by the presence of wrongdoing.) But if it did, the
struggle could in any case not be genuine. It would thus not
l=:"I"lC-IFI===--------~~-----------
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be of the kind presumably intended by the Demiourgos.
We should revert for a moment to further analysis,
arising out of this, of the mutual relationship of the
various sectors constituting the Dionysiac and Apolllinian
,~ Jconstituents of EpW • The presence of an appetitive
constituent in each of the three parts of the soul leaves
their existence as distinct sections unaffected. At all
events, this applies as far as the appetite in each is
restricted to the private object-matter of each. For
instance, Plato treats TO ~lA6vlKOV throughout as a middle
term between TO ~lA6ao~ov and TO ~lAOKEPO€J. This he does in
the sense that he keeps it separate from both, though at times
he brings it closer to the one, at times ~o the other.
(Overall, he seems to prefer to regard it as closer to TO
~lA6ao~ov than to TO ~lAOKEPo€JI06, but the balance is about
even.) In the last major passage in which the three parts of
the soul are dealt with l07 , he preserves this relation. The
status of the middle part as the ally, perhaps more naturally
of the higher than the lower, is confirmed l08 , but they are
still distinct.
In the instance of TO ~lA6vlKOV and TO ~lAOKEPO€J, the
common factor of appetite produces uncompromising overlap.
Early on we found an almost inextricable union of the two
parts. This was at the stage where the primitive republic,
by its choice of a drive for superf~ous commodities instead
of contented living on simple necessaries, 'unwittingly'
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projected itself into war l09 • Plato later separates these
parts, but his subsequent treatment of them as uniform
'desires' (~lAlal) serves to reintroduce the earlier fusion.
c.20 The sequence at that early point was not quite
straightforward. It is worth tracing it back in order to
clarify the steps by which the progression to war occurs.
The first stage comes with the observation that the simple
provisions for life hitherto listed 'will not be adequate'llO.
They will not satisfy certain people who (in Glaucon's
phrase) regard the plans made so far as good enough for a
city of pigs, but not for one of humans. The new LPu~waalll
and ~A€y~alvouaa city will want much more than it has so far
been allotted. But it appears, also, that this wanting will
be of a rather peculiar kind. It will extend not merely
beyond the original point (of necessities) to a definite
limit, but infinitely. For Socrates assumes, when he states
that their current provisions will be insufficient, that they
will need a bigger cit y l12 even though the population's size
has presumably remained unchanged. Briefly, they will have
to seize other people's land. They will have to become
thieves on the largest scale. Yet the fact that their
possessions would not immediately suffice had not entailed
that they would need a bigger city. Much less had it
necessitated that they should acquire the land for it by theft.
Socrates glosses over these seemingly fundamental issues.
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The simple remark he uses in rloing so is that parts of the
neighbours' territory will 'have to be annexed' (aTIOl~nl€OV).
And in this he strangely omits all aspects of the point,
clearly obvious to him, made above. (This is the truism that
people who want more, while already possessing essential
needs, do not need to rob others.) The !epublic's inhabit-
ants can for one thing work harder to make more, but it seems
that this method holds no attractions for them. For another,
they can expand into their own undeveloped territory, if, as
is normally the case, they have some available. They do not
need to avail themselves either of the moveable possessions
or land of others. Yet, notwithstanding all this, the second
stage - of seizing foreign territory - is reached in a sudden
rush. There would seem to be many preliminary stages to be
gone through before the final act of piracy, but our con-
elusion can only be that Socrates considers them self-evident
and does not wish to waste time considering them. The hard
final fact - and no-one recognises it better than he - is
that ul~imately these inhabitants of the would-be luxurious
state are inevitably going to be wanting their neighbours'
possessions and land. Above all, this is going to be the
case however much they may have of their own. The reality
might as well be recognised immediately. The intermediate
stages can go by the board. They are simply going to want to
engage in aggression irrespective.
And a further basic issue - which Plato has no doubt
deliberately made room for l13 is the following. There is,
among these inhabitants of the so to speak 'luxus-staat', not
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just this inherent interminability, this infinity, of baser
TIAEovE;la. There is not only the desire to get infinitely
more of everything, without discrimination of good or bad.
There exists, further, the clear-cut desire to get it
precisely by forcibly wresting it from others. This is so
not only although the attackers do not need it, but even if
" fthey do not need to apply force to get it. EpW has of
course here clearly gone drastically astray. The Apollinian
factor has fallen far short. But beyond all these in
interest, Plato delineates here a desire for contest as such,
with the emphasis on the amoral nature of that contest.
It is on this basis that the argument rests that Plato is
not actually postulating a desire for Vlxn as an achieved,
completed goal. What he is specifying it to be for .is a process
of struggle. The struggle is to gain vlxn, but continues
whether it is gained or not. TO eU~OElO(f inexorably and
incessantly desires vlxn. This is fundamental. Second, this
desire is incompletely logistic, and, to result in good,
must be properly guided by Aoyof. Such is the condition of
the success of ~pwf.
c.2l This is a striking suggestion on Plato's part.
First, no amount of gain however great will ever satisfy
unchecked (by the logistic sector) He is to repeat
this point later, more than once ll4 • But this is not all.
The desire for more is not confined even within accepted,
commonsense bounds. Ac~uisitiveness, it would be expected,
III - 260 -
would at least be limited to the things one can get without
endangering one's life. One's very ability to enjoy the
things one gets should surely never be gambled with. To
enjoy them one must, after all, be alive. Yet this gamble is
to be taken. Other peoples are to be attacked superfluously,
and their land wrested from them l15 , a kind of act performed
necessarily at the possible cost of everything the attacker
has, including his life. More interesting than ever is that,
judging by the way he phrases the passage ll6 , Plato regards
this apparently needless aggressiveness not merely as an
origin, but as the fundamental origin, of war.
For it is one thing to say, that man's appetite for gain is
never satisfied ll ? It is very much another to say that it
can nag him to such an extent that he will actually virtually
commit suicide to try to appease it. In particular, if
&VCP€lQ is a prerequisite for aggressiveness, greed is
nevertheless still all that is supposed to be needed to make
one go to war. (Plato certainly at first implies that it
is.) There should therefore be no need for the extra
~lA6vlXOV (eU~OElO€J) element to provide a fund of avopEla.
Greed should presumably supply all the aVCP€lQ necessary.
, s 'However, of course, aVupEla is a noble thing. The relation
of TO ~lAOXEPO€J and TO ~lA6vlXOV therefore needs closer
inspection.
Why is TO eU~O€lC€J necessary for aggression? Why, if
greed alone is apparently enough to drive a man to attacking,
is something further required to supplement it? On the face
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of it, there seems no need for any subsidiary aid to greed.
If we may conjecture that Plato has neglected to make
explicit any particular point resulting from his argument
about the consequences of greed, this is undoubtedly one.
The extent to which he incorporates in it the driving power
he later makes the proper province of ~O eU~O€lo£f is not
cl e ar • Still, he gives us some significant leads.
£TIleU~nT1KOV has, it seems, very compelling links with TO
In spite of TO eU~O€lo£f' preferential links with
beasts. This is noteworthy. Even if the first is a lion and
the evident superior of the other, these creatures are below
man. Both can become ~YP1ovl18. And both can, by their
separate, if simultaneous, efforts effectively cripple TO
AOylOT1KOVl1 9. Moreover, both have the principal core of
their meaning in the stem eu~-, and a resultant germ of
dynamism emerges.
c.22 As far as TO eU~OE18€f (and, somewhat in the same
way, lnleU~la) is a drive towards a particular type of
conduct, it stands in contrast with that of TO ~lAo~ae£f
(AOY10T1KOV). The latter is of course a much milder, more
ethereal tendency, far more so , ~than €TIleU~la. Plato has
now left it less completely defined than will make it fully
independent. He has postulated TO eU~O€lo€f as a distinct
feature because it seems to him to have an important
independent existence. Consciously, however, or
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unconsciously, he has made it look - at least at first - more
like a secondary feature. It resembles more closely
something supervenient on E~leUPlal20 than a real force on
its own. As such a feature, it adds extra weight on its own
account to TO ~~leUpnT1K6v (only later primarily to TO
~lAopaeef), but has only a partially distinct separate
existence. In short, first the ~A€ypalvoucra state desires
limitlessly and indiscriminately. As a result it ultimately
attacks (allegedly solely for yet further gain). Then
mysteriously it is made out, we find, to be contentious not
for the sake of contest as well as acquisition, but solely for
the sake of acquisition. If any desire at all does exist on
its part for contest as such, it is included with acquisition
under the one label - TO ~lAOK€poef.
Plato, in temporarily f~singacquisitivenesswith
contentiousness in this wayl21, no doubt still thought of
~~leUPla and TO 8UpO€lOef as stages of the dialectical
process of striving for , ~aya8ov. He began by placing them in
both roles - greed and contentiousness - and simply omitting
initial mention of TO 8UpO€lOef. In doing this, he was
probably taking TO 8UpO€lOef temporarily as an additional
contention factor, a kind of "supercharger", as it were, of
the basic desire-machinery. The fact is, nevertheless, that
we have TO 8UpO€lOef presented to us later independently,
with a wealth of detail and in a very different light. This
must certainly be considered important for modifying our view
of the kind of greed Plato regards as culminating in war.
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eU~O€lOEf should, further, be seen in that capacity as, once
again, having a strong bearing on the nature of both war and
injustice generally. The Apollinian factor is lacking, so
eU~O€lOEf' application is unsatisfactorily guided. And the
account of how war begins can be taken as an account 'writ
large' of the beginning of any kind of deprivation - or,
briefly, Injustice.
c.23 The reason for this interrelation, to recapitulate in
part what has already been suggested, is that, as is now
clear, more than just greed is needed in order to allow
particularly greedy people to implement their desires. To
possess the full force to achieve his ends, the unlimitedly
~lAO~€ponf (epithumetic) individual has also inevitably got
to be ~lA6vl~of (eU~O€lonf) to some extent. The very act of
stealing, to which he must inevitably first resort, must
consist first of all and basically in subjection of the
victim. Only together with this can there be appropriation.
Successful contest must precede (or can follow) removal of
property, because the prospective or actual victim of
stealing will at some stage resist. All these things require
force to counter.
One can divide the supposedly single act 'stealing' (here
of territory: Tnf ••• xwpaf ••• &TIOT~nTEov) into two distinct
stages. ~hese are respectively attack and appropriation.
The identical principle applies even in surreptitious theft,
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because the act of taking their property away from people
involves an ingredient of trauma inflicted on them. And
trauma of this sort has so much in common with that
accompanying the actual act of wresting it from them that it
is indeed almost impossible to tell the two apart. In short,
the act of depriving anyone of anything, since it involves
separating them from it, involves duress. Whether the
'separating' is done by open force or by stealth, it inflicts
shock. This shock may be physical or mental, but, whichever
it is, it invites forcible reprisal. And this reprisal the
thief then has to resist - if only by flight.
Illicit deprivation cannot therefore, in principle, be
anything other than 'contentious'. And, following from this
combined with the above finding, we may conclude that any
type of injustice whatever is, in principle, contentious. It
consists fundamentally of deprivation of others in respect of
goods, material or abstract, which are anything up to
potentially vital to them. As such, it must in principle
contain the element of aggression. The act of greed, on the
other .hand, does not on its own al ways 122 incorporate theft.
It does not, therefore, always incorporate aggression. In as
far as it observes the law, it will observe the legal
boundaries of any undesirable consequences it may have, and,
accordingly, it cannot rank as injustice unless it crosses
those bounds. But once it does so, it becomes an unjust, and
therefore a contentious, act.
The relationship Plato's treatment of the subject leaves
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us with is this. All injustice is contentious. Not all
contention is, however, unjust. This is clearly very
significant for the part of ~O eU~O€tO€J in the scheme of
justice and injustice. For as it turns out, there would in
effect be no injustice at all but for the existence of the
eU~O€tO€J element. On the other hand, there would be no
justice worthy of the name either. The eU~O€tO€J element is
the driving factor that generates all noteworthy activity,
good or evil, and the logistic determines how much good or
evil will relatively be achieved by the activity. With the
thumoeidic force removed, the universe would be a static hulk.
c.24 It will also be helpful to return temporarily to the
earlier point, that Plato has quite simply maintained l2 3 that
greed on its own initiates the type of war Glaucon's luxury
state will set out to wage. In fact, it looks there very
much as if he thinks of greed as having the inherent drive to
sustain that war as well. We need to test afresh the picture
so far given us of greed to see whether it wil~ permit of
this. Earlier we found references in the discourse between
ThrasyTIachus and Socrates to greed in connexion with
unjustice l2 4. Yet TIA€ov€Sla ('unlimited desire'), as we have
d ' ~seen, oes not naturally follow from €TIteU~la in the normal
Greek sense. Normal desire has a distinct object. On
acquisition of that object, it rests satisfied for an
appreciable time. When, in contrast, we conjoin with
'desire' the additional Platonic_rider of insatiability, a
new factor comes into play. Now the subject desires not just
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a certain object or objects, nor for a limited time, but
unlimited commodities all the time. This is the exact mental
backdrop to greed. In short, nA€OV€~la reveals itself as the
term denoting, as it were, super implementation of the mental
attitude characteristic of desire. It is desire b6lster~d ~y
TO eU~O€lo€f, and abandoned by AOYlaT1Kov. And Plato may
well have expected us to draw that conclusion. From this
point at any rate we may set out to find whatever links there
may be between 'high-temper-energy' (TO eU~O€lo€f), greed,
and injustice, which when present together in predominant
force cause ~pwf to fail.
Socrates is unwilling at first to discuss the problem of
whether the war which arises from greed achieves (~pyas£Tal)
good or evil 12 5. At the same time he maintains that evils




Having attributed luxury-grasping war to greed 12 9
alone, Plato however, as we have seen, then importantly
introduces the eU~O€lo£f element 130. This he now says
supplies the courage (~voP€la) necessary for the willingness
to fight 13l • We have already noted the overlap between greed
and 'high-temper' in respect to war 132 • To be the basic
cause of war, greed, we found, would have to generate its own
supply of courage. We could not see how it could do this
solely with the help of But we have now been
presented with the proposedly independent, specific source of
courage - TO eU~O€lo£f. The greedy man who also makes war
must get his courage from this. There is no other specified
source.
To support this conclusion. There is that about greed
which does not suggest an affinity with courage. At first
sight, the sequence followed in greed's realisation would be
this. The greedy man devotes himself to the wholesale legal
gathering in of property. Then, if unappeased, he covets the
property of others and tries to get it from them legally or semi-
legally. Ultimately, he seizes it illegally. But this final
step of seizure would, we have shown, invariably in principle
involve overcoming resistance. It would involve a need for
force, either in the shape of positive aggression, or
defence, and/or evasion of reprisals. And here, unless he is
courageous as well as greedy, the greedy man must stop.
Either he will never actually set out to seize what he
covets, or he will persuade others to seize it for him. But
F1==------------------~
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c.26
then, if we believe we have escaped the problem by this shift
(substituting "others" who will help him for his own
courage), there is the question of the motive by which these
others, the fighters he employs, will be led. Will they,
similarly, be fighting for mere gaitt? ~r .ill ~h~y ~e fighting
'(
nie~ely :- or"ao9itionally,:" ''.for:theJsake,;bf fight'i:p;;g'2 If they are
fighting for gain, then they are actuated by the same motives
as the greedy man is. There is still the problem of where
their courage comes from. For with only the motives of the
greedy man behind them, they are in his position. They in
fact, to take Plato's division strictly, could not fight at
all. 'To fight for gain alone' (that is for superfluous
gain, since fighting for the necessities of life can be
excluded as self-explanatory - one fights rather than dies)
involves a contradiction in terms. There must be the added
factor of 'contentiousness' present. For people who are
prepared to fight for superfluities, or just as a preferred
way of making a living, require more than greed. If,
therefore, they are fighting wholly or in part for the sheer
sake of fighting, then they must to that extent be actuated
by ~lAOV1Kla (TO eU~O€lo€f). They are not motivated, in that
department, by greed. The process of gaining vlKn, that is
of fighting itself, must be desirable to them.
In the previous chapt er l 33, we found that the
~lA6vlKOf brand of the thumoeidic person could only partially
satisfactorily be shown to enjoy the process by which he
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achieved vlxn. It looked as though completed achievement of
vlxn, the state of being victorious, was all that supplied
/
him with satisfaction. He did not seem so clearly to enjoy
the strenuous process of gaining it. But the indications
were that Plato did not actually regard him as deriving full
satisfaction from vlxn itself.
If these indications did not seem conclusive, a more
thorough follow-up yields some illumination. Closer
inspection of the case of the ~lA6vlxoJ on general grounds
reveals vlxn as on its own a very tenuous object of desire.
The vlxn enjoyed by a common soldier would certainly be
extremely flimsy. Without the subsidiary factor of Tl~n, it
does not even carry real conviction as a reward in its own
right at all. The common soldier earning pay for his
services does not, further, win much Tl~n in any case.
We have now substantially shown that some soldiers fight partly
or ~xclusively o~ing to ~lAoVlxla.' If th~~£in~in~s just'~ubted
are valid, it appears most unlikely that such soldiers will
be fighting even largely for purposes of gaining an 'end-
product' vlxn in the standard sense of the term 'end-product'
- or indeed for ll~n or anything similar to it in the way of
a 'final' end. They must, in fact, be fighting their
external enemy in great part precisely because they wish to
fight. They wish to experience the exertions and/or - if one
likes - the 'end-product' of the exertions - a physiological
state - involved in the process of fighting. ~lAovlxla, that
is to say, is in this respe~t the sole efficient cause of
their bellicosity.
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The doctrine Plato puts forward harmonises with this.
Greed may be an originating cause of ~lAovlKla's coming into
play. Or the contenders may even use it as a pretext to
cover their blatant ~lAovlKla. But it c*nnotbe a
cause of contention independently of ~lAovlKla.
This argument is recapitulated here mainly to draw
greater attention to the third member (6upaJ) of the three
manifestations in question. These three (~6avoJ envy, Sla
violence, 6upaJ hot-temper) are the definitive symptoms of
the thumoeidic person who pursues134 his thumoeidic
propensity to the limit. The manifestation of the third
member, 6upaJ (ouaKo~la is given by Plato as its
mainspring)135, is in the form of indulgence of hot-temper,
such as, for instance, in overt rage. It cannot reasonably
be doubted that this specialised 6upaJ was blended in Plato's
mind with the other two ingredients of the general 6upaJ of
TO 6UPO€lO€J. (These are the Sla that sprang from ~lAovlKla,
and the ~6avoJ arising from ~lAoLlPla.) A pattern of
thumoeidic action involving all three elements is the most
natural one. Exclusive manifestations of n6avoJ, Sla, or
6upaJ respectively, as though each could be present in an
absolute form, are less likely. This does not, of course,
exclude the possibility that one or other of the threesome
might predominate. If this were not so, the term
~lAavlKoJ136 could hardly be so freely used by Plato as a
comprehensive alternate to 6UPO€lonJ137. Where he speaks of
~66voJ, Sla, and 6upaJ, he must therefore be taken to mean
these mainly in combination (6upaJ perhaps lying somewhat to
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the fore). He would only to a lesser extent be likely to
intend them to apply separately. The overt expression of
eu~6f in rage, for instance, cannot be separated from ~e6vof,
or even from the infliction of Sla. Finally, the full
account of the actions of a person manifesting TO eU~OE10£f
without the curbing rein of AOY10~6f or vouf138 includes all
the ingredients of war. In particular, it includes the
simplest raw material of war, namely eu~6f coupled with Sla
- angry violence.
The t h r eeele men t s are ~e6v 0 f 0 win g to qn A0 T 1 ~ 1a, S1a
owing to ~lAOVU{la, and third, eu~6f owing to ouoKoAla. Of
these, eu~6f seems on the surface to be the only manifestation
in which something at all like contentiousness or violence is
wanted unqualifiedly and for its own sake. In it, the mental
condition (ouoKoAla) produces the physical manifestation
(eu~6J). It is the only one in which the producer seems
absolutely obviously to be of exactly the same type of
substance as the product. This is to say that, first, envy
does not seem so much to rely for its origin on love of
honour. Nor, second, does violence rely on a love of
triumph. But for anger a fund of hot-temper is essential.
In other words, Plato seems to be fathering all five items -
~e6\)of, ~lAO'(l~la, Sla, ~lAovlKla, and ouoKoAla - onto eu~6f
irrespective. He pairs them off with each other as seems
most apt, but makes eu~6f ultimately their fount and raison
d'etre. He treats eu~6J as at once a whole, and as part pf
that whole.
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The same thing happens in the case of TO AOYlGTlXOV and
the soul (logistic coming to be termed the only 'true' part
of the soul). Plato's tendency towards this dialectical
technique is critically important, since it is only within
the context of his total dialectic that the dialectic of
eu~of can be seen in perspective. In accordance with it, in
every event, we can say the following. Since eu~of is
apparently wanted for its own sake, these five above items -
~eovof, Sla, etc. - would all, as its several ingredients,
also be wanted for their own sake. Envy, ambition, violence,
contentiousness, and anger all receive a uni~ue treatment
from Plato. They are conceived of by him as indulged in ~
least as much for the sake of the experience of indulging in
them as for any other reason. And the nature of that other
reason (i.e. whether it is higher or lower) will depend on
the Apollinian AOYlGTlXOV'S degree of success in channelling
them correctly.
c.2? In passing, we may observe some of the consequences
of separating these "sub-elements". We could, for instance,
easily be prompted by the treatment of the various parts of
the eU~OElQ€f element as distinct units to think of, say, the
~lAOVlxof man as an employer of essentially dispassionate
violence. We could imagine that he indulged in violence
unqualified by any other factor, which he inflicted on others
in order to achieve victory. Then, on some entirely
unrelated occasion, we might suppose, he wpuld indulge in
envy, or again, anger. For ~lAoTl~la as purely a love of
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~~ni_.~~t~t:ion), indirectly:readintoit.
c
AdmlttedlYi ~ll xhat the word '1~6TIPO! strictly;what:Plato fueant~
honour can only have ,B6vo~ for one instance (a semi~aggressive
Bu.t thisi$ clea.rly not
tells us about a person is that he loves a traditionally
praiseworthy thing - honour. We are not told that he is
envious of, much less that he inflicts violence on, anyone.
Likewise, a '1~6vIXO! person is only violent by inference.
That is, he is only so if vlxn is presumed to re~uire
violence for its achievement. One could justifiably suppose
that, as he simply enjoys vlxn, he would be ~uite content
with it even if it were available without the need for any
effort whatever - least of all for violence. If his opponents
gave in without the slightest sign of a struggle, this would
apparently be ~uite satisfactory from his point of view.
This is a less convincing picture than for ,1AOTlpla.
For one can ~erhapsless readily conceive:of ~ictory~eing enjoyed
without a preliminary process of assault and struggle than of
honour being enjoyed without a preliminary process of envy.
Still, it makes more or less acceptable sense. What does not
make sense is the third proposition. The suggestion that all
that it takes to satisfy Qucrxo~la is a private, 'self-
contained' manifestation of Bup6J is unconvincing. To
propose that it would make no difference to the QucrxoAo!
(bad-tempered man) if no other individual suffered from his
effusions of QUOXOAlo does not ring true at all. It is in
the essential nature of Qucrxo~la that it vents itself un~
disagreeable effects on others. People atclarge must suffer by it
for the QucrxoAoJ to be satisfied. And one of his chief
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concerns is that they should suffer by it.
Listing the three mental states again with their
respective manifestations, we have : ~tAoLt~la engendering
~e6voJ, ~tAOVtKla engendering 81a, and QUGKoAla engendering
eu~6J. Of these three sets, neither of the first two need
necessarily (at first sight) entail a love of contentiousness
for its own sake. Nor, following from this, need it imply a
love of infliciting duress on others. Both the ~tA6Lt~OJ and
~tA6VtKOJ have, on the face of it, only actual and realised
Lt~n or V1Kn as their goal. No particular road to obtaining
either goal is specified. But this must, we may now be
certain, be an outcome more of strict, than of discriminate,
reading of the text. We cannot genuinely believe Plato to
have supposed that the seeker after Lt~n or vlKn did not
derive enjoyment from the dynamic process so much sewn up
with it. The whole routine of envying, fighting, and
emulating his fellow humans (as well as any concrete goals he
might reach in doing so) demands inspection as a potential
candidate for whit attracts him.
This inspection is rewarded. For the very structure of
the verbs ~tAOLt~£lGeat and ~tAOVtK£lV indicates that dynamic
processes are concerned l 39. The manner of their use by Plato
further confirms it. ~tAOVtK(lV, for instance, expressly
conveys the meaning 'love to engage in the process of
.conquering' • This implies 'love to contend', 'love to . ,Vle ,
'love to endeavour to win'. And the .effort to win is
focussed not just on one particular victory, but on the
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interminable attainment of - the interminable effort to
attain - victories. The effect this has is to reduce victory
to a mere hair-line of demarcation between successive stages
of ~lAOV1K€lV, the end of one effort to win and the
beginning of the next. Which lays fitting emphasis on the
minor status of vlKn itself relative to the process of
gaining it.
c.28 These evidences of the ingredient of contentiousness
in the first two manifestations (~e6voJ and Sla) of TO
eU~O€lO€J have, on this account, to be taken in combination
with eu~6J, the product of ouoKoAla. eu~6J immediately
confers on each an added factor of active dynamism.
ouoKoAla, unlike ~lAovlKla or ~lAOT1~la, does not look
towards any static, ultimate goal (except no doubt temporary
exhaustion of the ouoKoAla). It has no final end upon
attainment of which the OUOKOAOJ will rest contented. The
peevish man achieves contentment only by constant paroxysms
of irascibility and rudeness. There is no 'loophole' through
which he can attain permanent satisfaction, no other
realised, distinct object (material or abstract) the
acquisition of which will quiet his inclinations. There is
nothing of any kind that he can achieve and enjoy simplex
without further exertion on his part. In short, the main
enjoyment derived from the actions characteristic of his
eu~6J does not come after, but during, the exercise of that
eu~6J. Enjo~ment might, b! contrast, be thought more likely
to come after, than during, ~e6voJ or 8la. But in the case
I I
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of QuoKoAla it is the most obvious that what is sought is the
state of being relieved of excess accumulation of eu~6J. In
this, again, it would differ from ~lAovlKla and ~lAoTl~la.
These two have the characteristic that the thing enjoyed has
(if only on the strict interpretation made above) nothing
necessarily to do with what one does oneself, but with what
others do. The exercise of eu~6J would, in that case (like
gymnastic), be an indirect good - not enjoyed in itself, but
leading to the enjoyable. But it would remain a good arising
, ,
from a personal activity, while the goods of VlKn and Tl~n
need not (again at first sight only) necessarily arise from
any personal activity at all.
c.29 The strict interpretation given above was, however,
we found, nevertheless not the probable one.
~lAOTl~€10eal are verbs meaning, as we have seen, not merely
to 'love conquest' and 'love honour'. They imply loving to
do consistently the type of thing that leads to conquest or
honour. The ~lA6vlKOJ and ~lA6Tl~OJ are therefore,
correspondingly, not just people who love conquest and honour
once these are obtained. They are persons whose activities
are incessantly efforts to get constant supplies of them.
And that Plato had this view is further indicated by his
doctrine of the natural interminability of ~lAovlKla and
~lAoTl~la140 (as of the ~TIleu~lal). There never, indeed,
comes a time (except extremely transiently) when the
~lA6vlKOf or ~lA6Tl~of acquires enough vlKn or Tl~n to
convince him that he can relax his efforts. Nor is the
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cua~oAof content but for the briefest moment with the results
of his cuo~oAla. At any rate, he does not let up for long
enough for a marked pause in his conduct to become noticeable.
Plato's interpretation of this is that, like those of the
, ~ ~ ~ d ~ ,~inferior £TIleU~lal, the pleasures of vl~n, Tl~n, an UUOKOAla
are 'bastard' pleasures 141 • They lack truth and reality.
Therefore, since they cannot ever satisfy, infinite
quantities of them can be obtained by eU~O€lc€lf people, yet
no lasting satisfaction be afforded. On our own explanation,
they are biological requirements. They continue as long as
the individual remains alive, and the constantly arising need
for them is thus not strange. But this does not change the
fact that we also regard them as 'inferior' pleasures.
Irrespective of whether or not we accept his explanation
of why vlKn and Tl~~ are insatiably sought by the less
discerning eU~O€lo€lf, we must provisionally agree with
Plato's observation that they are incessantly sought. This,
in turn, poses the question why they 'lack reality'.
Plato's view that their lack of reality, and resultant
inability to satisfy, is owing to their being subject to
change is again a specialised point of dogma not easily
accessible to us. What, in Plato's view, essentially is
change? Its basic defectiveness in his eyes needs
considerable analysis. We are therefore left, until we can
achieve this analysis, with the key proposition that various
people do seek the pleasures associated with TO eU~O€lOEf142
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incessantly. They also do so without limit of quantity. No
matter how fully they achieve vlKn, Tl~n, or cuoKoAla, they
continue to seek them as though they had acquired none.
From such a finding, it might directly be concluded as
above, with Plato, that these particular 'pleasures' are
merely not of a specially satisfying type. Or one might
further assume that the individuals engaged in seeking them
must be too unintelligent to recognise the 'true' pleasures,
which would afford greater satisfaction. On the other hand,
the hard fact is that they continue insatiably to seek the
experiences they do as though they were pleasurable.
This is solid evidence for pinpointing the real source of
the pleasure they seek. Mere vlKn and Tl~n may give
satisfaction in themselves. We have no conclusive evidence
that they do not. We may even say that we cannot be
absolutely sure that their seekers enjoy the process of
struggling to acquire them more than the - so to speak _
'completed' commodities. (But here Plato's use of ~lAOV1K€lV
and ~lAOll~€108al helps us.) If we come out firmly, once
again, with the contention that the strict interpretation of
~lA6vlKOf we mentioned above was wrong, and that Plato means
by ~lAOV1K€lV and ~lAOll~€108al constantly endeavouring to
win fights or gain honour - not just being pleased with
victory or honour etc. once gained - we cannot escape the
clear inference. We must regard such people as wishing
perpetually to continue the process of struggle. He must
mean that they will necessarily do this regardles~ of whether
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they achieve final success or not. The fact that owing to
nA£ov£~la and &nAnoTla they never stop trying is no
reflection on the obvious consideration that those who, by
contrast, seek the genuine 'true' pleasures never actually
stop trying either. At each instance of their obtaining the
pleasure, it is a truly satisfying one. To think of them as
coming to a total standstill regarding its pursuit is however
not convincing. They, too, will perpetually be continuing to
try to gain that chosen pleasure. But, as we have mentioned,
when they get it they are, to an appreciable extent and
for an appreciable time, really satisfied. The others are
not. Another differentiating feature would no doubt be that
their efforts would be less gross and desperate (cf. assault,
murder, etc. by the ~lAoK£PonfI43) than those of the lesser
humans. But the essence of the distinction is that the lower
pleasures do not even temporarily give full satisfaction.
c.30 The question repeatedly posed here has, of course,
one immediate answer. The ~lA6vlKOf person gains pleasure
both by the actual process of trying to win victory and by
means of the victory won. This is so, it is argued, because
the dialectical process of striving goes on perpetually, but
obviously the attained victory must please in the first
place. Also, in the light of reason (or the just state), the
'struggle', as such, assumes a different perspective. But,
viewing the ~lA6vlKOf (~lA6Tl~of, etc.) man strictly qua
~lA6vlKOf, we have had a distinct problem to face, and it has
been pursued for this substantial distance because of its
' ..:.::-- \
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heavy bearing on the destiny of lO eU~O£lO€!. In its role of
'pressuriser' of an individual's activities - both just and
unj~st - it has a pivotal importance. The only thing he can
be incontrovertibly shown to enjoy is the process of contest
for victory. And we may thrust the VlKn of which this
~lAOVlKo! individual is a part towards justice or injustice.
We may assume him to be adequately or inadequately guided by
Apollinian AOyo!. Whatever we do to him, the pleasures
involved in his victory- and honour-seeking, as in the case
of corporeal pleasures, are, as Plato has said, 'untrue'144.
An 'attained' and efficaciously satisfying goal would not be
so classified.
In spite of all this, Plato does allow that certain
corporeal pleasures are 'necessary' ( e . g • eating, drinking,
etc. 145 ). It is not probable that, by this concession, he is
suggesting that such pleasures partake of any measure of
truth l 46. They ar e, after all, merely those employed in
removing discomfort. still, this does not lose them their
status as 'pleasures', however lowly. The issue that chiefly
presents itself is that, while the pleasures of repletion of
certain states of need may not be 'true', it remains the case
that, if Plato could call them 'necessary' pleasures, they
are still pleasures. Degraded as they may be, they still
hold that title. He would obviously not refer to them as
'most', or 'less', true l47 if only ~ class of 'pleasures'
(the 'true' ones) provided pleasure at all. He would not
allot the term to them if, because not altogether true, they
afforded no pleasure whatsoever. However deficient some are,
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they at least do, if only temporarily and to a limited
extent, do what they are expected to. Therefore it makes
sense that they should continue to be sought. They obviously
do supply the means of filling the natural and inevitable
physiological voids that develop in respect of them. These
voids may immediately open up again. They may be
incompletely filled, and the desire never fully cease, even
for a moment. But the substance of fulfilment, even if it is
only relative fulfilment, is there for the taking. The
pleasure may not be S€BalOf148 , firm, but it is still genuine
at least in so far as it serves to counterbalance the pain
which is its opposite1 49 •
Plato's example of a 'true' pleasure, such as that of
smell 150 , reveals to us more fully his view of true
pleasure. It is a 'bonus' on top of neutrality. The
pleasure of smelling an attractive scent is neither preceded
nor followed by the pain of an overwhelming craving. There
would be no problem in deciding why there should be a desire,
for instance, to experience the pleasure of a scent. The
wise man, at mental and physical equilibrium, desires certain
true pleasures. He then selects those of his particular
choice to be experienced for their own sake. He certainly
feels this desire to experience them, or he would not be
moved to do so. But as he is a controlled person, it is not
the pressing, painful desire of inanition of the epithumetic
or thumoeidic type by which he is driven. Another aspect,
mentioned above, of these 'true' pleasures is that it is
impossible to be content to suppose that true enjoyment of
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them can only occur by coincidence. This 'truest' type of
pleasure therefore also, we found, because it can be
deliberately selected, becomes analogous to the pleasures of
repletion. The individual may, certainly without previous
desire, happen by coincidence to come upon some desirable
scent, and experience pleasure. But the pleasure of scent is
not less true if he does desire it beforehand, and
deliberately indulge in it.
True pleasure, as well as false pleasure, can therefore
be positively desired. The 'pain' of desire for it is as
real. The difference seems only to be in that this 'pain'
seems to be not so intense as for the less true instances.
And the pleasures concerned are not so abandonedly desired.
Conversely, 'false' pleasures which are the subject of the
more abandoned type of desire may not be 'true', but they
must have validity at least to the extent that they fill,
however partially or transiently, the vacuum that gives rise
to the desire for them.
To relate this point to the problem of the pleasures
sought by the eu~o£10nf person. Whether he is predominantly
~lA6vlKOf, ~lA6Tl~of, or ouaKoAoJ, we can say of him, first,
that as ~lA6vlKOf, for instance, he does have an unremitting
desire for vlKn, but that in this he is not essentially
different from the individual seeking true pleasures. The
only differences are that he desires them more abandonedly
than the latter, and that they satisfy him less fully and for a
shorter time than the 'true' pleasures. Second, he does
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obtain the object-matter of his desire by means of the
pleasures he seeks (although, again, he cannot do this as
completely or for as long). Finally, these repletions with
their corresponding depletions are to certain people the only
known objects of desire and sources of discontent respect-
ively. And the simple reason for this is that they do not
have the intelligence or knowledge to recognise, or seek, the
true ones.
c.3l This leads to what now approaches our central
consideration. Socrates at many points in the Dialogues
postulates that only stupid people are unjust 15l . They are
unjust, first, because they do not know that justice gives the
most pleasure. Second, they are unjust because they do not
know how to be just. This squares closely with his doctrine
regarding TO eU~O(lO€J. A thumoeidic person who does not
happen to have much logistic power lives a life of simple
alternation between striving painfully for victory (just or
unjust) and gaining it, uncomfortably accumulating his anger
and venting it (justly or unjustly), and so forth. He goes
through life in this fashion purely because he lacks the
ability to devise just means for arranging the process.
Likewise, the very stupid, but highly epithumetic (and
averagely thumoeidic) persons spend most of their lives
alternating between corporeal hunger and repletion, lust and
satiation. Less inclined as they are towards the eU~O(lO(lJ
enjoyments afforded by honour and preferment, they achieve
their maximally 'low' corporeal requirements justly or
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unjustly by coincidence alone, because they are in fact in
the first place too stupid even vaguely to distinguish the
respective directions in which they should proceed.
These two doctrines, regarding the epithumetic and
thumoeidic faculties respectively, can resultantly now go
further in combination than Plato explicitly took them. The
link-up between the higher pleasures and justice, and in turn
between the baser pleasures and injustice, makes their
relationship more obvious. Discussion of these two aspects
brings us closer to an appreciation of the community of the
origins of injustice, and of action in general, in relation
to TO eU00ElOEJ.
Plato has specified the two morally most interesting
branches of conduct characterising wisdom, or the absence of
it. First, that of pleasure-seeking. By one of his most
consistently elaborated ethical aphorisms, everyone seeks
good for hirnself l 52. At the same time, the good is variably
shown to be the most profitable, or most truly pleasurable,
or simply the most obviously desirable, commodity. But in
any case the reason it is sought is essentially taken to be
self-evident. The only time anyone will not seek good for
himself is apparently when he does not know enough to be able
to recognise it for what it is. For after all, as the
doctrine reasonably enough assumes, any normal person must
want maximal profit or fulfilment of his desires, however
merely 'supervenient' these are on actual good. How
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effectively any person obtains good will therefore depend on
his intelligence.
The second major branch of conduct which Plato relates
closely to the possession of wisdom and its reverse is the
practice of justice. Just methods of obtaining good are the
most effective methods. Accordingly, the dual tendency of
stupid people first to commit injustice 153 , second to seek
only the less 'true' pleasures of TO ~lAOK€po£f (or at best
TO eU~O€lo£f), arises quite naturally. In the present
context, however, this phenomenon provokes close attention.
We will by now agree with Plato that eU~o€lonf (as also
~lAOK€ponf) behaviour keeps the individual at a mere neutral
balance of pain and pleasure. The desire for, e.g., vlKn,
creates a pain of void. When vlKn is obtained, this void is
filled, if transiently, relieving the pain. And V1Kn, while
not constituting a true pleasure, does constitute what the
~lA6vlKOf wants - that is, what he thinks he wants. It therefore
satisfies him to that degree, if merely on a rather low level.
If we now look at the object-matter of injustice in the
same way, a very significant picture is obtained. We have
several examples of traditional 154 unjust conduct*in Plato.
Socrates' view on this is clear.
The opening part of the relevant passage concerning it is
not very straightforward. The musical man's wish not to have
'more' (TIA£OV ~X€lV) than another musical man, but only than
an unmusical man, is obscure. We may infer from it, in every
* (apart from its major constituent 1SS )
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event, that it is characteristic of the wise man to want more
. ,
only than an unwise man. That is to say, the W1se man s
characteristic is to want no more than is his due. The unwise
man, owing to his unwisdom, wants and obtains so much
indiscriminate matter that on the balance he no doubt
ultimately gets rather little good. Indeed, he probably gets
considerably less overall than is a normal man's due. As an
unwise, and correspondingly unjust, man he is said to want more
than both wise and unwise. But we can put this more briefly as
that he simply wants more. More of everything (whether good or
bad, because he cannot tell the difference) and more than
anyone, indiscriminatelyl56. In this respect - that he is
never satisfied - he closely resembles the ~lA6vlKOf and
~lAOK€ponf men, though in the last two cases, interestingly,
the reason for failure of satisfaction lies in the falsity of
the pleasures sought. The unjust man qua unjust (i.e. qua
stupid) perpetually wants more both of true and of false
pleasures. It is, however, his lack of discrimination that
militates against his ability always to secure the true ones,
and with them full satisfaction l57 . He does not know enough to
be able to recognise them - as a result, he gets a random
mixture.
c.32 The eU~o€lonf'link with injustice becomes even clearer
now. The second main sector of injustice in Plato is the
eU~o€lo€f-originated one: contentiousness l58 . Unjust people
may proceed, to attack, even kill, others, on the face of it in
order to get more possessions. But so far from this being the
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whole truth, in reality they do it for the sake of contest as
well. Here we find an even more striking correspondence
between injustice and the search for both types of baser
pleasures. The lust for the basest pleasures, those of the
~TIleU~lal, has, however, as leading features both greed and
violencel59. Bestial hedonists in the first place eat, drink,
and indulge themselves sexually on the scale of farmyard
animals, yet they are subject to constant TIAEOVESla and
But, in the second place, ultimately, to gain more
of the pleasures which are the objects of their TIAEOVESla, they
attack and kill others l60 . These actions - comprehensive theft
and aggression - could well be said, if the postulates made
earlier in the thesis are valid, to represent the sum total of
injustice, and from now on we will take the liberty of working
on this as a valid hypothesis.
In the discussion of the genesis of war l6l , Socrates, as was
said, did not reveal explicitly - perhaps he just preferred not
to waste his time revealing it, since his inner view must be so
obvious - whether he regarded either the desire for more land,
or the wresting of it from others l62 , as unjust. Indeed, he
seems to avoid the term 'desire' here altogether. He mentions
that the state will 'need' COEna6~Eea) these extra items; that
previous territory will not be 'adequate' C;xavn); etc. The
only compromising word he uses is 'aTIElpOv163, unlimited. Their
needing it 'unlimitedly' implies greed. We may, however, in
any case infer his condemnation of contentious TIAEOVEsla, and
hence warlike attack, from both earlier and later disapproval
of unbridled TIAEovE;lal64, and his patent condemnations
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throughout of contentiousness l65 •
This viewpoint of his regarding war is immensely
important. Its central thesis is that, together with injustice
and the seeking of baser pleasures, the sequence of war-
initiation constitutes yet a third pattern of degeneration.
This pattern is, of course, the 8upo£lOnf one. The
~A£ypal~ouaa state indulges, as does the unjust and basely
lustful man, in variegated unnecessary desires. Next, it
grasps all that is immediately to hand. Then, apparently
insatiable by peaceable acquisition, it begins to plunder
people by violence. The important principle in point here
(though it is, again, not one Plato explicitly mentions) must
be this: Violence inflicted upon any unwilling party provokes
return violence. The attacked person, robbed of goods
(personal safety being taken as one) he in principle requires
for his livelihood, retaliates. And, necessarily, he
retaliates on anything up to a maximal scale. The result of
this is that any attempt to rob him of those goods carries a
fundamental risk of harm, ultimately of death, to the robber.
This risk is most obvious in war, but in common-or-garden
injustice it is just as familiar in principle. Indulgence of
the baser lusts closely corresponds. Indeed, war very clearly
has much, if not universally, common ground with injustice when
the question of infliction of one's will on unwilling parties
is concerned; and, in turn, injustice has much, if not
universally, common ground with war. The element of violence ,
the eupo£lo£f-generated element,is simply of a lesser and




In regard to their basic constituents, these last two
(war and injustice) are then very similar. They are in fact,
it seems, just views of precisely the same thing in differing
degree. Without entering into an inquiry as to how the views
differ in detail, we may throw some further light on the nature
of injustice by making an examination of their points of
coincidence, with special reference to their relation with TO
eUPO€losf. In each of war and injustice we have as basis the
sequence cupidity, acquisition, and aggression-with-risk. Each
shows a man desiring, taking, and finally forcibly seizing from
others, in the last case basically risking his life in doing so.
Plato's account of this is complete enough if we read
between the lines. We ought also not to make too demanding an
analysis of the explicit part he makes TO 8UPO€10sf play in the
system. It has, in fact, almost no explicit part whatever,
according to him, and we might imagine that it would deserve a
great one. Taking unjust 'pleasure' first 166 , we fin~ that the
,~
bestially appetitive creature kicks and butts and murders €v€~a
Tnf TOUTWV TIAEov€~laf (TOUTWV here being the pleasures of food
and sex). These are apparently the only ones it is interested
in. Simi~arly, the unjust man, by the traditional view of
Thrasymachus and Glaucon, is interested in aggression not by
any means for its own sake, but only for that of the TIA€ovE~la
which can be implemented through it. It seems, in
Thrasymachus' view, to be worth mentioning in addition that the
successful unjust aggressor is €0oalPwvl67, and is not hated by
his famil y l68, but these and a few other insignificant items
are the only activities or states amongst those making up his
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life pattern which (according to Thrasymachus) are not
absolutely patently to do with acquiring objects of property.
And even they look rather like it.
, ~
W~€A€lV, in his usage,
means to benefit materially169. LO au~~€POV is basically
material benefit. Similarly, 0nnp€L€lv is to provide material
benefit. All that they are ever associated with, in these or
his ensuing words 170 , is nA€ov€~la. His list of persons 171
.. t.. , 1: .. ( )committing jointly LnV OAnV aulKlav the whole of injustice
has not one single member who does not specialise in the
removal by stealth or violence of other people's commodities
(or persons) into the remover's own sphere of control.
temple robbers, slavers, housebreakers, embezzlers, thieves -
, 1: ..
the full sweep of aulKla is covered. And on Thrasymachus' view
(which we can safely take to be the one Plato attributed to the
general public), the exclusive purpose of these individuals is
to secure control over other people's property (Xpn~aLa) and
persons172. The road to standard pleasure as well as to wealth
is assured by this 173. Bla174 , the essentially eU~O€lC€J-
originated factor, is apparently understood to serve that
purpose and that purpose alone. Finally, we have war, where
the desire for incessantly more property precipitates those who
desire it into armed attack on others.
In all these three cases (baser desire, injustice, and
war), we have clear-cut reference to three principal things
only: baser desire, acquisition, and contention. The objects
concerned (property or pleasure) are desired. Second, they are
gathered in where freely available for the taking. Then, at
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the third stage, since desire continues insatiably, they are
seized violently, and fought for.
A slightly confusing feature is that there seems to be no
transition from stage two to stage three. One moment we have
safe, peaceable gathering in of possessions. The next we have
a flare-up into potentially deadly contest. But Plato no doubt
felt that there was no need to specify this obvious
intermediate stage. The greedy but peaceable gathering-in
stage is a process of obtaining superfluous things. These may
aid life, or give flavour to it, although not necessary to it.
When the subject graduates to actually risking his very life,
through inflicting violence on others, to gain more such
articles (which are of course absolutely useless without life),
a new and thoroughly strange element has entered into the
picture. But the critical factor is that these articles are of
the same type as those obtained peaceably. They are
superfluous.
c.34 Two conclusions can arise from this. Either the
desire for the superfluous articles, or the desire for the
struggle to gain them is more pressing than the desire for life
itself.
Yet, to take the first alternative: the likelihood that
life itself could be less dear to anyone than a useless surplus
of possessions is thin. The second major inference therefore
arises yet again: it must be the contest involved in gaining
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them for which this overwhelmingly potent source of longing
exists.
That Plato at the very leait suspected this is evident. He
speaks, as we have seen, at more than one point of the desires
and pleasures proper to la eUpOE18ff175 • He clearly alludes to
those mentioned above. The reason it perhaps does not claim
his attention as much as we might expect may well be this: he
most emphatically recognises this natural contentiousness in
man (it is, indeed, the backbone of ~pwf). Nevertheless, he
might ask, is there a serious enough importance attached to
isolating the full-blown desire for contest as such, shorn of
all the standard ulterior aims 176 , as a factor in injustice?
After all, such an omission would be natural. Granted that the
Apollinian Aoy?f is the deciding factor in ordering the
direction of application of la eUpOE18ff (its success or
failure in ordering it depending upon its adequacy),it is that
AOYO! which will have the last word for good or evil, not la
eUpOE18€!. And regarding rational strife and the intelligent
man, does not love ('€pwJ), which embodies his struggle for
justice, spring rather from that AOYO! than from the energetic
factor? Do not Plato's ~uAaKE! expressly have to be endowed
with enough intelligence to have this love for justice? The
emphasis on AOyo! would clearly be pr~ferred. 'fpwf must indeed
be seen as primarily dependent on Aoyof, and the
, 1: ...
virtue of aVupEla seen as a noble characteristic springing
mainly from the moral and highest part of the soul.
Yet a further point reinforces the likelihood of Plato's
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having treated the thumoeidic factor as more secondary to
injustice than it could have deserved. The proposition that
men normally attack others in order to gain the standard
currency of money and pleasures makes ready sense. The most
obvious reason for fighting is to steal something from your
enemy (which in excuse you claim he does not rightfully
possess). That people could, even qua eU~O£lo£~J, wish to
fight and risk their very lives with no such ulterior end in
view strains the imagination. To seek nothing beyond mere
fighting, all thought of standard gain excluded, makes too
little sense in common usage to convince.
Yet certain facts remain, and these facts are compelling.
If the eU~O£lO€J factor is necessary to make a person
contentious at all - if he just will not fight unless he has
that qualit y 177 - then it is not enough to say that simple
appetitive desire prompts him to enter into contest. There are
pleasures proper to TO eU~O£lO€J. Plato is quite specific
about that. These must therefore quite inevitably be different
from appetitive pleasures. The efficient cause of contention
cannot then be epithumetic. It must be ,solely and distinctly a
thumoeidic appetite. The moral standard of its application, of
course, will depend on AoyoJ. But the AoyoJ, it has also been
shown, can by Plato's own implication not suppress, but only
channel, the upsurge of TO eU~O£lO€J.
c.35 Rather, then, than deal with this difficulty (since it
may not have presented itself to him as primarily important),
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Plato does not waste time giving a full account of appetitive
attack. Instead he introduces the thumoeidic man. But now his
commitment grows heavy on him. For this thumoeidic man is the
only kind of man interested, by definition, in fighting. And,
on top of that, he is not necessarily epithumetically
inclined178. The Guardians are said to be thumoeidic, but by
no means acquisitive 179 •
A combination of Plato's comments at 375 a 11 with the
others referred to gives us this breakdown. First, greed gives
rise to fighting. But second, greedy people need to be
thumoeidic to fight. Third, thumoeidic people are not
necessarily greedy. Now the conclusion from this is that
fighting is therefore not done by merely greedy people. It is
done by people who are thumoeidic as well as greedy. Or, most
importantly, it can quite conceivably be done by people who are
purely thumoeidic without being greedy at all. The three
genres mentioned, incorporating the sequence Baser Desire,
Surplus Acquisition, and Contention, have therefore an
indispensable added qualification. Since they incorporate
contentiousness, all necessitate an added thumoeidic element in
the individual engaging in them.
This point has a critical significance for Plato's doctrine
of Justice. For we may reasonably take it that in expounding
his own view of Injustice earlier on in the Republic he is
speaking of the conventional, not the internal and spiritual
kind. In short, it more or less boils down to that of
Thrasymachus 180 , which as we noted centres round deprivation of
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others with or without violence (although we have found that
deprivation always incorporates a violence principle) of their
property and/or freedom. As far as its cause, and that of
KOX10 generally, is concerned, Plato's bias, differing
diametrically from that of Thrasymachus, is later towards
regarding it as a matter of ignorance18l • This in turn he
makes a matter of stupidity. His characteristic technique of
'€A€yx oJ (cross-examination) is then put into practice. He
takes the term otaxpoJ182, shameful, which is conventionally183
all but synonymous with KaKoJ yet also applicable to the
disputed term (i.e. TO au~~€pOV, the profitable). The first
(o~axpoJ) he gets his dialogue partner to concede (in fatal
error) to be equivalent to KaKoJ. The last (TO au~~€pov) he
, ~
has already easily got him to assume to be olaxpov. He can then
argue to the effect that, since injustice is o~axpoJ, it must
also be KOKn; and this leads to the clear conclusion that to
want purely TO au~~€pOV implies stupidity, for no-one wants
what is KaKofl84. This is the view put forward in the
Protagoras and Meno, and that propounded in the Republic is no
different. The law-breaking man is least intelligent l85 • The
~pOVl~OJ person is dya8oJl86. The ~lA6ao~oJ knows most about
pleasures l87 and has most true pleasure l88 • However, while the
finding that injustice is stupid is an immensely important one,
it leaves unanswered that one further question, earlier touched
on. And this carries perhaps the greatest importance of all.
Why do many people, who might be considered intelligent enough
to avoid it, nevertheless commit inJ·ust;ce I89 ? A k d b f (f~ see ore c.
para. c.13), this question can now be more fully treated.
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c.36 Plato is well aware of this problem. In the Republic
at least he seems to prefer to sidestep it 1 90. Nevertheless he
has himself provided the very means of solving it. It is well
worth following this up. The only reason for anyone acting
'stupidly' when he is not stupid must be that he is
experiencing some internal compulsion towards stupid activity
which overcomes his AOyo!. This will be a compulsion
unrecognised by external observers, and most often even
unrecognised by himself, but which it would be more painful for
him to resist than to surrender to, notwithstanding the
penalty. One such pressure may be found in TO ~lAOR€p6€!.
Greed and lust goad the individual to take commodities in the
face, to some extent, of penalt y 19l. But, as we found above,
we do not expect them to goad him to the limit. We do not
credit them with being able to harass him to the point of
making him attack others at the risk of forfeiting his very
life. To expect him to invite, for their sake, the risk of
actually losing every single thing he has, and of dying as
well, seems farcical. But it must nevertheless be conceded in
the first place that injustice by its very nature carries
penalties which totally disable the unjust man from enjoying
the commodities which he unjustly takes, or even from living to
hope for later enjoyment of them. To say that he is thrust
into injustice purely by the prospect of that enjoyment of
material goods accordingly becomes unconvincing. For, as we
have premised, above, this man is not a fool.
To rehearse the situation: we are given, first, a sensible
man. Second, we have under consideration a collection of
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commodities he many seize illegally. Third, we are aware that
he appreciates the heavy odds against his doing this unpunished,
possibly to the limit. Only an abnormality of physical craving,
we must assume, could prompt him to take the risk in spite of
this threat. In the extreme case, certainly, few pleasures can
possibly be worth losing one's life to gain. And this applies
yet more strongly if the process of gaining them may involve
death even before the actual gaining occurs. What is the
solution? We have to hypothesise the existence of thumoeidic
pains which make even death desirable if one cannot rid oneself
of them, and that supreme intellect can occasionally be needed
to find just nethods of doing so.
c.37 To go back a little. The speculation about degrees of
pleasure and pain is of course not conclusive. It is a matter
of guesswork how powerful some desires are, or what degrees of
pleasure can be derived from various activities. It must also
be a matter of pure estimate what extent of risk we would expect
them to provoke. What makes the speculation worth putting
forward is, as we have said, that Plato himself has (if somewhat
indirectly) pronounced on the topic. And his pronouncement is
this: There is another source of motivation concerned192 ,
namely lO eU~o£lo€f. "No person who is not eu~o£lo~f will wish
to be brave." Preparedness to risk one's life must therefore,
again, be engendered by a separate internal force, namely
lO eu~o£lo€f.
A closer analysis shows that, as it stands, his sentence 19 3
means 'No person who is not eu~o£lo~f will wish to engage ih
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war'. As we may now interpret it, engagement in 'war' includes
engagement both in war and in two other types of contest. These
are the contests characteristic of the two other things Plato
typifies by desire and contention, namely baser pleasure-seeking,
and injustice. TO eU~O£lOEJ, therefore, in this early guise,·
first aids the individual in the struggle for self-
aggrandisement. It assures him bravery in the contest which he
goes in for ostensibly in order to grasp more possessions. But,
in keeping with its double-edged character (compelling as well
as enabling), TO eU~O£lOEJ has a more complex part than this to
play in the individual's life. It not only aids in any proposed
struggle. We find now incisIlutably that it prompts that
struggle. It sets it off, and, after igniting the blaze, fuels
the flames. The more thumoeidic he is, the more eager the man
concerned will be to enter into contest. He will actually want
to engage in it for its own sake, and for nothing else. His
preparedness to do so may, furthermore, even extend to hurling
aside all vestiges of caution to fight bestially and with rabid
ferocity for seemingly unaccountable purposes and at the risk of
losing all he has, including life. Yet, as we observe, he will
do so with no ulterior motive in view other than the wish to
fight. He may, indeed, attack in order to obtain possessions
because he wishes to combine two aims in one - indulgence of the
thumoeidic and epithumetic elements. He may even ~o so
because, in characteristically 'self-justificatory' effort, he
wishes to convince others that it is purely possessions he wants
when he enters into conflict; as though to seem to be attacking
for any other reason would imply madness. But to the extent
that he is thumoeidic, his wish to fight will have nothing to do
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with his wish for gain. Indeed, it is only in a pronouncedly
thumoeidic person that the wish for gain is not totally confined
to honest and peaceable profit-making. The merely ~lAOK€ponf
individual may wish to wrest the property of others forcibly
from them. But unless he is also eU~o€lonf, he never will. He
simply has not, by Plato's own witness, that kind of drive.
Conversely, the purely thumoeidic individual may seize people's
property from them, but, unless he is also ~lAOK€ponf, this will
not be because he wishes for property. His interest will not be
in the property at all. He wishes for the contest itself: the
violence and emergency. The quickest and surest road to
obtaining these last three, as Plato will readily have seen -
and no doubt expected us to assume - is to provoke the creatures
who are most competent to hit back. In this department, other
human beings are superior to any alternate source of opposition
in the world.
c·38 From this it becomes clear that an unusually thumoeidic
individual who also happens to have a considerable measure of TO
~lAOK€POEf in his make-up will have little potential for justice
unless his logistic sector is exceptionally strong. He will be
tempted not only to secure more wealth than he needs, but to do
so by violence. And this will apply whether violence is
necessary to his purpose or not. Violence will form a sine qua
non for him of the process of gaining it. He will simply _ and
here we strike the very core of the question - have a propensity
for injustice for its own sake. And the only way he can avoid
channelling these urges of his unjustly is through intellect. If
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his eU~OE10€f element is very strong, he will, again, have to be
exceptionally intelligent to avoid that injustice.
Althorigh Plato does not explicitly carry his theory to this
conclusion, we can af.ain reae between the lines. Inceed, even if he
exhibits uncertainty at times as to whether a tendency to vice
is acquired, inborn, or inspired194, he does hint on several
occasions at inborn funds both of savage, lawless appetite l 95
and hostilityl96. (These are no doubt the ~TIleu~tal associated
with TO ~lAOKEPO€f as much as TO ~lA6vlKOV, for it becomes
equally likely, when aYP10Tnf is predicated of both l97 , that
both are included.) Man therefore, as a species, has, in
Plato's view, certain natural l98 vicious propensities for the
OE1VOV,
'.... .....aYP10v, and avo~ov. It seems highly probable, too, that
he had in mind here the illicit lusts not only of TO
'e'" "ETIl U~nT1KOV, but of TO eU~OE10~f (incorporating TO ~lAOV1KOV) -
the urge for contest per se 199 • Adam urges 200 that Plato rebuts
the concept of original sin20l • Depending on one's inter-
pretation of 'original sin', Plato's statement seems, on the
contrary, to be quite positive in this regard. The innate evil
in man, he says, may be diminished, but it is there to begin
with 202 • His reference to an inner Etoof ~TIleu~twv203 confirms
this view. TO eU~OE10€f is an inborn potential for violent
action. When inadequately regulated by TO AOY10T1KOV, it
represents a tendency towards injustice or justice
indiscriminately.
c.39 We have in the first place, then, the desires,
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varyingly developed in different individuals, both for
possessions, and for contest for its own sake. In the second,
we have a natural fund of the 6E1V6v, ~YP10V, and '6vopov, if in
a restricted area204 • These two groups have certainly to be
linked. They might even to some extent be identified. The case
of &voPla of the ~YP10V, 6E1V6v type and the tendency it
represents is undoubtedly the same thing as that of the
thumoeidic desire for contest for its own sake. But injustice
(here '~voPla') would be chosen only by the relatively ignorant
as one of the categories of contest. This would be so whether
it were chosen simply for the contest's sake, or because it
seemed to him to incorporate material gain with contest.
At all events, whatever view is taken of their relation, the
two groups - aggressiveness and desire - cover the whole range
of injustice. It would be splitting hairs to see a difference
,
between the savagery (aYPloTnf) produced by the thumoeidic
tendency, and that emanating from the savage type of desires
('aYP10V EToof ~nleUP1WV) inherent in man. It would even be
pedantic to see one between these and the ~YP10v205 part of the
many-headed beast. The latter denotes the vicious aspect of
general desire. Yet great stress must be placed on the point
that, added together, the sum of them nevertheless does not
represent an implication that Plato conceived of a natural
*tendency to injustice as such.
A more sophisticated verdict than this is indicated. Only
ignorance allows of injustice. The common factor in all
implying the road to injustice is ~YP10Tnf. When each has that
*(in spite of the ~YP16Tnf of eUPOE10€J20~ dreams 207 , and the beast 208 )
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common factor removed, we have in the first case (TO eU~O€lO€J)
several terms which also convey the meaning 'contest', but none
conveying generally illegal conduct. The second (TO ~VO~OV)
, ,
denotes a limited field only of injustice - aVO~la. The third
is blank. So we can see that throughout, as far as inborn
vicious characteristics are concerned, Plato places almost no
stress on misconduct falling outside the borders of simple
contest. The many-headed beast and the lion can carry one to
injustice 20 9, but only when specifically feasted and
strengthened. It is not, then, so much injustice as such that
Plato regards as inborn. What he envisages as man's innate
defect is a relatively unpolarised crudity or brutishness
springing from his nature as an animal. This shows itself
, , Jfirst and foremost in ayploTn , aggressive roughness (in short,
violence). Second, it appears in greed and illicit lust. But
it is only when these are given expression that they have
validity. As mere tendencies residing in the soul, they have
no significance for injustice on the social plane as it is here
presented. The cardinal feature of both of them is, socially
speaking, the contentious demand they make on others' rights.
, ,
The ordinary €nleU~lal are inborn, and they seem the more
basic of the two major causes of contest (greed, and high- or
hot-temper). Nevertheless, they are only so when allowed to
grow unchecked, and obtain the collaboration of the eu~6J .
.They are not themselves inherently ~YPla. , , JSuch aYP10Tn as
they may be conceived to have comes from their 'brutishly'
lustful fraction, but the species of random kicking and goring
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of each other that cattle do, in Plato's example, is so
directionless and mindless as hardly even to amount to genuine
, , fayptOTn • It is rather a kind of reflex activity that could
harm one if one got in its way, and this is no doubt how Plato
sees it. The incidental violence concerned there can be
regarded as implemented only for the utterly undirected
indulgence of that particular part of the animal soul.
c.40 Some principal conclusions may now be listed. Man has
certain natural inborn (or somehow otherwise developed)
tendencies. One is the acquisitive (TO €TIteu~nlt~6v), another
the high- or hot-tempered (TO eU~O€tO€J), a third the
intellectual (TO AOytcrTt~6v). These he can satisfy perfectly
well, and justly, by his own efforts. To fall short of justice
" , , J ' fis to be aot~oJ, and so atcrxpo , and therefore ~a~o • But
no-one wants what they know to be ~a~6f210 (least of all as a
personal and spiritual property). Therefore to go outside
justice is stupid. On the other hand, just in the same way as
~TIteU~lat press people towards acquisition and the logistic
towards knowledge, so the thumoeidic element inexorably presses
them towards contest. The knowledgeable person will know
better than the stupid how to obtain commodities, how to expend
his contentious urges, and how to gain knowledge, without
committing unjust acts. But since there is the natural
tendency in all people to perform these three types of action:
the search for knowledge, the implementation of hot-temper-
accumulation-release, and the grasping of commodities, the
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stupid will not always manage to remain just while engaging in
these procedures.
Second, it appears clear that of the three urges the
second, or thumoeidic, especially when abetted by the third,
the epithumetic, is most potent for injustice. Yet that acts
of deprivation and duress do not constitute a natural tendency
to injustice as such is proved by the point that injustice does
not necessarily have to occur as a result of them. Injustice
incorporates as its,two main components the two corresponding
practices acquisition and contest. But acquisition and contest
can be carried on justly. The knowledgeable will know how to
direct them in that fashion. They can avoid their unjust
forms, deprivation and duress, while the ignorant, unable to
devise just action-media, cannot. In consequence, the ignorant
will, first, inflict deprivation because they want commodities
which they can think of no other way of getting. Second, they
will inflict duress, being too stupid to find legal ways of
competing with others, and crassly embarking on undesigned
contest. They simply do not, in a word, have the intelligence
to indulge in these activities justly. But they must indulge
in them, so they go blindly ahead. Once again it should be
stressed that they are not the only ones who want them either.
The law-abiding people want them just as much, in proportion as
the epithumetic and thumoeidic elements are varyingly present
in them. But the law-abiding people are good because they have
the brains to avoid injustice. The stupid are bad because they
necessarily have not.
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Perhaps most instructive as indicators of what Plato
regards as the essence of injustice are his views on its
'cure'. And here we find the thumoeidic element taking the
leading role. First, he prescribes organised contest for the
disputants, TIAnpWV TOV eu~6v. This is of absolutely paramount
importance. By this means strife will be lessened 211 • Second,
and exertion by Plato.
pains and penalty are stated to be the only effective cures of
}
injustice212, and not much distinction is made between pains
(Gymnastic is tTI1TIovof, laborious, and
~6TpEualf, healing, impli,citly betrays the sense 'painful' in
!
tTI1TIovof, while penalties on Socrates' plan are, in any event,
always painfuI 213 .) He approves of regular gymnastic, possibly
even of the most strenuous type 214 • This he takes indeed as
part of a normal regime. The KOAas6~Evof, the punished person,
becomes better 215 • Penalised people are not wretched 216 •
All these individual points indicate an observation on
Plato's part that the normal man needs regular exertion. But
not only this: even pain and adversity are needful to his
health. And, most subtle and thought-provoking point of all,
all three are physically desired. For the erratically (and so
sometimes justly, sometimes unjustly) contentious man, to
encounter contest, trouble, or pain somehow corrects the state
he is in. It gives him satisfaction which appears to take the
shape of a type of relief. It will also provide satisfaction
for the wisely and justly contentious man. Each of these men
will in the process avoid injustice (and disproportionate pain)
to the extent that be is wise. The thumoeidic element is
looking for an outlet, and can be satisfied only by meeting
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opposition in the shape of pain or reciprocated contest. If it
is unprovided with such counters, it simply proceeds to find
alternate outlets. It is worth reiterating that the
contentiously unjust man must therefore, alongside other forms
of adversity, even in a sense desire penalty. To him it is
simply of the nature of one more outlet.
c.4l Plato's view of penalty as essentially traumatic 2l7
indicates that he thought of injustice, its complement, in the
same light. We have already argued that this is so from a
logical point of view. From the various passages we have seen
it appears that, while Plato did not dissociate injustice from
greed, he also in the final analysis thought of it as almost
exclusively a matter of contentiousness. An important
inference follows. The satisfaction by just means of the
desires proper to TO eU~O(lOEJ will be proportionately
instrumental in preventing injustice.
It is certain that Plato believed that, if these thumoeidic
desires were satisfied systematically in advance, the
propensity for committing injustice would largely or totally
disappear 2l8 • That he did not develop this theme is probably
owing to his preoccupation with establishing the nature of the,
to him, centrally important subject of discussion. This was, of
course, injustice in the soul. The finding on his part that
there was in man an innate factor of 'high-' or 'hot-temper-
edness', through which contest was generated and kept going,
laid the foundation for wider conclusions. But again, having
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given an account of TO eU~O€lO£f which revealed its part in the
genesis of war, and later of contentious drive generally, he
had completed the essential research. It remained for others,
he no doubt felt, to draw the conclusions.
c.42 The overall consequence of these findings on the
anthropological plane may now be summarised. To translate
eU~O€lonf virtually invariably as 'spirited' appears to involve
a serious imbalance due to neglect of its frequently
unfavourable 'injustice-prone' overtones. A single uniform
translation valid throughout is impossible. Translations
incorporating an anger-constituent are at times satisfactory.
At others, the anger-constituent, while present, cannot
preserve what are considerably higher than purely
'epithumetically' passionate connotations. The translation
'high-' or 'hot-tempered' does indeed suggest itself more often
than any other. But a general rule can still not be laid
down. The problem posed earlier was whether, for present
purposes, a sufficiently marked common factor, of anger or
anything else, ran at all through the uses of eU~O€lonJ, at
least in the Republic. Was there, for instance, one great
enough to justify modification of the translation 'spirited'
to, say, 'hot- tempered'? On the whole, it seemed there was. But
the main ar~ument against unifor 1 b·
~ ~ m y su st~tuting any single word,
'hot-tempered', ' . 1 '
v~o ent, or whatever, for 'spirite9' was exactly
the same as the one against constantly using 'spirited' - that they
could often be thought as strongly biased towards the 'lower'
side of eU~O€lonJ as 'spirited' is towards the 'higher'.
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'High-tempered' does most often escape this charge .. The
'higher' and 'lower' constituents are distributed 3n ~t almost
on a fifty-fifty basis. On even superficial inspection, while
showing a bias overall towards the higher as in the cas~ of
'spirited', it shows a much less marked bias. And this is
certainly the more appropriate one. The word eU~o£lonJ has,
again, ~ ring of militarist high idealism in the Greek where
'spirited' has it in English. It is more a utilitarian term, a
'passion-~uotient' connoting 'capacity for being roused'.
Radically, it simply and solely confers on a person usefulness
as a contentious individual - or fighter - as such. This
fighter need not have any ideals at all - he need merely wish
to fight. Given these data, then even if 'high-tempered' is at
first a strange-sounding translation of eU~o£lonJ, it is in
most contexts a more accurate one. Its role, in its 'better'
sense, as a critical constituent of ~pwJ becomes clear too as a
closer to neutral, sheer driving force. In this guise it
properly aids the AoyeJ in their combined bid to attain the
Good. But it still cannot stand throughout as a uniform
e~uivalent of eU~e£lonJ. The position of eU~o€lo~f along the
"emotion-spectrum" must, in each case of its occurrence,be
specifically assessed.
c.43 SOCIO-POLITICAL AND COSMIC ASPECTS.
At the anthropological level, the eU~O€lo£J element has
been seen as acting to some extent in combination with an
intellectual ingredient. The whole thus constituted was then
deemed to represent the entity conceived of by Plato as ~pwJ.
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By contrast, the socio-political eU~OE1Q€f is perhaps a less
complex concept. It is primarily limited to firing the
AOY10T1XOV'S struggle to survive efficiently in the world
against external aggressors. Yet at the same time it also
constantly fuels it in its necessary effort to maintain
internal harmony.
At the socio-political level, proper control by the state's
governing body, representing the logistic sector, ensures that
the military and producer classes cooperate efficiently without
intruding unduly on the total welfare. The logistic sector may
fail in its work. It may be guilty of inefficiency,
or of some other defect.
Plato into one quantity:
(All these variants are simplified by
ignorance.) If so, it either
neglects the thumoeidic drive altogether, in which case this
drive emerges in random forms, or it actually deliberately
turns it into indiscriminate channels. The result of both of
these alternatives is a chance mixture of just and unjust
actions, this time on a national scale. The more extreme the
errors of the logistic eleQent, and the stronger the thumo-
eidic, the wider the eeviations pro~uced. The situation will
veer from extreme justice to extreme injustice, from the most
sublime peace to the most brutalised war. The soldiery may
incline to justly conducted defence or offence ,
with the basest element of the society.
or to cooperation
i
At the ultimate stage of justice, we have total harmony and
balance. The good of all ;s th I• e so e consideration. At that
of injustice, we have tot I ha c aos, resulting in unprovoked,
wholesal.e aggression, random slaughter f· to :Lnnocen and guilty
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alike - in short, all the results of violent ignorance.
Cosmically, if the AOY1GT1KOV is defective, the universe
suffers major disorders. Comets appear, storms break out,
droughts and famine, the effects of random celestial
movements 2l9 , take place. Finally, in the transcendental world
of the Forms, the AOY1GT1KOV, if it could be conceived of there
as straying from ultimate perfection, would be unable to guide
its thumoeidic and appetitive elements with full intelligence.
It could not carry on perpetual harmonious maintenance of that
perfection. Only when ultimate Justice had been achieved,
would the harmony there be total.
For completeness' sake, an investigation should now briefly
be made, in the light of the dynamics of "rational striving",
into the virtues of the respective social classes (individuals
having already been dealt with). First we have GW~pOGUVn as
that of the 8aVaUGOl (epithumetic sector), ~voP£la of the
~UAaK£f (thumoeidic sector), GO~la of the ~PxoVT£f (logistic
sector). These operating in due proportion produce balance,
harmony, justice (olKaloauvn).
Second, there is an independent dynamic and dialectical
connexion between the epithumetic, thumoeidic, and erotic. It
is by operation of the latter that GO~la is sustained. And
throughout, the position predominantly taken in this thesis has
been that the Apollinian (logistic) sector has not so much
striven with, as guided, the Dionysiac (thumoeidic and
epithumetic). So,rather than the process represented by
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~pwJ, namely direction of the lower sectors by the higher in
the cause of the Good, it is the simple harmonious combination
" Jof the three sectors that has .been termed EpW • But clearly
there is more to the question than this. We have been
presented with a schema incorporating society as man-writ-
large. This latter quantity we find e~bodied for us
in the social unit, or state. We may now, exactly in the
manner set out by Socrates, take the opportunity of getting a
clearer view of that question.
In the social unit, the tradesmen (8avavaol) and soldiers
(~DAaKEJ) are the fundamental providers of the means of life
for the whole. Without food and defence, the unit cannot
exist. The question whether it can proceed in any direction
cannot even begin to be put. Granted their presence, however,
its existence is assured - and now the progress of the whole
can be considered, and that progress must be ordered. The
rulers must supervise the activities of the lower groups.
Matters must be organised in such a way that the whole state is
kept on a morally acceptable course. This moral acceptability
implies, moreover, by Socrates' entrenched doctrine, the
greatest profitability in every respect.
Here we have a picture in which the keynote is
cooperation. Supervision must indeed occur. But if the lower
sectors are sufficiently intelligent, they will acquiesce in
it. This ordering by an adequate intellectual sector of the
activities of its inferiors automatically brings about justice.
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c.44 But there is a second point of view. The
interrelationship of the various sectors may be somewhat
differently seen. The two lower sectors were, we took it, for
practical purposes almost devoid of logistic powers. Instead,
they were filled, in varying degree, with an irrational
energy. In the case of the epithumetic this was a lesser
energy, aimed at satiation of its crude lusts. In the case of
the thumoeidic it was a vastly more marked, driving force,
aimed at every possible kind of contest and contentiousness
(their justice or injustice unconsidered). The two together,
at any rate, constituted to that extent a power basically in
opposition to the logistic. The latter was there ostensibly to
guide them, but they had their own specific, limited desires,
and they aimed for them with a headstrong force which could
only be deflected from unjust routes by corresponding force, or
at least a powerful enough persuading factor to influence their
small logistic component.
There are two possible solutions to this problem. First,
the Apollinian Aoyal may be taken to be able to exert a
substantial diverting force on these lesser elements.
Alternately (which is more likely) it may possess some kind of
dynamic cunning adequate to persuade the relatively small
rational elements present in these Dionysiac energy-sources
that their interests lie in certain given directions. This
relationship would itself alnost seeR to constitute a contest. It
looks indeed more like a struggle, in a sense, than a mere
process of guidance. And so it is. Yet the two pictures are
quite consonant with each other.
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'€pwf must have this dual nature, since there can only be
successful '€pw! where the Apollinian Aoya! succeeds in its
effort to direct its Dionysiac counterpart. There can only be
'€pw! at all where effort takes place. The struggle may not
succeed. The fact that the Aoyaf should need to struggle at
all for success presupposes the possibility of failure. This
may be due to error, to its own weakness, or to the undue
strength of the other sectors. Furthermore, even if it does
succeed in its persuasion, its own powers may not have been
adequate to select the right direction for progress. Yet,
despite these various factors, the divine nature of €pw!
remains.
The necessity of a struggle at all towards the Good is
conspicuously obvious. Even if it fails - even if it is not
even directed towards the Good - this can only be so because
the logistic sector is not sufficiently gifted to recognise
certain essentials. It may not know what the Good is.
Alternately, it may not know how to reach it. It must desire
the Good, because no individual deliberately desires evil. But
it may be mistaken in what it conceives to be the Good. And
the whole divine nature of the phenomenon rests in the fact of
struggle. It is a struggle necessarily towards what the
individual or social unit, etc., thinks to be the Good, but a
struggle which might, after all, not even have taken place.
There might be only vacuum and stasis. Such a situation, we
found, could hardly be conceived of as divine. Instead,we have
the eternal mysteries of Dynamism and Form. These two can
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only be attributed to the Divinity.
c.45 TRANSCENDENTAL ASPECT.
It is a natural step from socio-political to transcendental
considerations. Accordingly we may now examine the Platonic
theory of Forms in relation to previous points with a fuller
view of what they entail. It would not be of much importance
whether the Forms were in Plato's estimation composed of air,
or of Anaxagorean vouJ, or of some other attenuated and unseen
substance. Given the type and degree of abstraction we find
them allotted in Plato's writings, they are a cornerstone of hiS
philosophy, and are closely bound up with the eU~O€lonJ
problem.
~,Substance, or UAn, was, as we have seen, everywhere - as
far as Greek philosophy was concerned. A vacuum was
impossible. In order to be maximally indestructible, the Forms
had therefore to be maximally attenuated ~An. Indestruct-
ibilityand eternity then conferred the ultimately supreme
Reality on them. The sole reality was therefore these unseen
Forms - but the existence of the Form of any particular thing
could only be apprehended through that of the solid version
available to the senses. We can therefore be certain that
Plato acknowledged the validity of that means of access to the
Forms. That he proposed to consider everything whatever in the
guise of a relatively 'unreal'version of a divine Form is,
however, hard to believe. In particular, that the ~U~O€lO€J _
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let alone the £TI18upnT1KoV - element might have had a
corresponding celestial 'Form' would seem a remote and
irrelevant object of speculation. We can perhaps imagine that
Plato contemplated a Form of the thumoeidic part of the soul,
another of the epithumetic, another of the logistic, all three
carrying on some kind of ideal, abstract interaction, although
this would involve an infinite regression. The soul parts (or cert-
ai nly the logistic), in the i r ';pur~" go i se, unencumbered by,wor Id ly -
evil~ were no doubt as !abstract as anything could be. To conceive of
the m ass ha r i n g s 0 me',yet m0 rea t tenuate d ex i s tenc e, with s 0 me fur the I
end in view than the attainment of what had already clearly
been attained - namely Justice - could be thought of as
straining the text. We need not therefore disturb ourselves on
this account. Plato takes a common-sense view of his
doctrines, and no doubt expects others to take the same view.
He may have illustrated his meaning by means of a common
household table, of which there was then a "form". But he
speaks of Forms seriously only in association with such things
as Truth, Goodness, Beauty. This probably in any case cancels
out any belief that he contemplated, for instance, a perpetual
series springing from the tripartite elements of the soul. An
infinite regression in the 'upward'220 (spiritual) direction is
as repugnant to our conception of Plato's intention as one
'downward'. The existence of further logistic, thumoeidic, and
epithumetic 'homunculi' within the logistic, thumoeidic, etc.,
sectors of the soul, and of others within those ad infinitum ,
cannot, we found,'be -a ,serious subject'ofspeculation.'Indeed"
,the sectors of the soul are with him, we can be sure, very
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probably the ultimate divisions.
The purpose of all existence was for the logistic element
in the soul first to achieve effective guidance of the
thumoeidic and epithumetic elements. Having done this, it
would, second, proceed to apprehension of the ultimate Forms.
Finally, having separated itself totally from the body, it
would achieve assimilation to the Forms themselves.
The soul, striving to apprehend the Good, and, by becoming
independent of earthly things, to become one with it, ensures
as fully as possible that, when its time comes to leave the
body, it will be able to merge totally with the Good. But it
is primarily the logistic element that achieves this merging.
The thumoeidic element has only provided the drive to achieve
it. The epithumetic in turn has supplied the nourishment for
that drive. These lower elements of the soul, when we look
closely at them, might scarcely seem to have a recognisable
place in the state of perfection. We can hardly imagine that
/
they belong there. We might hypothesise that when that state
is reached they simply fall away. Or possibly, they now take
on a duty of maintenance of the perfection attained. This
possibility could be worth following up.
Let us suppose that the thumoeidic and epithumetic (the
logistic has the ulti~ately plausible claim) elements night just
conceivably have a part to play as Forms. Plato will, after
all, scarcely have contemplated even perfection as a static
'Rational
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affair. The explanation of the fact that the Demiourgos had
created dynamism might have been a mystery, but there was no
question about the dynamism's presence and divinity.
striving' might, in a state of perfection, seem superfluous.
Yet it could, as we have said earlier, also have represented a
striving to maintain the existing state of perfection. The
realm of the transcendental, i.e. that type of being which was
beyond the cosmic, and in fact corresponded with - was - the
Absolute, could never be quite on the same plane as that of the
cosmic, social, etc. These last were moulded by the Demiourgos
from lesser material, and therefore could not belong with it.
Plato would never have ascribed to the Absolute, and the "World
Soul", the same character as he ascribed to these lesser
entities. There seems, however, some reason tosuppose\that he might
have conceived of the Absolute too as in'a sense a "dynamic" system.
On that account w~ can suppose that ideal Forms' of AOY10TUf.OV,',
eUj.lOE:uS€f and ~lTleUj.lnTUf.Ov' may; in his view, have carried on,' in the
realm of transcendent Forms, a process of "maintenance" of _that ,ulti-
mate being which characterises the Absolute itself ..This :activity
would then perhaps;' in some degree, .p~rallel the :cosmic, socio-
political;~nd anthropological strivings towards the existence enjoyed
by'the Forms: With them, it would thus iulfil the Principle of Ident-
ity ..But on the whole, the concept of Forms as motionless, perfect
Beings - indeed as Being itself - is paramount in Plato, and we must
accept their difference in this respect from the also perfect, but
"constantly moving" (cf. Phaedr. 245c), soul.
c.46 At the transcendentally perfect level, the three
elements would have achieved harmony. The AOY10T1~OV would be
exerting prope~ authority over its two inferior sectors (those
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which give it its impetus), the two latter being primarily the
, ,
eU~o£lc€f, secondarily the £TIleU~nT1KOV. With this hurdle
crossed, it would be able to progress unhindered. The process
it engaged in, instead of achievement of perfection, would now
be one of sustaining that perfection. The irrepressible energy
fountain of the eU~o£lc€f sector would be channelled with ideal
correctness to this end. Instead of inexorably thrusting the
whole off course into the imbalance and disharmony of
Injustice, it would now be directed in such a way that it
expended itself justly. In this way, it would further aid the
AOY10T1KQV to achieve ideal Being.
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d.l SYNOPSIS OF THE POSITION OF THE eU~OE10Ef ELEMENT IN
RELATION TO JUSTICE.
The eU~OE10Ef element has, according to the present thesis,
been assigned by Plato the position of driving force in the
individual human, social, cosmic, and transcendental unit. It
is the force, that is, on which the logistic primarily relies
for all those of its activities that are not exclusively
vegetative. As such, it must, we have found, necessarily be
the force responsible for both unjust as well as just
activity. A unit with a strong logistic but weak thumoeidic
element would accordingly, on the one hand, be able to avoid
injustice almost completely. On the other, however, it would
be incapable of any really significant acts of positive justice
either. By contrast, a strongly thumoeidic and weakly logistic
individual would be capable both of great benefits to the
whole, and of great crimes.
Because it is capable of promoting evil no less than good,
we would be safe in thinking of the thumoeidic element as
overall, morally, a neutral quantity. The fact that without it
there can be no significant positive action at all, whether
good or bad, militates for that designation. A medium in which
significant action cannot occur, even if it gives no potential
for eVil, can scarcely have positive moral meaning for us. The
potential for good must be there for any purpose - most of all
a divine one - to be intelligible in the system. This point is
-----.-ml~===~_........_---..,.----------------
IV - 329 -
a salient one in support of pressing the hypothesis that the
eU~OE1C€J is the critically imp?rtantagency in the production of
good and evil.
These considerations nonetheless leave it without the
strong claim to morally positive value that Plato so often
gives it. On the other hand they also divest it of the strong
morally negative value he gives it at other times. The simple
solution is, of course, that it has - and must duly be given -
different values at these different times. The cosmos, with
thumoeidic forces causing varyingly justice and injustice at
random, is capable of transformation, through addition of
and resultant successful rational striving of €pwJ, into a just
one. If this morally positive tendency in it is more
pronounced than the reverse, this does not mean that we have to
see TO eU~OE10€J in a more positive light. The cardinal force
responsible in ~pwJ for positive morality is the AOY10T1KOV.
Yet critically, once again, a cosmos with thumoeidic forces must hav,
the propensity for injustice as well as for justice. A world
without a thumoeidic could only be conceived of as an abode of
vegetable life; a world with it must have the alternatives of
good or evil. If man was created with his full dynamic pdwers
for any purpose - and Plato as much as anyone else without any
doubt believes this - it must have been for a purpose in
\
pursuit of which those powers could, and would have to, be
used. No medium from which such powers were absent could allow
the genuine "achievement" of that purpose.
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d.2 The purpose of all Being is, by the Platonic system,
to attain the Good beyond all other goods. For this reason,
the force which makes its purpose possible must, to that
extent, also be good in itself. This basic goodness places it
in a distinct category. It is the agency which makes the
creatures of the Demiourgos capable of becoming divine. Yet it
also permits them to become diabolical. Why does the
Demiourgos not provide each individual with a logistic element
powerful enough to see the right way to go? This is a question
that has been put, and not answered. The reason He does not is
an enigma. Certainly if He did, there would, as we have
concluded, be no real striving, no genuine effort to find the
truth with partially effective intellect, no place for error,
no choice between good and bad, and no acquisition of knowledge
by experience. In short, there would be stasis and nullity.
Instead, with imperfection, we see dynamism. The Demiourgos
must, it might accordingly well be believed, have planned
dynamism, the struggle which incorporates it, and the
complexity of the universe which gives added variety to that
struggle. Why He should have done so appears, of course, as
the final inscrutable question which man seldom pretends to
comprehend. Plato treats the problem in the only way it can be
treated - with silence or myth. It must for others, as it no
doubt does for him, remain sufficient that, as far as their
understanding takes them, the fact that the Demiourgos has
planned things in this way involves certain consequences. And
these, ill their turn, imply "duties" for humanity.
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d.3 We have found that if a strong AOylOL1HOV can
guarantee just behaviour where the eU~o£loEJ is extremely weak, this
guaranteed just behaviour is nevertheless so trivial as to be
negligible. The guarantee is worthless. By contrast, a strong
eU~O£loEJ can similarly generate a justice worthy of a strong
AOylOL1HOV. Likewise in turn, a strong eU~O£lOEf coupled with
a weak AOY10L1HOV can, reversely, be oaximally evil.
(It also can, coincidentally, be maximally good, but this -
since it is coincidental - means little.) The critical point
emerges, at all events, that in each case it is the eU~o£lo€f,
not the AOY10L1HOV, factor which has to be present for anything
significant to happen at all. It is in fine the eU~O£lOEf
which seems the more ultimately indispensable factor in the
divine plan. Certainly without it, neither of the other two -
logistic ~ epithumetic - can attain any palpable effect
whatever. The logistic in particular can never come near a
divine level of notability. Both need that extra thrust of
driving emotion, passion, even sometimes the anger of
indignation to propel them forward. If any
appreciable height of achievement is to be attained, they
cannot do without it. Without the thumoeidic thrust
no amount of AOylOL1HOV, much less ETIleU~nL1HOv, can ever push
man upward to full comprehension of, and association with, the
For ms •
Because that thrust can also lead to the grossest evil, the-
error in calling eU~O£lo€f at all uniformly 'spiritedness'
becomes manifest. Without it, man must stay impotently on the
ground, like any other animal. This has to be admitted. But
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the negative aspect cannot be lost sight of. Man can be helped
by his logistic element, and enabled by the limited energising
effects of his epithumetic portion, to outdo less intellect-
ually gifted creatures. But if he is not endowed with that
quantity of thumoeidic vigour, producing ~pwf, which can raise
him to a significant level of intellectual and spiritual
accomplishment, he cannot emulate the gods of crafts and
learning. He cannot approach closer to the supreme God. However,
should he have strong thumoeidic gifts ~aided by logistic, his
life can sink to levels of the utmost degradation. That,
too, must be interpreted as part of the divine dispensation.
The natural capacity for aggression and savage war is a proper
part of man. But the term 'spirited' is in no sense relevant here.
Where he harnesses his thumoeidic and epithumetic elements
correctly, then, justice results. This is defined as the
situation in which logistic, thumoeidic, and epithumetic
sectors work together harmoniously. For that justice to be
noteworthy, some aspect at least of the harmoniously
functioning sectors must also be great and noteworthy. And we
have found that, in essence, it is the thumoeidic sector that
has to be strong for there to be a chance that this will be
so. To repeat, however, if the logistic is weak there is no
chance whatever of real achievement either. ~pwf cannot
succeed if TO eU~O£lo€f is small, but if the logistic is not
there, it can be direly misdirected.
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d.4 The effect of a fuller interpretation of the thumoeidic
factor on Plato's Theory of Justice specifically is,
accordingly, to throw light on the attainment of significant,
and ultimately the highest, Justice (or Injustice). On the
balance, we might estimate that Socrates makes the eU~O€loEJ
appear to incline more to justice than to injustice. But this
depends on the way in which we happen to interpret that balance.
He also has, as we have seen, a very great deal to say in derogation
of eU~O€loEJ. As we saw, for the just
outcome of its operation to be guaranteed at all, it must in
any case be accompanied by a strong logistic element. Any
general estimates of its significance are therefore of no real
value. The leading feature of TO eU~O€lOEJ is not so much its
hypothetical tendency to goodness or badness. It is its
continuous "auto-generation" within the individual, and its
need for provision of a constant outlet if it is not to
accumulate to bursting point. The logistic sector must
constantly be present in sufficient strength to be able to
devise effective channels into which it, the thumoeidic force,
may be directed.
On the four "levels" we have man, the leaders of the
society he lives in, the logistic sector of the cosmos, and the
AOYlaT1KOV of the transcendental plenum. In all four the
AOYlaT1KOV must be sufficiently developed to guide the
thumoeidic element in such a way that it will produce that
"level's" own particular type of justice. Lack of intelligence
produces a mutual clash among logistic, thumoeidic, and
epithumetic units - briefly, injustice. It is precisely
because the eU~O€loEJ is a double-edged agent that it can, we
lrrl~Pl!!!!'l-_04 "'A==i=_~' - _
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may fairly hypothesise, most immediately of all three lead to
the decay and ultimate disappearance of the unit. It is
precisely because it is a neutral emotional quotient which one
can turn to good or evil, rather than a purely elevated
quantity such as the translations 'spirit' or 'spiritedness'
convey, that it has to be directed along the right route,
whether human, social, cosmic, or transcendental, by the
essentially "divine" logistic agency. It is, in a word, the
critical source both of Justice and Injustice. Only its
intelligent channelling will ensure the promotion of Justice,
with the corresponding disappearance of its opposite. And only
, "!through its proper guidance by AOYO! can the €PWT1KO process,





a • The first object of the thesis wa~ to ascertain what the
wbrd &u~OE\8~~ means, inparticul~r ~onnexioti.with.Justice. :The
context in whi~h its meaning was principal!y aought w~s that6f ~ts
usage in Plato',sReptiblic~' .Theiterm was examined with :speci.f.ic
reference to theeU~~E16~J element of the .soul in his tripartite
divisi()u of it, and the finding arrived at was that ,it-constitutes
overall a .morallyneutral,.cons!antly.accumulating energy-source.
b. The secone object, arisin~ fro~ this, was to make
clear the deduction that "spirited" is therefore an inadequate
overall rendering of the word. The reason for specially attempt-
ing to show this is that this rendering is still used almost
universally by scholars, as though adequate as a virtually uniform
equivalent of the term.
c. Third, and most important, it is postulated that Plato
deliberately hints at certain highly significant consequences
of TO &U~OE\o€f' nature as an irrepressible energy-source. That
is to say, he suggests that, owing to this characteristic (as
well as its general nature as explored earlier in the thesis),
TO &U~OE10€J represents a permanent potential for justice or
injustice irrespective. To give an analogy, it builds up, as it
were, an excess "energy-pressure", which must he periodically
released in suitable quantities if "explosion", and/or total
exhaustion, is not to occur. In the human context, this appears
as the truism that man's surplus energy can be prevented from
causing harm only by systematic channelling. But the fact that
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the energy-accumulation is constant and irrepressible is central,
and, again critically, the channelling must be supervised by
intellectually capable authorities. In the third place, it is
noted that the most common eventuality is total and disastrous
neglect to channel it at all.
d. To place it in its proper perspective, when seen to-
,... J
gether with other vitally important quantities such as €pW ,
~p€Tn, TO &ya~6v, etc., the background of TO ~U~O€lO€J in myth
and early philosophy and theology is examined. Then a detailed
analysis of its meaning is atteopted by means of close study of
all instances of it occurring in the Republic. Where this has
seemed useful, other dialogues are also consulted. The minute-
ness of this investieation has been thought justifiable on
more than statistical grounds.
e. A more general assessment follows, in which the appli-
cation of these detailed findings to basic Platonic terms is dis-
cussed. Their bearing on the specific issues chosen for invest-
igation is also examined. The conclusion is arrived at that the
term eU~O€lO€J should therefore not virtually uniformly be rendered
'spiritedness', 'spirited elel'lent', 'spirit', etc., but also,
where relevant, as 'high~' or 'hot-' 'tenper', and regularly
'anger-element'. It is indeed defined by Plato as that sector of
the soul by which ~U~Ou~€~a ('we are angry') (Rep. 436 a), and
this definition must be regarded as decisively significant ;in .anY
i
assessment of the -.;yord. The "anger"-ingredient ;must be considered
whether TO:i~U~OE10€fis thought oLas 'anger' .simplex, as the morall
m0 r e ne u t r a 1 conc e pto f ': d r i v i n gem0 t ion'" , " indig n a t ion", e t c .; 0 r a
-.. ..~.'.:.
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any other manifestation on the emotion-spectrum. "Spiritedness",
at all events, applies only at the morally "higher" pole - which
is moderately rare. Nowhere else.
f. In this more balanced guise, ~U~O€loEJ can more easily
be seen for what it is. It is nothing less than the cardinal
source of Platonic dynamism - leading to ~pwJ, but equally also
to all just and unjust activity. Properly channelled, it appears
as the driving force with which the AOYlOTlKOV, at all levels,
combines to constitute that EPW!. The composite whole of ~pw! can
then itself go forward (with the subordinate aid of the ~TIl~U~­
nTlKOV), to the attainnent of the perfect Forms. The ultimate
state of Harmony (= Justice) consequent on that progress of
perfect ~pw! has therefore, by its now perfected functioning, led
to the realisation of what to Plato is the aim of all existence -
apperception of the Forms themselves.
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